"In Common Struggle against a Common Oppression": The United Farm Workers and the Black Panther Party, 1968-1973
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Lauren Araiza

The Safeway grocery store at 27th and West Streets in Oakland, California, was closed. The parking lot was devoid of cars, except for that of the manager who probably marveled at the turn of events. Robert Magowan, CEO of Safeway Stores, Inc., had been given fair warning. Cesar Chavez, president of the United Farm Workers Organizing Committee (UFW), wrote Magowan in February 1969, “Blacks, Filipinos, and members of all minorities will express their solidarity against all oppression by joining their neighbors in supermarkets other than Safeway.” And yet Magowan ignored Chavez’s warning, or maybe he just didn’t believe that the UFW, with little funds and less political power, could defeat a behemoth like Safeway. But what the UFW lacked in money or might, the union made up for with supporters who were ready to lend their assistance to the farm workers at a moment’s notice. Indeed, Magowan’s tragic mistake was that he had not figured on the involvement of the Black Panther Party (BPP), the UFW’s strongest ally in Oakland. And now just four months after Chavez’s warning, the picket lines—composed of farm workers, UFW organizers, Black Panthers, children, and members of the community—had succeeded in closing the Safeway store for the foreseeable future.1

In opposing both the UFW and the BPP, Safeway unwittingly brought together two groups that, in the popular American imagination, appear to be unlikely allies. After all, the Black Panther Party was African American, militant, urban, and socialist and therefore differed in nearly every way from the largely Mexican American, nonviolent, rural, and Catholic UFW. But despite their differences, Cesar Chavez and the UFW welcomed the support of the BPP and its leaders, and supported them in turn, beginning in 1968. Over the years, the two organizations came together because they saw each other as commonly oppressed victims of the capitalist ruling class. It was this willingness and ability to find class-based commonalities across racial lines that enabled the UFW and the BPP to form a successful, mutually beneficial alliance.

In the past, scholars of both the UFW and the BPP have overlooked this alliance. While recent scholarship on the Black Panthers in particular has expanded

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and complicated our understanding of their aims, tactics, programs, membership, and coalition-building, for the most part the focus has been on the relations with radical organizations. For example, in his essay “Rainbow Radicalism: The Rise of the Radical Ethnic Nationalism,” Jeffrey O. G. Ogbar examined the linkages between the Panthers and the Brown Berets, the Chicano nationalist organization. Of the recent scholarship on the party’s coalitions, only Laura Pulido in her larger study of radical ethnic nationalism in Los Angeles mentioned, but provided no details on, the relationship between the BPP and the UFW. The literature on Cesar Chavez and the UFW has been dominated by journalistic accounts directed at a popular audience. Scholarly studies of the UFW have focused on Chavez’s rhetoric, leadership style, and use of nonviolence. While the scholarship on the UFW has continued to develop and expand, the union’s relationship to the Black Panthers and other African American organizations has escaped thorough analysis.2

“BITTER DOG”:
THE MAKING OF RACIAL AND LABOR SOLIDARITY

Shortly after the party’s founding, the Black Panthers were attracted to the cause of the United Farm Workers. Founded in Oakland, California, in October 1966, Bobby Seale and Huey P. Newton organized the group in an effort to confront the rampant police brutality in that city, and soon afterward expanded its aims to include issues of poverty, employment, education, housing, and legal rights. While the BPP’s “Ten-Point Program” demanded the right “to determine the destiny of our Black Community,” and “an end to the robbery by the capitalists of our Black Community,” the party from its inception addressed these issues on behalf of all oppressed groups, not just African Americans, and advocated multi-racial solidarity. This stemmed from the BPP’s underlying socialist ideology which emphasized class as well as racial issues. In his 1970 memoir and manifesto, Seize the Time: The Story of the Black Panther Party and Huey P. Newton, Bobby Seale declared, “In our view [there] is a class struggle between the massive proletarian working class and the small, minority ruling class. Working-class people of all colors must unite against the exploitative, oppressive ruling class. . . . We believe our fight is a class struggle and not a race struggle.” Therefore, the Panthers formed alliances with progressive and militant organizations regardless of racial or ethnic background, including the Young Lords, the Puerto Rican nationalist organization; the Young Patriots, a group of young white migrants from Appalachia and based in Chicago; and the Red Guard, a radical Chinese organization in San Francisco’s Chinatown. The Panthers formed these multiracial coalitions because they recognized early on that they could not combat the capitalist power structure on their own and the camaraderie and coalitions across racial lines were imperative for obtaining social justice and economic equality. Seale explained, “Racism and
ethnic differences allow the power structure to exploit the masses of workers in this country, because that’s the key by which they maintain their control.”3

The UFW, with its ties to the Democratic Party, was hardly socialist. Its leaders had participated in “Viva Kennedy Clubs,” which were formed to rally Latino support for Massachusetts Senator John F. Kennedy during the 1960 presidential election; and in 1968 New York Senator Robert F. Kennedy was at Cesar Chavez’s side when he broke his fast ending his month-long protest against California lettuce growers. However, similar to Seale and the BPP, Chavez and the UFW saw the wisdom in bridging racial divides to form alliances. Cesar Chavez founded the National Farm Workers Association, later changed to the United Farm Workers, in 1962 to organize California’s primarily Mexican American farm workers to combat low wages, unfair hiring practices, and dangerous working conditions. From the first strike against grape growers in Delano, California, in 1965, Chavez sought assistance from the farm workers’ diverse allies, including civil rights activists, organized labor, and progressive clergy. By the time of the BPP’s founding in 1966, this strategy had proved to be successful and had resulted in important victories for the union.4

After engaging in a series of successful labor negotiations with several grape growers in Delano, California, the UFW focused its efforts in 1967 on one of the largest companies in the region—Giumarra Vineyard Corporation, which had refused to negotiate with the union. In August 1967 Giumarra’s workers went on strike and the UFW launched a boycott of Giumarra grapes. Initially, the boycott was less successful than the UFW’s earlier actions because it was difficult for consumers to discern the brands of table grapes targeted. This was compounded by the fact that labels from seventy other growers were affixed to Giumarra’s crates and sold nationwide. In response, the UFW launched in 1968 a nationwide boycott of all California table grapes, regardless of the brand name of the grower. Farm workers were promptly dispatched to major cities across the country to coordinate the campaign.5

As soon as the grape boycott went national, it attracted the attention and support of the BPP. In October 1968 the first article on the grape boycott appeared in the Black Panther, the party’s weekly newspaper, distributed nationally and internationally. The party leadership viewed its newspaper as an educational tool essential to raising the political consciousness of the African American community, and informing its supporters of its ongoing activities locally and nationally. The party leaders explained, “The consistent reporting of all news and information relevant to the interests of Black people, workers, oppressed peoples, youth and the aged provides readers with a built-in interpretation of the news that is in their interests and consequently raises their understanding of the nature and condition of our society.” Therefore, the BPP sought to not only inform, but to educate its African American readers and others about the issues that confronted farm workers
in California and the political and economic connections between the workers’ exploitation and groups victimized by labor and racial oppression. After the publication of the first article on the UFW, the Black Panther kept its readers informed about the progress of the boycott with regular updates.6

The leadership group for the BPP, the Central Committee, spearheaded the organization’s support for the UFW, and one of its first actions was to ban the consumption of “Bitter Dog,” the official drink of the Black Panther Party. Bitter Dog was made by pouring filtered lemon juice into Italian Swiss Colony red wine and refrigerating it. Bitter Dog became the favorite drink of Bobby Hutton, one of the first party members. After Hutton was gunned down by Oakland police in April 1968, Panthers nationwide drank Bitter Dog to honor his memory. In late 1968, however, the Central Committee announced that Panthers were no longer to drink Bitter Dog “out of solidarity with the farm workers.” BPP Minister of Information Eldridge Cleaver, in a speech at the Berkeley Community Center in December 1968, explained that the ban on Bitter Dog was in support of “our brothers,” the striking farm workers. In referring to Mexican Americans as the Panthers’ “brothers,” Cleaver expressed the party’s position that “to be progressive was to be beyond nationalism.”7

The emerging coalition between the Panthers and the UFW was strengthened when the union decided to organize a secondary boycott of the Safeway grocery stores in early 1969. Although the grape boycott had attracted considerable attention nationwide, its effectiveness remained limited. Therefore, UFW organizer Fred Ross decided that the union should also conduct a secondary boycott of the Safeway grocery store chain, which was the largest buyer of California grapes after the U.S. Department of Defense. In addition, most of Safeway’s directors also served as the CEOs of large agribusiness corporations. UFW leaders also believed that a boycott of Safeway would serve to galvanize and draw minority and progressive groups to their cause.8

The BPP immediately announced its support of the UFW’s boycott of Safeway stores. At the same time, party leaders had their own reasons for supporting the campaign against Safeway. In announcing the boycott in the Black Panther newspaper, the leadership emphasized that Safeway officials had consistently refused to authorize food donations to the Panthers’ Free Breakfast for Children Program. Developed by Bobby Seale and others in October 1968, the Free Breakfast for Children Program was a way to combat academic underachievement among poor, hungry children. It was launched at St. Augustine’s Episcopal Church in Oakland in January 1969. The program, which eventually provided a hot, nutritious breakfast to 20,000 school-aged children in nineteen cities, depended on the donations of local stores and businesses. Store owners and managers were asked to donate food or money to support the children’s breakfast program. The Black
Panther newspaper listed the names of the stores whose owners refused to make donations, and readers were urged to boycott those businesses, while party members sometimes put pressure on store owners through tactics of harassment and intimidation. Many storeowners decided it was “good for business” to donate food and money to the Free Breakfast for Children Program, but Safeway owners and managers still refused. As the largest grocery store chain in the West, and the second largest in the country, Safeway was not as vulnerable to pressure from the Panthers as small neighborhood stores. When Panther leaders found that with the UFW they had a common enemy in Safeway, the Black Panther Party became one of the most vocal supporters of the UFW boycott. The Black Panther carried regular reminders to its readers to support the farm workers. “The Black Panther Party urges all consumers to support the farm workers’ boycott and to do everything possible to bring victory to them in their struggle for survival here in fascist America.” But the Panthers supported the UFW with their words and their bodies, and when UFW organizers planned to picket a Safeway or to hold a press conference to make important announcements, they would call the local Panther office. The “officer of the day,” who oversaw activity at the party office, would then dispatch as many Panther members as requested to assist the farm workers.9

The Black Panther Party’s boycott of Safeway stores was a tremendous contribution to the UFW’s boycott efforts. When the Panthers set up pickets at Safeway stores, they were an intimidating sight with their black leather jackets, berets, and dark glasses. UFW organizer Gilbert Padilla recalled that when he organized the grape boycott in the Los Angeles area, Panthers on the picket line acted as a restraint on police harassment because the Panthers “scared the hell out of them.” More importantly, the party’s boycott of Safeway was well organized and innovative. Bobby Seale, like many other Panthers, had served in the military, and drawing on his experience in the U.S. Air Force, Seale created a “motor pool” for party use that was employed in the Safeway boycott. In the evenings when people went shopping for groceries, party members would not only explain to them why they should be boycotting Safeway, but they also provided transportation to the Lucky’s grocery stores, which had donated to the Free Breakfast for Children Program and had agreed not to sell California grapes. Seale explained,

In the evening we’d get the kids who lived in the community to come get in the picket line and when people would come and walk into the store, we’d say, “Lucky’s supermarket donates to the Black Panther Party Free Breakfast for Children Program. And therefore we would like you to go to Lucky stores to do your shopping. . . . We have cars here. We will drive you to the Lucky store and drive you home.”

By using the motor pool to aid in the UFW-BPP boycott, the Safeway store located at 27th and West Streets in Oakland was soon forced to close.10

The Panthers’ support for the UFW was not limited to their activities in
California. When Gilbert Padilla conducted boycott activities in Philadelphia, the Panthers there “had an open door for us.” In fact, Padilla believed the party was supportive of the UFW nationally. “I [sought] them [out] whenever I went somewhere. I looked for them.” Another UFW organizer, Eliseo Medina, worked with Fred Hampton and the Panthers in Chicago. The party’s widespread support for the UFW was reciprocated when Panthers were victimized by a series of beatings, murders, and raids by law enforcement officers. In the mid-1960s the FBI had unleashed COINTELPRO, the counterintelligence program aimed at destroying African American civil rights and progressive leaders and organizations. As a part of COINTELPRO, FBI agents infiltrated the party, many Panthers were murdered, and even more were imprisoned. Following the murders of Fred Hampton and Mark Clark in their apartment in a pre-dawn attack by Chicago police on 4 December 1969, and the violent raids on Panther offices in Los Angeles a few days later, the UFW took decisive steps to help defend party members against these attacks, while still utilizing nonviolent tactics. Two weeks after the murders of Hampton and Clark, the UFW began serious discussions with the Panthers on how union members could be of service. A UFW spokesman explained, “We felt it was not just enough to pass a resolution saying that what happened in Chicago and Los Angeles was not right. We discussed ways and means of making our bodies available to place between the police and Panthers.”

THE FARM WORKERS IN DEFENSE OF THE PANTHERS

UFW boycott committees in the Pacific Northwest were particularly willing to come to the defense of the BPP chapters in those regions where they had developed close and productive relationships. In Portland, Oregon, in January 1970, the local UFW boycott committee announced, “The United Farm Workers four weeks ago voted unanimously to support the Black Panther Party in an effort to stop the killing and jailing of Panther members.” In Seattle, Washington, on 28 February 1970, UFW members participated in a rally in defense of the Panthers after it was revealed that the Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Division of the U.S. Treasury Department asked Seattle Mayor Wes Uhlman for permission to raid the Panther office. Uhlman, however, vetoed the raid. A massive rally was held to demonstrate support for the Panthers and their programs which in Seattle included a medical clinic, a food bank, and a Free Breakfast for Children Program. In its defense of the Panthers, UFW leaders consistently expressed their belief in the shared nature of the state repression. A UFW representative at the rally declared, “We will not sit in silence while the enormous fire power of government is used in an attempt to annihilate a group of Black People who have felt the same sting of racism, job discrimination, and exclusion that we have felt.”

UFW’s support of the Black Panther Party caused no small amount of
disagreement, both inside and outside of the union. Some farm workers did not agree with the union's declarations of solidarity because the militant black group did not follow the philosophy of nonviolence. This same argument was made by other unions that refused to openly support the Panthers. For example, a representative of the International Woodworkers of America local in Klamath Falls, Oregon, wrote to Cesar Chavez requesting that he clarify the UFW's position on the Panthers. In explaining the UFW's position, Chavez reasserted the solidarity between the UFW and the BPP and responded, "We may not agree with the philosophy of the Black Panther Party, but they are our brothers, and non-violence extends to standing up for [whoever] is being persecuted."13

Despite the UFW's support for the BPP, the persecution of the Panthers hampered their attempts to assist the UFW. In 1970 the farm workers were finally victorious and obtained contracts with twenty-seven California grape growers, including the Giumarra Vineyards. Soon after this momentous and hard-won victory, the UFW targeted California's growers of iceberg lettuce. From 1968 farm workers openly sought UFW representation and expressed a desire to go on strike for higher wages. Rather than attempt to negotiate with the UFW, lettuce growers signed "sweetheart contracts" with the notoriously corrupt West Coast Conference of Teamsters that falsely claimed to represent the farm workers and endorsed the existing wage schedules and working conditions. In response to the underhanded maneuvers, the UFW launched a boycott of iceberg lettuce, beginning in September
1970. Lettuce grower Bud Antle, Inc. obtained a legal injunction against the boycott, which the UFW appealed arguing that this was a matter of “free speech.” The court, however, sided with the growers in October, and Chavez was arrested and jailed for contempt of court in December 1970 for failing to end boycott activities.\(^\text{14}\)

Although the Panthers had participated in the UFW grape boycott, they were not initially involved in the lettuce protest, even after Chavez was imprisoned, mainly because COINTELPRO and police attacks were causing serious, expensive, and time-consuming legal problems for the Black Panther Party. Throughout 1969, Panthers across the country were being arrested regularly on charges ranging from disorderly conduct to murder as part of the FBI and police attempts to “neutralize” the party. The arrests culminated in August 1969 with the arrests of party leaders Bobby Seale and Ericka Huggins for the kidnapping and murder of Alex Rackley, a Panther in New Haven, Connecticut, who was suspected of being an undercover agent. Following Cesar Chavez’s imprisonment, Panther leaders were unable to rally members to Chavez’s defense because their primary attention, fundraising, and mobilizing were focused on the Seale and Huggins trial, which lasted over six months (it took almost four months to select the twelve-member jury from a field of 1,500 potential jurors). On 25 May 1971 and after they spent almost two years in jail, the charges against Seale and Huggins were dropped.\(^\text{15}\)

In the period immediately following the release of Seale and Huggins, the Panthers were still unable to provide significant support to Chavez and the UFW because following the release of party co-founder and Minister of Defense Huey P. Newton from prison in 1969, ideological differences developed between Newton and Minister of Information Eldridge Cleaver, even though Cleaver decided to flee to Cuba in November 1969 when his parole was revoked and he was ordered to return to prison. The disagreements between Newton and Cleaver over party strategy and tactics escalated until 26 February 1971 when the conflict came to a head during a morning television news show in San Francisco. During the live broadcast, with Cleaver participating by telephone from exile in Algeria, Newton expelled Cleaver from the party. A few days later, Cleaver expelled Newton from the party. This insurmountable rift, known as “The Split,” divided the Panthers into Newton and Cleaver factions. The Split, combined with the relentless attacks on party members by law enforcement officers, resulted in a substantial decrease in Panther activity. Given the internal turmoil, it became virtually impossible for the Panthers in northern California to assist the farm workers in their protests.\(^\text{16}\)

By the early months of 1972, however, Huey Newton and Bobby Seale had regained control of the BPP, at least in California, and set about changing the group’s direction. Years of battles with law enforcement agencies, which led to the deaths, beatings, and imprisonment of scores of Panthers, served as one of the justifications for the shift from “revolutionary confrontation” to a more reformist
agenda. After a period of introspection, Seale and Newton decided that the party would make its community service programs priorities over militant self-defense and confrontation with police forces. Newton called these services “survival programs . . . pending revolution. . . . They were designed to help the people survive until their consciousness is raised, which is only the first step in the revolution to produce a new America.” The survival programs, including free busing to prisons, escorts for seniors, home maintenance, grocery and clothing give-aways, and the Children’s Free Breakfast Program, were enormously successful and endeared the Panthers to Oakland’s African American community. The BPP had always intended the survival programs as “a means of organizing . . . the black community,” but by 1972 the most popular program, the free breakfasts for children, had been adopted by churches, parent-teacher associations, and local governments across the country. This demonstrated to the Panthers that their programs could be used to organize people on a much larger scale and could also be successfully incorporated into the existing social and political structures. Panther Bill Jennings explained, “Our concept was we can’t change the world, we can’t change every state, but if we can use Oakland as an example of how to go about garnering political power then people everywhere could see it, just like the breakfast program.” Therefore, the decision was made in May 1972 that Bobby Seale would run for mayor of Oakland; it was later decided that Panther leader Elaine Brown would run for Oakland City Council.17

CAMPAIGN AGAINST PROPOSITION 22

The Black Panther Party’s foray into electoral politics coincided with the battle between the UFW and California lettuce growers moving from the fields to the polls. No longer content to enlist the aid of strikebreakers to undercut the lettuce boycott by farm workers, the growers turned to more sophisticated measures to try to undermine the UFW’s expanding power and influence. In July 1972 the California produce growers and their political allies sponsored the “Agricultural Labor Relations Initiative,” known as Proposition 22, in an attempt to completely eliminate the UFW by curtailing workers’ rights to organize and bargain collectively. Under Proposition 22, “secondary boycotts” such as the ones the UFW conducted against Safeway grocery stores during the grape boycott would be illegal, as would “publicity directed against any trademark, trade name of generic (species) nature of agricultural product.” Under the terms of this proposition, “For anyone [including the striking union workers] to say ‘Boycott lettuce’ would be a crime, punishable by fine and imprisonment, even if the statement were made outside California.” Growers could be granted injunctions automatically when a strike or boycott, real or threatened, was made against the state’s agricultural products. Finally, restrictions were to be placed on who could participate in elections for
union representation to only those workers who were employed by one grower for one hundred days a year. The measure also disqualified farm workers who had voted on another farm or ranch in the area during the same year. If implemented, these provisions would have likely eliminated up to 75 percent of Mexican American farm workers from participation in union elections.18

The growers used every tactic at their disposal to pass Proposition 22, both legal and illegal. Growers and their supporters spent an estimated $700,000 in their effort to gain support for the proposition, while the UFW spent only $150,000 “mostly on food, transportation, and lodging for hundreds of farm workers who traveled around the state making personal contacts with the voters.” Even though days before the election, sixteen people were arrested and charged with fraud for forging signatures on petitions on behalf of Proposition 22, the money and political influence of the growers extended to agencies within the California state government. In the days after the fraud arrests, it was revealed that “[t]he State Agriculture Department’s official statement in support of Proposition 22 actually was written by a public relations firm hired to promote the controversial initiative.”19

Bobby Seale and Elaine Brown’s electoral bids overlapped with the UFW’s campaign against Proposition 22, and once again the Black Panther leadership allied the party with the farm workers. The 23 September 1972 issue of the Black Panther newspaper devoted several pages to the farm workers’ plight and urged its readers to vote against Proposition 22. The party’s renewed support for the farm workers stemmed from the Panther leaders’ firm belief in class-based, interracial solidarity and cooperation. Despite the ideological changes within the party, the remaining leaders still understood that UFW members and the vast majority of black workers were victimized by the same corporate capitalist institutions and structures. In their support of the UFW, the Black Panther newspaper editorialized, “We, Black people, join with the Spanish-speaking people in common struggle against a common oppression. We know, far too well, the plight of the landless and the disposessed.”20

As the November 1972 election approached, the Black Panther Party increased its assistance to the UFW in its fight against Proposition 22. In order to publicize the issues surrounding the measure, farm workers dispersed to cities all over California and went door to door to explain their plight to voters. Because the Panthers had been essential to the UFW’s boycott of Safeway grocery stores, Cesar Chavez recognized that their assistance would be critical to effectively reach African American voters in Oakland. At Chavez’s request, BPP members campaigned against Proposition 22 in the black community and helped get voters to the polls. The Panthers arranged for UFW members campaigning in Oakland to stay at Mills College, a local women’s college. On 5 November 1972 Chavez visited the BPP Central Headquarters in East Oakland. That evening, Panthers Elaine
Brown and Ericka Huggins spoke to the farm workers who were working the precincts in Oakland. Once again, Brown voiced the spirit of camaraderie and solidarity that the Panthers felt with the UFW: “Without each other, there will be no overcoming, there will be no power to the people, there will be no winning our own cause. This is our case, together. Proposition 22 is a part of our struggle.”

Through the strong campaigning by the farm workers and support from their allies, including the Black Panther Party, Proposition 22 was soundly defeated with 58 percent of the vote. However, the victory over Proposition 22 did not end the alliance between the UFW and the BPP. Rather, each group learned lessons from the campaign that strengthened each other in their relationship. When the party included the fight against Proposition 22 in its own venture into electoral politics, the UFW and the BPP explicitly united their causes, broadened their political bases, and increased their power. In defeating Proposition 22, both groups had decisive evidence that their alliance could produce tangible—and significant—results. But the corrupt methods of the opposition also taught them that their opponents were strong, influential, and committed. In fact, immediately after the election the growers made it clear they intended to continue their campaign to destroy the UFW and “promised to try again not only in California, but across the country.” Therefore, it was imperative that the UFW and the BPP maintain their alliance in the face of their common foes. Building on the momentum from the battle against Proposition 22, the UFW and the BPP continued to work together and enjoyed their closest relationship during Bobby Seale’s mayoral campaign.

BOBBY SEALE FOR MAYOR

From the beginning of Bobby Seale’s campaign to become mayor of Oakland, California, he and the members of the Black Panther Party set out to demonstrate that Seale’s political program was not solely concerned with African American issues, and that he was intent on addressing the concerns of Mexican Americans as well. This was the product of party ideology, political strategy, and experience. From its founding, the BPP had emphasized multiracial cooperation and that the working-class struggle against capitalist exploitation would bridge racial differences. At the same time, party leaders knew that African Americans and Mexican Americans were the fastest growing groups in Oakland in 1972, and thus had the power to determine the outcome of elections if they were registered and voted. According to the 1970 census, Oakland’s population was 34.5 percent African American and 7.6 percent Hispanic. Seale’s campaign correctly recognized that if the two groups worked together, they would form a significant voting bloc in the city. The Panther leaders also understood that productive coalitions would be essential to successfully governing Oakland once in political office. As Panther
leader Elbert “Big Man” Howard explained, “We probably got into a coalition of political power that could really make some significant changes along those levels. Not necessarily radical changes, but positive changes because we, the Party, couldn’t run the city all on its own. We would have to work with that broad cross-section.” Therefore, Seale’s campaign, headed by Bill Jennings, implemented a series of actions designed to appeal to Oakland’s Mexican American community. Seale and party members made a concerted effort to strengthen their ties to Oakland’s Mexican American community in meaningful ways. Because the vast majority of Mexican Americans in Oakland spoke Spanish in the home and were born either in Mexico or in the United States to Mexican-born parents, campaign fliers were printed in both English and Spanish. Meetings with the BPP candidates were held in Mexican American churches and community centers in Oakland where Mexican Americans presented their needs and concerns to Seale and his staff. At the behest of activists in the city’s Chicano community, Seale called for Oakland to become the first city in California to provide ballots and electoral information in Spanish. In an open letter to the mayor and city council, he pointed out that failure to do so was not only “insulting” to Spanish speakers, but “injurious to good government.” Seale also appealed to the current of nationalist sentiment in the Mexican American community by pointing out that Mexicans were the first settlers in California and therefore, “the Spanish language is, in a very real sense, the native language of California.” Indeed, the BPP readily understood the importance of learning Spanish and thus offered Spanish language classes in its Oakland Community School, the party’s acclaimed elementary school.

Two weeks after the open letter was circulated, Seale and Chicano community organizers Mary Thomas and Antonio Rodarte presented the issue before the Oakland City Council, resulting in the council’s endorsement of their proposition. While the proposal was being further evaluated by the council’s Civic Action Committee, the BPP urged African Americans to support the use of bilingual ballots. In doing so, the party educated the African American and Mexican American communities on the connections between their struggles and reinforced the importance of multiracial unity. An article in the Black Panther declared,

The Black Panther Party calls on the Black community to support the Chicano community’s drive to make Spanish, a language spoken on California soil long before English, and the language from which many of Oakland’s street and place names have been drawn, into the second language to be included on election ballots. We believe that the English-only ballot is discriminatory towards Spanish-speaking people, just as the poll tax and grandfather clause in the Jim Crow South were discriminatory towards Black people.

By supporting the call for bilingual ballots and election materials during the 1973 election, the Black Panther Party predated by two years the coalition that developed
when the NAACP supported the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF) in its successful bid to add language provisions in 1975 to the extension of the 1965 Voting Rights Act.25

Seale’s call for bilingual ballots and election materials was only one aspect of his platform that appealed to Oakland’s Mexican American community. In fact, nearly every part of Seale’s political program contained elements of particular interest to Mexican Americans. In the area of employment, Seale planned to force the Port of Oakland to hire “Black and Spanish speaking people proportionate to their unemployed status in the city.” Seale also called for the increased hiring of Latinos in police departments, fire departments, and other public agencies. In the area of public education, Seale’s platform called for the hiring of Spanish-speaking teachers and teaching assistants and the implementation of bilingual education. Of particular interest to the UFW, Seale called for the opening of childcare centers for migrant workers, in addition to expanded preschools.26

At the same time that the BPP reached out to Oakland’s Mexican American community, it sought to enhance its relationship with the UFW. The Black Panther newspaper continued to publish updates on the union’s struggles and called for support from the African American community, but in January 1973 the party leadership began to pursue a more direct relationship with the UFW’s leaders, especially Cesar Chavez. Many Panthers not only admired Chavez, but party leaders also understood that if he endorsed Seale’s candidacy, it would attract more Mexican American voters to their campaign. Indeed, Chavez’s endorsement would be important in rallying Mexican American support for Seale because Chavez in effect validated Seale’s political objectives.27

While Panther leaders sought to strengthen their relationship with Chavez, he was simultaneously reaching out to them. The BPP had been indispensable in the UFW’s battle against Proposition 22 and he thus wanted to sustain the alliance that had been built. In early January 1973 Chavez and Seale began calling and corresponding with each other in an attempt to arrange a personal meeting. That March, Seale and “Big Man” Howard traveled to the UFW headquarters in La Paz to meet with Chavez and seek his endorsement, thereby breaking Seale’s earlier pledge that he would not actively seek endorsements. After dinner with Chavez and farm workers in the union hall, Chavez agreed to support Seale’s campaign, largely because of the party’s previous support for the UFW.28

Chavez and the UFW announced their endorsement of Seale’s campaign in a press release on 29 March 1973. “We laud Bobby Seale’s approach to gaining political power for his people and all poor people in the city of Oakland. . . . We support their efforts and urge all registered voters of Oakland to support them on April 17.” From that time, Seale’s mayoral campaign was explicitly tied to the
struggles of the UFW. For example, the bags of groceries that the Panthers distributed to the community included UFW literature and buttons, which were proudly worn by African Americans in Oakland. A few days after the UFW’s endorsement of Seale, it was announced that two days before the election, Chavez would deliver a sermon at St. Louis Bertrand Church, a Spanish-speaking Catholic parish in Oakland, on behalf of Seale’s campaign, followed by a reception to raise funds for the UFW.29

Unfortunately, the mayoral election came at a critical juncture in the UFW’s history. On the day Chavez was scheduled to speak in Oakland, he was forced to cancel because the leaders of the Western Conference of Teamsters announced that they had signed contracts with 85 percent of the grape growers in the Coachella Valley. This was done without consulting any of the farm workers whom the Teamsters claimed to represent. In response, over a thousand farm workers staged a rally where they voted not only to launch a strike against the offending growers, but also to renew the nationwide boycott of California table grapes. In a telegram to the Panther office, Chavez confirmed the unity between Seale and the UFW, and declared, “We are present in spirit, for we are part of the same struggle for justice and dignity which these candidates represent.”30

The UFW’s declaration of a new strike and grape boycott served to intensify the alliance between the union and the Black Panther Party. Seale’s campaign still held its planned rally at St. Louis Bertrand Church, and support for the UFW’s efforts was forcefully expressed by Panther candidate Elaine Brown who read a telegram she and Seale sent to Chavez:

Though you could not be here with us today, we wish to express to you, Cesar Chavez, to the entire membership of the United Farmworkers Organizing Committee, and to the countless men, women, and children whose lives are currently and callously being parlayed for profits by deceitful growers and opposition unions, our complete and open solidarity and support with your efforts to secure the basic human rights for the farmworkers of this country.

Seale gave a stirring speech in which he described his personal reasons for supporting the UFW. The battle of the farm workers hit close to home for Seale, whose father supplemented his income as a carpenter with work as a farm labor contractor. When Seale was 14 years old, his father bought a surplus Army bus to transport farm workers to the fields surrounding the Bay Area. Seale, his brother John, his sister Betty, and other black youths often picked fruit along with the other farm workers and “got to know a lot of young Mexican American people who were also in the fields trying to make a living.” The elder Seale charged the growers one dollar per worker that he brought to the fields, and he charged the farm workers a dollar each for the bus ride. Seale was disturbed by his father’s practices and when the crop wasn’t good, Bobby, his mother, brother, and sister would insist that their
father only charge the workers fifty cents for the ride. Seale also revealed to the audience that night,

I know what [the farm workers] are talking about; I know what they mean when they demand their rights. I just couldn’t charge a mother who was trying to ride the bus out to the farm . . . who made only three or four dollars a day. I couldn’t charge her a dollar . . . I wouldn’t do it.

Because Seale’s sense of injustice had been aroused by the exploitation of farm workers at a young age, he was sympathetic to the UFW cause and the farm workers’ plight. Long before his leadership of the Black Panther Party, Seale came to see that the trials and tribulations of exploited workers crossed racial lines. The memories of his experience with Mexican American farm workers stayed with him and influenced his leadership within the party and his political career. The UFW had not introduced him to the plight of farm workers and mere political expediency was not the reason for Seale’s support.31

The affection Seale felt for the UFW was mutual. On Election Day, 17 April 1973, the UFW was subjected to violent attacks from the Teamsters. The UFW informed the Panthers that “a squad of about 50 Teamster goons, armed with baseball bats and chains, arrived to try to intimidate our members who are striking in the Coachella Valley.” However, Seale and the Black Panther Party were not far from the minds of Chavez and the UFW. When it was revealed the next day that Seale had obtained enough votes to qualify for a run-off election against incumbent Mayor John Reading, the embattled UFW leadership took the time to send a letter of congratulations and sent a donation to Seale’s campaign. Panther leaders were moved by the UFW’s show of support for Seale during such a tumultuous time for the union. Huey P. Newton sent a telegram to Chavez on 22 April thanking him and offering the Panthers’ protection to the union. Chavez thanked Newton the following week for his offer of assistance, but he did not take him up on it. Chavez knew that to involve the Panthers might escalate the level of violence from the Teamsters.32

Seale and party leaders understood and respected the UFW’s commitment to nonviolence and continued to support the union in the same ways as in the past by reporting on the union’s developments in lengthy and detailed articles in the Black Panther. These articles were thorough and heaped praise on the farm workers, referring to the grape boycott as a “struggle for justice and human dignity.” At the same time, however, the Panthers did not question UFW’s commitment to nonviolence, even in the face of violent attacks by the Teamsters.33

But in reality, the UFW was in dire need of the BPP’s support in any form, as the violence between the farm workers and the Teamsters increased. In early May 1973 the UFW filed a lawsuit seeking more than $32 million in damages from eight Coachella growers who, along with hired goons, had used violence and intimidation
Moreover, was Oakland’s beginning under Chavez’s powerful campaign. Seale’s noted, “Though using different tactics to serve their people, both understood the undeniable bond of their struggles.” Chavez pledged to send UFW members to Oakland to work for Seale in the days leading up to the runoff election. Although Chavez and the UFW had previously endorsed several Democratic candidates across the country, from the Kennedy brothers’ presidential campaigns to Coleman Young’s mayoral bids in Detroit, this was one of the few times when Chavez went beyond issuing a press release and sent UFW members to help. When Seale asked how he and the party could aid the UFW boycott, Chavez replied, “The most important thing you can do now is to channel all of your forces into the campaign and win the elections for all of us.”

Even though the UFW’s rural base was far from Oakland, Chavez understood that sympathetic city governments were essential if the UFW was to take their boycotts nationwide. If Seale was mayor of Oakland, one of the farm workers’ strongest allies could use his position to publicize the UFW’s cause and to order city agencies to participate in the boycott. Moreover, Seale’s leadership would undermine the historically antilabor stance of the Oakland city government. Beginning in the 1930s the Oakland Police Department had assisted in breaking strikes and had frequently been accused of brutality directed at labor organizers. Moreover, Oakland’s city government was heavily influenced by California’s powerful agribusiness corporations. Throughout the 1960s a vice president of Safeway consistently sat on the Oakland School Board. And during the first six years of his tenure as mayor of Oakland, Republican incumbent John H. Reading was also the president of Ingram’s Food Products Co., which produced packaged foods. Therefore, Seale’s election would simultaneously strengthen the position of the UFW in Oakland and weaken the hold of the union’s enemies in agribusiness on city officials.

Following the press conference, Chavez and Seale filmed a television endorsement for the campaign and met with students from Malcolm X Elementary School in Berkeley. Pictures taken of Chavez and Seale with the students were immediately used in a bilingual campaign flier that was distributed within Oakland’s Spanish-speaking community. The flier announced Chavez’s endorsement of Seale’s campaign, listed several other prominent Latinos who had endorsed Seale,
and explained how Seale’s platform met “the needs of Oakland’s Raza community.” But perhaps more significant was Chavez’s act of walking the Spanish-speaking precincts of Oakland, personally going door-to-door asking the people to vote for Seale, which he did later in the day after their meeting on 9 May. This simple act not only demonstrated the level of Chavez’s personal commitment to Seale and his campaign, but doubtlessly influenced many to join him in supporting the Panther candidate.36

**BATTLING SAFEWAY AND THE GRAPE GROWERS—TAKE 2**

Although Bobby Seale lost the run-off by a narrow margin, he did not abandon the cause of the UFW with the end of the election. Rather, Seale channeled much of his time and energy into supporting the farm workers. The Panthers followed suit, reporting on boycott developments in each issue of the *Black Panther*. Beginning with the 9 June 1973 edition, each issue of the paper included a clip-and-send form for readers to send financial donations directly to the UFW. The Panthers were closely involved in the UFW’s renewed battle with Safeway grocery stores. On 6 June 1973, the UFW called on Safeway to not stock non-UFW grapes and lettuce, but the store chain’s executives refused. As a result, the UFW began picketing at 150 Safeway stores. However, on 14 June Safeway won an injunction that limited UFW pickets to “one per store entrance or parking lot entrance and seven per parking lot.” As during the earlier grape boycott, the Panthers rallied to the side of the UFW when it once again went up against the party’s old nemesis.37

Panther leaders did not let Safeway’s injunction against the UFW prevent them from helping the farm workers. Instead, on 10 July 1973 the Black Panthers launched their own boycott of all Oakland Safeway stores after the store managers refused to remove non-UFW grapes and lettuce from the shelves. In a dramatic show of unity, Panthers and farm workers marched together on the picket line at the West Oakland Safeway. Panther leader Elaine Brown explained that party support for the UFW was based on class-based unity. She announced to the press, “It’s a natural alliance of poor people and people that understand that everyone has a right to live.” The Mexican American community in Oakland appreciated that the party maintained its commitment to multiracial solidarity after Seale and Brown’s campaigns had ended and in turn maintained its support of the Panthers. Mary Thomas, the Chicana activist who had worked with Seale on the creation of Spanish-language election materials, declared with regard to Panthers’ boycott of Safeway, “I think they’re doing great. . . . They get on the job and stay with it. It’s not just a one shot deal, or one day or one hour. They’ll stay with it until they shut down the damn place.”38

During the boycott of Oakland’s Safeway stores, Seale also took up the farm workers’ cause when the UFW targeted Ernest and Julio Gallo Wineries. The
massive Gallo Wineries, which produced a quarter of all wine grapes in California, had been under contract with the UFW since 1967. When the contract renewal negotiations stalled in June 1973, Gallo began negotiations with the Teamsters, prompting the UFW to go on strike against all Gallo wineries on 27 June 1973. Two weeks later on 9 July, Gallo signed a four-year contract with the Teamsters. The following day, the UFW launched a major boycott of all Gallo wines.49

The Panthers immediately voiced their support for the UFW’s latest protest. Seale and Brown spoke in support of the Gallo boycott at a rally at Sproul Plaza at the University of California, Berkeley, just days after the strike began. During his speech Seale again dismissed racial differences and emphasized solidarity with the UFW as exploited workers who were fighting their common foe, the forces of corporate capitalism. Seale received “a thunderous ovation” when he proclaimed,

We have to relate humanistically when people decide to get themselves together in order to stop being exploited; in order to stop the slave labor, the cheap labor. When people say they want decent wages, when they say [they] want certain fringe benefits, certain health benefits, it is their constitutional right to protest exploitation. I ask you to unite with us and strike against these capitalists and support the UFW.

On 4 August 1973 Seale again spoke in support of the UFW boycott at a rally in Richmond, California. The UFW had organized the rally and subsequent march through Richmond in order to demonstrate broad public support of the farm workers.40

But the public’s support of the UFW had little bearing on the growers, who were emboldened by Gallo’s actions. Soon after Gallo signed with the Teamsters, Franzia Wines followed suit. But the final blow came on 16 August when twenty-five grape growers who had previously signed contracts with the UFW switched and signed with the Teamsters. In response to the growers’ Machiavellian maneuvers, the UFW attempted to draw increased attention to the nationwide boycott of California grapes that had begun in April. Unfortunately, the strike against Gallo ended soon after the deaths of two farm workers: Nagi Daiffullah, a Yemeni farm worker, was beaten to death by a sheriff’s deputy on 14 August; and Juan de la Cruz was shot and killed by strikebreakers two days later. Sensing defeat and not wanting to incur further violence, Chavez called off the strike and boycott.41

Beginning in October 1973, however, the UFW resumed its call for the boycott of Gallo wines. Chavez had waited for the end of Gallo’s harvest season and for approval from the AFL-CIO, whose Distillery and Wine Workers Union could have been hurt by a boycott. Although the boycott continued, the fear of violence against UFW members prevented Chavez from calling for another strike. Chavez explained the move in a fundraising letter: “Rather than see more of our people slain, we moved our picketlines from the fields to the cities, taking our cause once again
before the American people.” The Black Panther Party maintained its support for the UFW and its newspaper continued to report on these developments and to call for solidarity with the UFW. Also in the fall of 1973, however, one of Chavez’s political positions served to weaken the UFW’s relationship with the BPP for the first time. At that time Chavez began speaking out in defense of the state of Israel and released a statement calling for additional aid from the U.S. government. This did not sit well with the Panther leadership, which had been pro-Palestinian from the party’s founding. David Du Bois, Editor-in-Chief of the Black Panther, advised Huey Newton to issue a statement criticizing Chavez’s position, “which, at the same time, states the Party’s continuing support for the struggle of the Farm Workers themselves.”

Chavez’s position on Israel, combined with the cancellation of the Gallo strike and the two-month suspension of the boycott, led to a precipitous decline in coverage of the UFW in the Black Panther; though the party still officially supported the farm workers. But the most significant blow to the relationship with the UFW was Bobby Seale’s resignation from the party. After losing the campaign to become Oakland’s mayor, Seale believed he needed to chart a new course for himself. This was compounded by the internal turmoil plaguing the party that resulted from Newton’s erratic behavior. During Seale’s campaign, power in the party had been concentrated in Newton’s hands. During this time, Seale claimed he “did not know the extent of Newton’s substance abuse, extortion of local crime organizations, misappropriation of Party funds, and violence against fellow Party comrades and members of the community.” Seale finally left the party in July 1974 after a major disagreement with Newton. Therefore, Seale’s electoral defeat meant not only that the UFW would be deprived of a supporter in the highest rank of city government, but it also lost one of its earliest and strongest allies who had taken the lead in maintaining the alliance between the UFW and the BPP.

Seale’s loss in the Oakland mayoral election precipitated an overall decline in BPP membership and activity in California. Following Seale’s departure, there were many defections from the party stemming from disappointment in the election, questions over the party’s future, and the increasing disarray within the organization. The latest losses in membership had a significant impact on the party’s already decreasing numbers. According to some estimates, in 1972, membership had decreased from five thousand members in 1969 to less then five hundred. The serious drop in membership was assisted, directly and indirectly, by actions taken by FBI agent provocateurs who had infiltrated the group and helped to orchestrate the violent conflicts and the subsequent imprisonments of scores of Panthers. These FBI agents ensured that discord and suspicion reigned among the remaining members, which resulted in a series of expulsions and purges that dramatically decreased party membership.
The decrease in the BPP’s numbers also had a detrimental effect on the UFW. When the Central Committee decided that Seale should run for mayor of Oakland, it passed a resolution calling on Panther chapters in other cities to close and for members to relocate to Oakland to assist with the political campaign. But instead, many Panthers simply left the party. But more importantly, by closing the chapters outside of Oakland, the party eliminated its nationwide network. This not only meant that the Black Panther Party was no longer a national organization, but it deprived the UFW of important allies in major cities across the country. The UFW had always depended on its supporters in other cities to provide housing, walk picket lines, and attend rallies during the boycott campaigns. Without these allies, many in the BPP chapters, it would be virtually impossible for the UFW to successfully conduct a nationwide grape boycott. Although Chavez had decided to continue the grape boycott in the aftermath of the deaths of Daiffullah and de la Cruz, it was more difficult for the UFW to organize a nationwide boycott without the assistance it received from Panther chapters during the earlier grape boycott.45

CONCLUSION

Following Seale’s departure, the Black Panther newspaper continued to report sporadically on the progress of the UFW. But less than one month after Seale left, Newton fled to Cuba to escape new criminal charges against him. The defection of both founders signaled the beginning of the end of the Black Panther Party. Although Elaine Brown took the helm as the party’s leader, it has been suggested that by that date, the party had fewer than two hundred members and basically restricted its activities to community service programs in Oakland. This coincided precisely with the UFW’s loss of power; by 1974, after having lost all but a few of their original contracts to the Teamsters, the union faced dwindling membership, depleted financial resources, and a struggle for its very survival. The coalition between the UFW and the BPP that had blossomed during Seale’s campaign was productive while it lasted, but the defeats contributed to the end of the effectiveness of both organizations. However, this was not due to conflicts between the groups, or a failure to adequately assist each other. Because both groups were embroiled in battles for their very existence, the alliance could not save them. Perhaps if either the UFW or BPP had been on a more solid footing, they could have contributed to each other’s survival. Unfortunately, neither was strong enough to simultaneously fight its own battle and assist their allies with theirs.46

However, the UFW-BPP coalition should not be viewed as a complete failure. Both organizations used their relationship to educate their constituencies on the importance of crossing racial lines to establish class-based solidarity. Richard Ybarra, Chavez’s bodyguard and son-in-law, reflected on his experience in the UFW: “I learned about diversity by working there because it was all about people,
not about color. . . . It was never about race or color differences. It was always about similarities.” By uniting around their common interests, each organization benefited from the alliance. Their struggle against the Safeway stores brought the UFW and BPP together, but they continued to support each other in subsequent campaigns because they recognized their similar interests and the strong potential in combining forces. Members of the UFW and BPP to this day fondly remember the alliance based on their common identity as workers who shared values, mutual respect, and dedication to the pursuit of political and economic advancement. Panther Bill Jennings declared, “Every time I’m at an event and somebody says, ‘I’m a farm worker from back in the day,’ I make it a point to shake their hand and tell them, ‘We supported you guys and it was our same struggle.’”

NOTES

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Ibid., 405; Seale interview.


Ybarra interview; Jennings interview.