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Anti-war demonstrations and American public opinion on the war in Vietnam

ABSTRACT

Evidence was brought to bear on the question of the crediting of anti-Vietnam war demonstrations with the American public’s dis-enchantment with the war in Vietnam. Demonstrations had no measurable effect on the decline in favourable public opinion as measured by Vietnam-related poll and survey questions; such changes in opinions largely were explicable by other factors (presidential policy initiatives and war-related events in the short-run; casualties and duration of the war in the long-run). The American public’s general dislike for Vietnam war protesters also makes it unlikely that demonstrations could have served as ‘mediating links’ between the war and the American public; it appears that the news media served this purpose. The major implication of this account is that anti-war demonstrations in the U.S.A. are not effective instruments for changing American public opinion.

On several occasions, the late President Ho Chi Minh of North Vietnam noted occurrences of anti-Vietnam war protest in the United States and expressed his gratitude to the Americans who demonstrated in opposition to their government’s policies in Vietnam.¹ These remarks probably would be best interpreted as appreciation for the sentiments that the protesters expressed; President Ho does not appear ever to have stated that he thought anti-Vietnam war protests themselves would have any effect on what the American government decided to do in Vietnam.

One would suppose, though, that anti-Vietnam demonstrators sought to change American policy in Vietnam in terms of one basic objective: the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam.² How protest would yield this result does not appear to have been explicitly spelled out. Presumably, however, anti-Vietnam war protest in large part was intended as ‘educational’, to convert the American people to the anti-war perspective.³ According to some accounts, these efforts were successful. One observer commented that some returned Vietnam veterans ‘were expressing their disgust [with the Vietnam war] long before antiwar protests had begun to make a serious dent on public opinion’.⁴ Another asserted that ‘the war [in Vietnam] would still be
going on with CBS covering it like an apolitical boxing match, had it not been for the protesting people in the streets.5

Much of the American public’s disenchantment with the war in Vietnam (as reflected by the polls), as well as the American government’s eventual de-escalation of the war and withdrawal of troops from Vietnam, took place against a backdrop of anti-Vietnam war demonstrations. If demonstrations were credited with bringing about these changes, presumably one would argue that demonstrations had converted public opinion which in turn (presumably) encouraged the administration to change its Vietnam policies. If anti-war demonstrations can be shown to have had their intended effects on public opinion, then (1) any (rational) would-be demonstrators can look forward to taking to the streets when next the American government hints at plans to implement or implements a foreign policy of which they disapprove, and (2) demonstrations or the threat of demonstrations can serve as a constraint on the American government’s decisions about military intervention in other parts of the world (otherwise demonstrations can be ignored).

The purpose of this investigation is to assess the impact of anti-Vietnam war demonstrations in the U.S.A. on the changes in the American public’s views about the Vietnam war. In the account that follows, short-run, long-run, and ‘mediating’ effects of anti-Vietnam war demonstrations on American public opinion are considered in the latter half of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s.

DEMONSTRATIONS: SHORT-RUN AND LONG-RUN EFFECTS

If the decline in the American public’s support for the war in Vietnam were attributable to anti-war demonstrations, it would be reasonable to expect that this support (as indicated, for example, by the Vietnam-related Gallup poll questions) would have dropped off after major demonstrations took place. An ingenious study of this question was done by Berkowitz, who enumerated demonstrations with 10,000 or more participants as reported in the New York Times between 1965 and 1971 and then examined fluctuations in percentages in three Gallup poll time-series for five periods ranging from one month to two years later.6 The major finding was that American public opinion did not appear to respond to anti-Vietnam war demonstrations in terms of either disapproval of American involvement in Vietnam, disapproval of the President’s handling of the Vietnam situation, or disapproval of the President’s handling of his job. There was, however, a modest relationship between the occurrence of a demonstration and a subsequent increase in favourable opinion of the President’s handling of the Vietnam situation.7

The results obtained in Berkowitz’s study are persuasive indicators that demonstrations did not turn American public opinion away from
support for the war in Vietnam. The failure of a relationship to emerge between occurrence of a major demonstration and reduced war support seems even more noteworthy when contrasted with Vietnam-related poll questions in which there were sharp changes of opinion that did appear linked to events. Perhaps the most striking of these was the Tet offensive at the end of January 1968, in which the National Liberation Front launched simultaneous attacks on major cities of South Vietnam.\textsuperscript{8} If the Tet offensive had a ‘message’ for the American people, it was that contrary to the Johnson administration’s announced interpretations, the war was going badly and a \textit{dénouement} favourable to the Americans was not in sight. An effect of the Tet offensive was reflected in the public’s change in preference from ‘hawk’ (‘step up our military effort’) to ‘dove’ (‘reduce our military effort’) between the January and March 1968 Gallup polls; one observer called this ‘the largest and most important change in public opinion during the entire war’.\textsuperscript{9} Another apparently Tet-related change was the decline from one-half to one-third in the proportion of Americans who thought that the U.S. was ‘making progress’ in Vietnam.\textsuperscript{10} Other Tet-related changes were reductions in the public’s approval of President Johnson’s handling of the Vietnam situation and of his performance as President.\textsuperscript{11} Quite apart from Tet, the other major short-run influences on Vietnam-related opinions were Presidential policy changes. For instance, approval of President Johnson’s handling of the Vietnam situation increased by 15 percentage points in the month following his 31 March 1968 announcement of a partial halt to the bombing of North Vietnam and his willingness to negotiate a settlement to the war.\textsuperscript{12} Similarly, approval of American bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong increased by 35 percentage points over the two-month period when this became American policy in 1966.\textsuperscript{13} These relationships indicate that American public opinion on Vietnam-related matters was not insensitive to events: it responded to a dramatic change in the war situation and it responded to Vietnam policy changes. But it did not respond to anti-war demonstrations.

If it were conceded that anti-war demonstrations did not have a short-run effect (even up to 24 months later, as shown by Berkowitz), it still could be argued that demonstrations had long-run effects, effects that were confounded by other events, and that the cumulative effect of anti-Vietnam war demonstrations was to reduce the American public’s support for the war in Vietnam. It could be pointed out, for example, that the Gallup poll question on support for the war in Vietnam (one of the three used by Berkowitz) did show that support for the war declined (more or less gradually) from 1965 onward and that this decline might indicate that the ‘message’ of the demonstrations was (more or less gradually) received by the public. This argument has surface plausibility. It also has another feature: it appears impossible to specify the criteria for its falsification. If the effects of demonstrations
are cumulative and 'confounded' by other events, then the assumed effects of demonstrations cannot be distinguished. If these effects cannot be distinguished, then an obvious question is whether they are there at all. Were there no other explanations for the decline in Vietnam war support that were empirically supported or supportable, then the viability of the cumulative-effects-of-demonstrations argument at least would be enhanced. There are, however, some alternative explanations that show the association of other variables with declines in pro-Vietnam war-related opinions.

Mueller’s explanation for the decline in support for the war in Vietnam, one that used American casualties rather than anti-war demonstrations as the causal variable, did fit well with the Gallup poll data on the support-for-the-war question; indeed, it explained 90 per cent of the variance.14 In addition to accounting for these Vietnam opinions, the casualties explanation also accounts for most of the variance in American public’s support for the Korean war almost two decades previously—a war that contrasted with the Vietnam war in at least two important respects: (1) it elicited few (if any) visible anti-war demonstrations, and (2) pro-involvement sentiment (as measured by the polls) was fairly stable over time except for a sharp drop following the intervention of the mainland Chinese army in the latter part of 1950.15 The basic finding for both the Vietnam and the Korean wars was, in Mueller’s words, ‘every time American casualties increased by a factor of 10, support for the war declined by about 15 percentage points.’16 Mueller’s casualty explanation for the decline in popularity of the war in Vietnam, then, has two advantages over the anti-war demonstrations explanation: (1) it fits the data, and (2) it is a more general explanation in that it accounts for the decline in popular support for an earlier ‘limited’ war that was unmarked by anti-war demonstrations.

Casualties are a symptom of what wars cost, and when visible progress is limited, it can be expected that the public increasingly will see the war as representing an unfavourable balance between costs and benefits. This would lead to the proposition that support for such a war drops off simply as a function of time: the longer the war’s duration, the less its popularity. In the case of the war in Vietnam (but not Korea), this interpretation also fits the Gallup poll data and explains 90 per cent of the variance: support for the Vietnam war declined at an average rate of roughly 1 per cent every two months.17 And although the data are less extensive, a similar interpretation can be applied to the French public’s response to their country’s war in Indo-China in the late 1940s and early 1950s: declining support for a ‘limited’ war as a function of its duration.18 The casualties explanation also might fit the decline in support for this war. The point, though, is that a gradual decline in war support over time is susceptible to explanations other than anti-war demonstrations. In the case of the American public’s
support for Vietnam involvement, it will be recalled that roughly 90 per cent of the variance was explained whether casualties or month of poll served as the independent variable. It appears doubtful that the addition of anti-war demonstrations to either explanation would add more than clutter.

**Demonstrations as 'Mediating Links'**

Neither the casualties nor the duration explanation for the decline in the American public’s support for the Vietnam war considers the question of ‘mediating links’ between the war’s costs and benefits on one hand and the public’s perceptions and interpretations of these costs and benefits on the other. As a variation on the theme of long-term effects, it might be suggested that anti-war demonstrations were a crucial part of communicating the negative aspects of the war to the American people. That is, while the American casualty rate, for example, was simply a statistic, it was the demonstrations that helped ‘bring the message home’ to the public. Accordingly, it could be argued that the casualties and the duration explanations are not in conflict with, but rather are complementary to, the argument that the American public’s gradual disenchantment with the Vietnam war is attributable to anti-war demonstrations. As a variation of the long-term effects argument, the mediating link argument shares the feature of not providing a means for distinguishing the effects of demonstrations and as such prevents any direct empirical test. As will be seen below, however, indirect evidence indicates that it is unlikely that demonstrations served as a mediating link to the American public: the public’s usual source for information about events far from home was the news media (especially newspapers and television); probably not many people paid much attention to anti-war demonstrations or spokesmen for news coverage or for their ‘editorial’ interpretations of the war in Vietnam.

Certainly a major, if not the major, factor in communication is the audience’s attention to and acceptance of, or favourable opinion toward, the communicating source. The data show that most Americans made use of at least one of the news media and that the public’s views toward such sources as newspapers and television generally were neutral if not favourable. While there appear to be no data on the public’s attention to those who protested against the war in Vietnam as a source for news or news interpretation, the data are clear in showing that Vietnam war protesters were looked upon with disfavour. Indeed, in 1968 the American public gave Vietnam war protesters an average (mean) rating of 28.4 on a scale that ranged from zero (very unfavourable) to 100 (very favourable). Given the surface plausibility of the idea that a source that is held in disesteem is unlikely to prove itself very influential in converting opinions, it seems unlikely that Vietnam war protesters would have won many Americans to their way of thinking.
The idea of a relationship between an audience's feelings toward the source of a communication and the subject of the communication, and on the effects of this relationship on opinion formation and opinion change, is contained in the consistency (balance) theory. The balance theory deals with attitudinal or affective consistency between three linked elements (audience, source, and object) and assumes that (1) the relationship is balanced when the product of the three signs is positive and not balanced when the product is negative, and (2) while balanced relationships are stable, unbalanced relationships are not and accordingly are likely to change so that balance is obtained.21 Now, since Vietnam war protesters obviously did not like the war in Vietnam (− sign), Robinson pointed out that when the balance theory is applied to the relationship between the public, protesters, and the war, there are only two balanced relationships: the public likes protesters (+) and dislikes the war (−), or the public dislikes protesters (−) and likes the war (+).22 This means, for example, that the opinions of persons who felt favourably towards both the war and towards protesters would be unstable and that at least one opinion would be likely to change. This also means that given the largely negative opinions that the public had of Vietnam war protesters, balanced (i.e., stable) relationships would be when the public had positive opinions about the war. In other words, the balance model would lead to the prediction that the effect of anti-war demonstrations on the American public would be to reinforce public support for the war, while among those segments of the public that were undecided, anti-war demonstrations would lead to pro-war opinions. From the anti-war protester's point of view, then, anti-Vietnam war demonstrations would be counter-productive.23

Since at least during the first few years of American military action in Vietnam, the public's general support for the war would be in balance with negative feelings toward anti-war protesters, it might be supposed that support for the war led to dislike for those who protested against it. This supposition seems unlikely, however, given the consistency of polls and surveys in showing the unpopularity of dissent and protest behaviour in the U.S.A. almost irrespective of issue content.24 This finding suggests that Vietnam war protesters were unpopular not because they were expressing opposition to the war in Vietnam, but simply because of the behaviour in which they were engaged; they were dissenters, deviants and were evaluated accordingly.25

The negative public views of Vietnam war protesters and the prediction by consistency theory that increased support for the war would result from demonstrations seem inconsistent with the decline in the war's popularity while demonstrations were going on. A resolution of this seeming inconsistency lies in Robinson's finding of a low rank-order correlation between the American public's feelings toward Vietnam war protesters and opinions on what to do in Vietnam; as a reason for the low correlation, he suggested that 'many members of the
public simply do not mentally join together the two attitudes.\textsuperscript{26} That is, the public tended not to associate its opinions about the war with its feelings toward Vietnam war protesters. The reason for this lack of association, in turn, may be found in Schuman's interpretation of 'two sources of antiwar sentiment'. According to Schuman, students reacted to the Vietnam war on moral grounds while the public saw things in very pragmatic fashion and as such was not much interested in, or impressed by, arguments and 'information' based on moral criteria;\textsuperscript{27} hence, because protesters and the public by and large evaluated the war using different frames of reference, anti-Vietnam war demonstrations did not communicate about the war to most Americans.

The conclusions to which this discussion leads, then, are that (1) if demonstrations did not communicate with the public, they could not have had much effect on the public's opinions about the war, and (2) if demonstrations did communicate with the public, consistency theory would predict that demonstrations would be counter-productive. These conclusions, in turn, make dubious the argument that anti-Vietnam war demonstrations served as a 'mediating link' in the changes in American public opinion away from support for the war in Vietnam.

The news media, on the other hand, have been assumed to occupy an important place in communicating information and interpretations about world events. C. Wright Mills, for instance, saw the news media as 'agents' and 'servants' of the national 'power élite' in shaping the public's thinking (via 'manipulation').\textsuperscript{28} With the war in Vietnam, however, this tie-in apparently was less than complete since, beginning in the summer of 1967, newspapers and news magazines were weakening in their support for the war and for American policies in Vietnam, while editorials in major newspapers and on the national television networks turned quite explicitly against continuing President Johnson's Vietnam policies after the Tet offensive in early 1968.\textsuperscript{29} Note of the changes in the printed news media was taken by Hamilton and Wright who examined the 1964 to 1968 drop in the proportion of the American public that favoured 'a stronger stand in Vietnam' as an effect of reading newspapers and news magazines.\textsuperscript{30} They found that the largest changes away from the stronger stand option were among upper-middle-class white Protestants and that, within this group, the change was associated with increased reading of newspapers and news magazines; the inference was drawn that this latter relationship was a result of the shift to a sceptical or anti-war stance among the major newspapers and news magazines.\textsuperscript{31} The Hamilton and Wright finding, then, was that in the segment of the public where the largest shift in Vietnam opinions occurred between 1964 and 1968, this shift was associated with attention to the printed news media. It could be that the opinion change was due to the change in editorial positions, or it could be that the change was a reflection of being better informed about what the war was costing (e.g., via pictures of dead and wounded Americans). In either
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case, though, the proposition that the news media served as the 'mediating link' between the war and the American public seems more plausible than the proposition that anti-war demonstrations served this purpose.

CONCLUSION

The major point to be gleaned from this review is that there is no evidence that shows an effect of anti-Vietnam war demonstrations on reducing the American public's support for the war in Vietnam or that shows an effect of demonstrations on Vietnam-related opinions. Unlike either for the Tet offensive or for policy initiatives by President Johnson, there were no visible short-run effects on public opinion that were attributable to demonstrations. While a long-run effect of demonstrations could be asserted, the assertion as such is not directly testable; by contrast, alternative long-run explanations in terms of casualties or duration of the war were testable, and when tested explained most of the variance in the decline in the public's support for the war over time. The unpopularity of Vietnam war protesters, plus the lack of association between public opinion on the war and feelings toward protesters suggest that demonstrations largely were irrelevant to Vietnam-related opinions. The change in Vietnam opinions of the segment for the public that was most attentive to the printed news media between 1964 and 1968 suggests that this opinion change was linked to changes in the Vietnam-related views expressed by the news media. The assumption that anti-Vietnam war demonstrations reduced, or helped to reduce, the American public's support for the Vietnam war, then, is not supported by the evidence.

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Notes

1. See Ho-Chi-Minh, On Revolution: Selected Writings, 1920–66, edited by Bernard B. Fall, New York, Praeger, 1967, pp. 361, 369–70, 377–8. In 'Questions about Viet Nam', Encounter, vol. 30, no. 1 (January 1968), p. 10, Alastair Buchan commented that 'Americans are not patient people'. He went on to note that 'if Ho Chi Minh has read his 20th-century history (and the evidence suggests that he has), he will know that big powers generally lose small wars, not on the battlefield but at home. His interest in the liberal protest movement in the United States is not mistaken.'

2. According to anti-war activist Tom Hayden in Rebellion and Repression.
Cleveland, Ohio, World Publishing Company, 1969, p. 25. 'The antiwar movement began with the premise and with the expectation that Vietnam was a mistake which could be brought to the attention of the government'.

3. Ibid., p. 35.

5. Nicholas von Hoffman, 'Good Citizens Don't Ask Why', Washington Post (2 May 1975), p. B8. A similar assumption appears to have been shared by sociologist Robert Nisbet. In 'Who Killed the Student Revolution?' Encounter, vol. 34, no. 2 (February 1970), p. 16, Nisbet stated that 'had it not been for the passionate attack from the student Left, the curse upon America [the Vietnam war] that began substantially in the early 1960s might well have continued much further into the future'.

7. Ibid., pp. 9-10.

9. Howard Schuman, 'Two Sources of Antiwar Sentiment in America', Amer. J. Sociol., vol. 78, no. 3 (November 1972), p. 515. Actually Schuman's treatment of this matter is a bit misleading because unlike George Gallup, 'Public Opinion and the Vietnam War', Gallup Opinion Index, report no. 52 (October 1969), pp. 9-11, he neglected to include the results for the hawk-dove questions from the Gallup poll of early and late February 1968. As such, one would not learn from Schuman that (as Gallup, ibid., p. 10, previously had noted) the Tet offensive 'initially increased the number of "hawks" who wanted to "strike back"' (italics added).

10. These Gallup polls are reported in Oberdorfer, op. cit., p. 246.
11. The percentages are found in the Gallup Opinion Index, report no. 35 (May 1968), pp. 2, 17. Approval of the way President Johnson is handling the situation in Vietnam 'dropped from 39 per cent in January 1968 to 26 per cent in late March. Approval of Mr Johnson's performance as President dropped from 48 per cent in February 1968 to 36 per cent in late March.
12. See ibid.
17. The Gallup poll percentages were the same as those used by Mueller, ibid., pp. 54-5. The independent variable was month of poll, with July 1965 serving as month one. Following are the results of these computations (columns A and C) and, for purpose of comparison, those reported by Mueller, ibid., p. 61, in which the logarithm of American casualties was the independent variable (please see table at top of facing page). Since the units of the dependent variable were percentage points and those of the independent variable were months, the slopes in columns A and C indicate that support declined at a rate of slightly less
than one-half of a percentage point per month and that opposition increased at a bit more than one-half a percentage point per month, respectively. The standard errors of the regression coefficients for columns A and C are proportionately similar to those in columns B and D; also similar are the standard errors of estimate. (The difference between the standard errors of estimate in columns C and D, for example, amounts to one-half a percentage point.) These similarities, in turn, indicate that the regression of support/opposition to the war in Vietnam on month of poll fits the data about as well as the regression of support/opposition on casualties. The proportions of the variance explained \( R^2 \) by month of interview are virtually identical to the proportions explained by casualties.

18. Surveys of public opinion in France between 1947 and 1954 showed a substantial and essentially monotonic drop in views favourable to continuing the war in Indo-China. Because of differences in the response choices presented in the earlier surveys and the large proportion of respondents that did not answer, interpretations should be made with caution. However, in the last three surveys (when similar choices were presented), the proportion of the cross-sections that said ‘Rétablir l’ordre, envoyer des renforts’ declined from 27 per cent (October 1950) to 15 per cent (May 1953) to 7 per cent (February 1954). In these same surveys, the preference for the ‘Négocier, traiter avec le Viet-Minh’ policy increased from 24 to 35 to 42 per cent. See *Sondages: Revue française d’opinion publique*, vol. 16, no. 1 (1954), p. 57.

19. For a review of data on American public opinion toward the news media, see Hazel Erskine, ‘The Polls: Opinion of the News Media’, *Publ. Opin. Quart.*, vol. 34, no. 4 (Winter 1970–1), pp. 630–43. The indicators of ‘credibility’ and ‘liking’ largely are indirect, but the 1960s vintage polls seem to support the summary statement that the American public believed in the freedom to print news without censorship and controls, and in the overall fairness of news coverage. According to a 1970 national survey reported in Robert T. Bower, *Television and the Public*, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973, pp. 104, 107, 54 per cent of the American public thought that television newscasters ‘give the news straight’, and 26 per cent that news was ‘coloured’ by newscaster opinions. The remainder did not know or had ‘mixed’ views. For those with a favourite newscaster (74 per cent of the sample), 78 per cent thought that his news was given ‘straight’ and 6 per cent that it was ‘coloured’.

20. This finding from the (Michigan) Survey Research Center’s (SRC) 1968 American national election study appears to have been extraordinarily popular with American social scientists and was reported time and again. See (in order of publication) Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, Jerrold G. Rusk, and Arthur C. Wolfe, ‘Continuity and Change in American Politics: Parties and Issues in the 1968 Election’, *Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev.*, vol. 69, no. 4 (December 1969), p. 1087; John P. Robinson, ‘Public Reaction to Political Protest’, *Publ. Opin. Quart.*, vol. 34, no. 1 (Spring 1970), p. 2; Philip E. Converse and Howard Schuman, ‘“Silent Majorities”

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23. Sam Brown in *The Politics of Peace*, *Washington Monthly*, vol. 2, no. 6 (August 1970), p. 39, stated that the national anti-Vietnam war moratoriums of 15 October and 15 November 1969 produced a backlash in Middle America. The latter moratorium, according to the estimates listed by Berkowitz, op. cit., p. 4, brought an estimated 250,000 persons to the demonstration in Washington, D.C., which made this the largest single anti-Vietnam war demonstration up to that time. It will be recalled that Berkowitz, ibid., p. 10, reported a slight increase in approval of the President's handling of the Vietnam situation following demonstrations.

24. See Hazel Erskine, 'The Polls: Freedom of Speech', *Publ. Opin. Quart.*, vol. 34, no. 3 (Fall 1970), pp. 483–96. Converse et al., op. cit., p. 1105, reported that in 1968, a mere 20 per cent of the American public approved of peaceful demonstrations 'permitted by the local authorities'. Also of interest is the report by ibid., p. 1087 and by Robinson, 'Public Reaction . . .', op. cit., p. 2, that a majority of the American electorate thought that the Chicago police used 'the right amount' or 'not enough' force in coping with demonstrators at the Democratic Party's 1968 national convention in that city.

25. The flavour of this anti-dissent sentiment is vividly conveyed by the reactions of parents of Kent State University students after the Ohio National Guard had shot four students to death (during a non-violent student demonstration on 4 May 1970 following the American 'incursion' into Cambodia). In *Kent State: What Happened and Why*, New York, Random House, 1971, p. 453, James Michener reported that 'Of the four hundred students whom the researchers of this book interviewed in depth, a depressing number had been told by their own parents that it might have been a good thing if they had been shot.' When one student returned home (as reported in ibid., p. 460), 'her parents said, "It would have been better for America if every student on that hill had been shot." [The student protested:] "I was there. Only a miracle of some kind saved me. What about that?" [Reply:] "You would have deserved it."'


29. Oberdorfer, op. cit., pp. 86–92, reported that in the summer of 1967, there were (1) changes away from support for the Vietnam war in newspaper editorial positions, and (2) a similar shift in the editorial offices of *Time* Incorporated which in turn filtered into the pages of *Time* and *Life* magazines. Subsequent discussion (ibid., pp. 246–51) told of the 'passage' to disbelief in the war of CBS news commentator Walter Cronkite. Also noted were the expressions of opposition to American policy in Vietnam by the *Wall Street Journal* (ibid., pp. 244–5) and *Newsweek* magazine (ibid., pp. 273–5) after the Tet offensive.

Richard F. Hamilton and James Wright, 'Attitudes belliqueuses en matière de politique étrangère. Quels sont les véritables partisans des solutions...

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