Opposition to the Vietnam war among American university students and faculty†

By the late 1960s, a good number of articles and summaries, both scholarly and journalistic, had appeared regarding dissent, protest, and opinions opposing American participation in the war in Vietnam. The early stirrings of this opposition to the Vietnam war in America usually are traced to universities where students and faculty were among the first groups to organize and to voice opposition to the war in a way that very soon became highly visible to the news media and to journalistic commentators. To what extent were these manifestations of disapproval of the Vietnam war reflective of the sentiments of American college students and faculty during the 1960s? How did it come to be that anti-war activity on the campus was so in vogue during the Vietnam war and so lacking during the Korean war? What characteristics differentiated those members of the university community who opposed the war and protested the war from those who did not?

The intention in this account is to bring data to bear on questions such as these by use of published studies of opinions and protests among American universities and members of the university community. Data for opinions consist of polls and surveys of students and faculty members, for anti-war protest, institutional surveys of student protests and studies of faculty members who affixed their names to anti-war advertisements and the like.

For the most part, this investigation is limited to the period that ended with the American ‘incursion’ into Cambodia in the spring of 1970. By that time, opposition to the war had become such an ‘in’ thing among both students and faculty members, as well as among leading politicians of the Democratic party (who undoubtedly saw political gains from such a stance), that it required neither courage nor wisdom for those at the more prominent American universities to count themselves among the opponents of the war. At the risk of irreverence, one

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is reminded here of Levy’s fifth law, ‘In unanimity there is cowardice and uncritical thinking.’

**STUDENT OPINIONS AND STUDENT PROTESTS**

The protest movement against the war in Vietnam surfaced in the spring of 1965 with teach-ins and with the march on Washington in April of that year. As American involvement in the war in Vietnam escalated, so too did the protests. The assumption that a new wave of student radicalism inundated much of the student population in opposition to the war in Vietnam may have been good for press copy and bad for relations with university old-grads and the public, but it was a poor reflection of how things really were on the campuses in the 1960s, as we shall see presently. Two manifestations of student anti-war feelings are considered here: first, protests, and second, opinions.

At least three national ‘institutional’ surveys of American student protests took place during the 1960s: one for 1964–5, one for 1967–8, and one for 1968–9. All three studies showed that Vietnam war protests on American campuses were a good deal less widespread during these academic years than the talk about college student radicalism might have led us to believe.

Peterson reported that among the accredited four-year colleges and universities in the United States in the 1967–8 academic year, the war in Vietnam was the most popular protest issue. Organized student protests were reported at 38 per cent of such institutions in that year. By comparison, the second most popular issue was ‘living group regulations’ (e.g., women’s curfew) which was an issue for protests at 34 per cent of colleges and universities in 1967–8. The proportion of institutions reporting Vietnam protests showed a marked increase between 1964–5 and 1967–8: in 1964–5, when American troop commitments in South east Asia still were relatively modest, 22 per cent of colleges and universities reported Vietnam protests. The institutions surveyed by Peterson in 1964–5 and 1967–8 were four year accredited colleges and universities and as such undoubtedly over-represented the incidence of protest since we would expect less ‘radical’ behaviour on the part of those attending two year (junior) colleges and technical institutions. This in part helps explain why the Bayer and Astin study of the subsequent academic year (1968–9) showed such a small proportion of schools with protests. Of course it may also be true that the frequency of protests did decline from the 1967–8 to the 1968–9 academic years but we have no way of knowing in the absence of comparable data.

In the 1968–9 academic year, the number of schools in which student protests of any type occurred were 22 per cent of all American colleges and universities. Of those schools where protests did take place, only about half of the protests, both violent and nonviolent, were overtly
related to the war in Vietnam (the war itself, R.O.T.C., selective service, military recruiting, and the like). This means that at only about 10 per cent of American colleges and universities did organized student protests (both violent and nonviolent) take place on matters related to the war in Vietnam in the 1968–9 academic year.

Now if anti-war protests took place at somewhere between 10 and 40 per cent of American college campuses in the 1964–9 period, and protesters in turn represented a small proportion of students on those campuses, then we are left with the conclusion that student protesters must have been an exceedingly small proportion of all college students, even after American public opinion began to turn against the war. This in itself is not astonishing; such a claim was made on a number of occasions by spokesmen for the Johnson and Nixon administrations, for example. Such instant analysts were on safe ground since probably politically concerned and activist students always have been a minority of students as a whole. However, as Feuer documented, student protests on a variety of issues have a long and colourful history in America, stretching back to before the Civil War. Indeed, we might be prompted to wonder why student protests about the war in Vietnam had not been more numerous by the end of the 1960s. A good part of the answer may be that student opinions themselves by and large did not appear to be so ‘radical’ on the war.

Just how representative were the opinions expressed by protesters in comparison to those of students as a whole? Based on a review of evidence from several sources, Lipset and Altbach concluded that up to early 1966, student anti-war protests reflected the sentiments of but a fraction of the student population. Similarly, the Gallup poll of student opinion showed that on the question of self-identification as hawk or dove, the following distributions of opinion resulted:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Spring 1967</th>
<th>Nov. 1969</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dove</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawk</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No opinion</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
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These data reveal that in the spring of 1967 (less than a year before the McCarthy campaign), about one-third of American college students favoured the ‘moderate’ policy of simply de-escalating the war (no complete withdrawal implied), but almost half favoured escalation.

The change in sentiment by November 1969 was truly dramatic; by then over two-thirds of college students favoured de-escalation of the war in Vietnam. However, before we get carried away by the ‘radicalization’ of American students, two other considerations should be noted. First, in this same student poll, Gallup also reported that 50 per cent of American college students approved of President Nixon’s policies in Vietnam. This means, referring back to the percentage of
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doves in November 1969, that a substantial proportion of students (at least 19 per cent if we assume that all students who gave hawk and no opinion responses approved of Mr. Nixon's policy) both called themselves doves and approved of Mr. Nixon's policies. Second, the opinions of the cross-section of the American electorate for the same question also showed dramatic shifts over the period that it was asked, so that by November 1969 the responses of the cross-sections were distributed as follows: 55 per cent dove, 31 per cent hawk, and 14 per cent no opinion. These results suggest that while a majority of both students and the American public wanted, by the end of 1969, to de-escalate the war, this policy preference (or for that matter peacefully protesting the war) for the most part no longer was a very useful indicator of 'radicalism'.

A more direct indication of 'radicalism' among college students is obtained from the Fortune magazine study. Main reported that in April–May 1969, 3.3 per cent of American college students could be classified as 'revolutionary' in terms of their political beliefs and another 9.5 per cent as 'radical dissident'. The bulk of the remainder was classified as liberal reformist and the like. Interestingly, even the predominantly reformist orientation among students differed markedly from the views of young people of like ages who were not in college; the latter were more conservative. Also of interest along this line is the finding by Converse, et al., that Governor Wallace drew votes disproportionately from among young adults when he contested the Presidency in 1968. In sum, then, it appears that both among adults 'under 30' and among students in particular, the new left ideologues were generals without armies in the 1960s.

FACULTY OPINIONS AND FACULTY PROTESTS

A comprehensive survey of American university faculty that included a Vietnam question was conducted in the autumn of 1969. This survey showed that in the autumn of 1969 (after the Nixon administration had begun withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam), 18 per cent of American faculty members wanted to withdraw immediately from Vietnam, 40 per cent wanted to encourage a coalition government, 33 per cent wanted to reduce involvement but prevent a Communist takeover (the apparent policy of the Nixon administration), and 8 per cent wanted to defeat the Communists. Even after the E. McCarthy campaign and the end of escalation of the war, then, less than one in five faculty members favoured immediate withdrawal from Vietnam.

Two earlier surveys of faculty opinions, one of the Boston area in April–May 1966, the other at the University of Michigan in March 1967, both showed that contrary to popular impression (Mr. Agnew included), most professors could not, by the most generous stretch of the imagination, be considered 'radicals' on the war. Many expressed
qualms and qualifications and so on but the ‘extreme’ solution of immediate withdrawal of American forces from South East Asia that was advocated by some faculty members was not in vogue.

Sociologists, by contrast, did not quite fit this mould. In a mail questionnaire distributed to the members of the American Sociological Association in the autumn of 1967, 38 per cent favoured withdrawal from Vietnam and 39 per cent favoured de-escalation.19 The questions that these surveys used are not comparable to the Gallup poll questions during this period, so it would be foolhardy to attempt comparison of faculty opinions to those of the public.20 But in a general sense, it seems reasonable to suggest that, in the aggregate, faculty opinion on the war was not markedly more anti-war than mass public opinion. On the other hand, it also was true that only a small proportion of the faculty in these studies favoured escalation of the war, unlike the mass public. In more tranquil times, perhaps a ‘moderate’ stance is what we might have expected from men of learning.

Part of the faculty expression of opposition to the war in Vietnam took the form of ‘respectable’ and peaceful protest such as newspaper advertisements and resolutions of academic professional associations. Within particular disciplines, the generalization about the ‘moderation’ of faculty opinions on the war in Vietnam was not always true. At its 65th Annual Meeting in November 1966, the American Anthropological Association Council passed an official resolution, supported by ‘two-thirds to three-quarters of those voting’, to condemn the methods of warfare used by American forces in Vietnam and asking that ‘all governments . . . proceed as rapidly as possible to a peaceful settlement of the war in Vietnam’.21 To the author’s knowledge, this was the first academic ‘professional’ association to so resolve and, prior to 1970, the only one. The only other official action before the ‘incursion’ into Cambodia was by the American Sociological Association which, at its Annual Meeting in 1967, voted down the question of taking a public stand on Vietnam but did (as sociologists are wont to do) take a survey of its members (as we have seen).

Social scientists were atypical among professors with respect to taking public positions in opposition to the war in Vietnam. Ladd found marked variation in the representation of academic fields among faculty signers of a ‘Stop the Bombing’ petition published in the Sunday New York Times in January–February 1967.22 The social sciences showed the highest score on Ladd’s Profession Representation Index of any academic area (251 versus 117 for natural sciences, for example), and, within the social sciences, the sociology and anthropology category showed the highest representation of all (304). By contrast, for fields such as agriculture (6), business (10), and education (18), the representation score was very low.23 All of this is to suggest that while some faculty members were actively
opposed to the war in Vietnam, their high visibility was not enough to make them typical of faculty members as a whole. The presence of outspoken war critics often apparently led to an association of anti-war sentiment with professors in general.

**Senses versus Samples**

How does it happen that the ‘objective’ evidence reviewed here is so strongly contradictory to the impressions of the author and most probably contradicts those of the reader as well? Some light is shed on this by the fact that in 1969 there were more than 2,400 two- and four-year institutions in the United States from which one could obtain education that is considered college training and that among these institutions there undoubtedly was wide diversity both in institutional characteristics and in the students and faculty.24

For example, Converse and Schuman25 explored further the relationship of college education to pro-war sentiment by classifying respondents who reported college attendance by ‘a general quality rating of the universities they attended’. They found that preference for taking a stronger stand in Vietnam among respondents who were products of quality institutions in 1966 and 1968 was markedly lower than that of the non-college population as well as for that of products of small or unrated institutions. Those respondents from small, unrated, or lowest rated (‘E’) colleges were more hawkish than those from other colleges or the non-college population.26

What was true for the Vietnam opinions of college graduates, also was probably true for college students and faculty members. Anti-war sentiment and anti-war activity was concentrated at the more prestigious (and visible) institutions. Most of the ‘other’ institutions of higher learning in America and the students that they matriculate and the faculty they hire are outside of the experience of the academicians most likely to write on ‘student radicals’ as well as outside of the experience of journalists and news commentators.27 These latter-day political pundits were committing the same error that undergraduates presumably are (or should be) made aware of in their first introductory sociology course: the fallacy of generalizing from isolated experience. We tend to forget that the college students or faculty members seen in the news usually are not selected from the university community by anything approaching strict probability methods, and, as such, our impressionistic ‘samples’ are unlikely to be representative.

**Protests in Perspective**

The war in Vietnam is not the first war to be disapproved of by a substantial proportion of the American electorate. Public opinion polls
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on the war in Korea show that war to have been as unpopular during most of its duration as was the war in Vietnam prior to 1968.28 Similarly, in its latter phase the Korean war was not very popular among students either. A composite cross-section survey of 2,975 male college students in April–May 1952 revealed that 26 per cent ‘very often’ felt the Korean war was ‘not worth fighting’; another 37 per cent felt that way ‘sometimes’.29 Military service also was in disfavour: 24 per cent chose the ‘don’t want to go in at all’ response; another 63 per cent wanted to ‘stay out if possible’.30 However silent these college men may have been in demonstrating their feelings about the Korean war or military service, it seems clear that by 1952 they viewed that war with something less than enthusiasm.

Yet despite its unpopularity both in the electorate as a whole and among college students, protests against the war in Korea seemed unknown or at least went unrecorded. Why were protests so relatively common during the Vietnam war in comparison to the Korean war? One conventional explanation was that we were witnessing a new phenomenon of leftist sentiments among college students; the ‘Spock’ generation, it was suggested. For some proportion of the American university community, undoubtedly that was the case. But we also must remember that it was a good deal safer and much more fashionable to express such sentiments in the late 1960s than, for example, in the early 1950s.

It may be difficult for one of the ‘under 30’ generation, or a more elderly person with a short memory, to grasp the idea that dissent was not always in vogue on the American university campus and that the expression of anti-war sentiment could be cause for punishment. The Korean war period, of course, coincided with a ‘red scare’ in the United States; it was the era of the Joseph McCarthy communist witchhunts. It seems likely that the fear of being accused of subversion in large part was responsible for the absence of organized campus anti-war activities during the Korean war. Incredible as it may seem compared with events in the late 1960s, respondents in the Lazarsfeld and Thielens study reported student spies, accusations of pro-communist sympathies (usually unfounded), and, in some cases, loss of jobs. Usually these events resulted only from some criticism of the United States or a favourable remark about the Soviet Union.31 It is not difficult to visualize the screams of outrage that probably would have resulted had faculty members in the early 1950s dared, for example, to place newspaper advertisements or make public speeches expressing the same sentiments about American participation in the war in Korea as were being expressed about the war in Vietnam in the late 1960s.32

In 1917–18, both the federal government and universities acted to suppress critics of World War I. One commentator wrote that ‘most frequently’ universities passed resolutions ‘that rested on a demand for
full support of the war and that frequently led to exclusions and dismissals from the student body.\textsuperscript{33} Beginning in June 1917, the anti-war American Socialist party was denied use of the U.S. Mail for distribution of party periodicals.\textsuperscript{34} Following the strong Socialist showing in the municipal elections of 1917, ‘mass sedition indictments were returned against almost every major Socialist leader’.\textsuperscript{35} If such harassment typified the lot of those who raised their voices in dissent in America during the Vietnam war, it was a well-kept secret.

Among students in the late 1960s, the question might be raised about the possible effect of the draft, real or imagined, as a punishment for student dissenters. Despite the fears expressed by some war critics and others, it does not appear that the draft had any measurable effect on curbing dissent. On the contrary, fear of being drafted may well have stimulated anti-war activities among many college men under age 26 who normally would have busied themselves with more traditional collegiate pastimes.\textsuperscript{36} The only data on this question that have come to the author’s attention were from male students at the University of Wisconsin in 1966: less than 38 per cent feared the loss of their student deferments in response to 'peaceful picketing in protest against the Vietnam War'.\textsuperscript{37} This is a significant percentage, but let us recall that by the end of 1966, anti-war protests still were not an ‘in’ thing and that probably not many college students were interested in protesting the war at that point anyway. That is, in the absence of contradictory data, it is reasonable to argue that most of those who might have been dissuaded from demonstrating against the war in Vietnam by fear of losing their student deferments probably did not feel strongly enough against the war to protest under the most favourable of circumstances.\textsuperscript{38}

Conditions in the late 1960s, then, were fairly favourable for anti-war protest, at least compared to the World War I or Korean war periods. Protesters in the 1960s by and large were dealt with lighthandedly unless they happened to be enlisted in the American Armed Services or had publicly burned their draft cards. Unlike during World War I, access to the U.S. Mail and the mass media were not overtly curtailed or denied. Those whose expressions of anti-war views were limited to speech were not normally jailed; indeed, especially within major universities, tolerance of dissent among the faculty and students was the norm.\textsuperscript{39} All of which is to suggest that a good part of the explanation for the upsurge of anti-war protests in the late 1960s on American university campuses may well have been simply that the costs and dangers of such activities were relatively modest.\textsuperscript{40}

\textbf{SOME ROOTS OF PROTEST}

The dominant popular image of the faculty Vietnam war opponent seemed to be the young instructor, who himself only recently had left
the student ranks. In fact, the opposite seems to have been the case. The public signing of anti-war petitions among faculty members was disproportionately not the ‘young turks’ who, though perhaps a good number were ‘radical’ in mind, at the same time normally were without the security of tenure. A study of signers of anti-war advertisements in the Sunday New York Times, for example, showed a direct relationship between professorial rank and signing ads. A study of social scientist signers of a ‘Stop the Bombing’ advertisement in early 1967 showed an over-representation of senior rather than junior social scientists. Similarly, a study of the signers of the ‘open letter’ of 1 November 1967, from the American Sociological Association to President Johnson opposing the war in Vietnam, concluded that the data ‘point to a signer who is well integrated into the profession and who signs from at least an objective position of security and strength’.

In the case of senior faculty members (and intellectuals in general), for the most part there was probably little to be lost (other than a security clearance) by vocally supporting leftist causes. The professorial radical, especially if a Ph.D., usually could find one or more universities willing to hire him (up through the late 1960s anyway), and one or more book publishers and magazine editors willing to publish leftist critiques and condemnations of the existing order (they sell), including ‘the military-industrial complex’ and American foreign policy. Meanwhile, for the more fortunate among radically minded faculty members, it was possible to draw on a handsome salary (plus possibly book royalties), to live in a nice neighbourhood, and to fly around the country on expense accounts to speak or to consult. One suspects that so long as the intellectual leftist is getting his share of the benefits that American society has to offer, he does have a certain amount of vested interest in not being so ‘radical’ that his own standard of living is endangered. Criticism and dissent is one thing; revolutionary upheaval is something else.

As a marginal note, notice should be taken of the shrinking academic job market which began to show in the United States in 1969 and which is likely to grow far worse in the 1970s. One effect of this shrinkage may be to discourage professorial protests, particularly among junior faculty, who will probably find it prudent to concentrate their attention on scholarly work that will yield publications.

In the case of students, the evidence indicates that the social base of American student radicalism and protest primarily was drawn, not from among the sons (and daughters) of the proletariat, but from the children of the most affluent and well-educated strata of the American middle class. Indeed, it probably is among the least ‘oppressed’ strata of modern societies (from the cushion of affluence) that the inclination (guilt, perhaps) to champion social change and the leisure time in which to do so are most likely to appear. Fittingly enough, Von
Hoffman referred to such students or former students as ‘credit card radicals’. Of the turn towards violent tactics (smashing store windows, bombing buildings, and the like) in some segments of what used to be the ‘new left’, Von Hoffman commented that such behaviour reflects the self-indulgent anger of the upper-class person thwarted, and in this the rich revolutionary resembles his parents. This violent, military, murderous politics he’s practicing here is what his elders have practiced abroad. This is the domestic application of American foreign policy tactics.

Talk in this world is as cheap as it ever was; perhaps by the late 1960s, American political élites had become aware that talk and protest among university-based critics, if it did not represent an articulation of public sentiment that could be translated into a significant quantity of votes, by itself posed no serious threat to the existing order. Thus perhaps it was not by chance alone that the wicked ‘establishment’ that reputedly (as presumably seen by the more paranoid members of the ‘new left’) was hatching nefarious plots to make wars, exploit the ‘third world’, oppress the blacks, and buy off the American working class also evidently had made no serious attempt to silence dissent and protests against the Vietnam war. If we accept the assumption of a ‘power élite’ or the like, then perhaps these power-wielders saw too many of their own sons and daughters in the ranks of these would-be revolutionaries. Or perhaps this ‘élite’ knew a pseudo-threat when it saw one.

CONCLUSION

Campus-based anti-war protests in the late 1960s gave a misleading picture of American university students and faculty. At the overwhelming majority of American campuses up through the 1968–9 academic year, no anti-war protests were reported. On the other hand, although protests were not unique to the 1960s, such events do appear to have been a good deal more common and more widespread than, for example, during the Korean war. Student and faculty activism in the 1960s probably was fostered by the atmosphere of official tolerance of non-violent dissent. Protest behaviour also seems to be related to the relative security of protesters, who were disproportionately senior professors and students from affluent families.
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Notes

1. The proportion of American students and faculty that took part in the post-Cambodia wave of protests appeared large in comparison to protests in the 1960s. For an estimate of the incidence of protests both war-related and other during the 1969-70 academic year, see Alexander W. Astin, 'New Evidence on Campus Unrest, 1969-70', *Educational Record*, vol. 52, no. 1 (Winter 1971), pp. 41-6. Using a weighted population estimate of four-year institutions based on reports of protests in 196 campus newspapers, Astin reported that 78 per cent experienced one or more protests on off-campus issues, e.g., 44 per cent for Earth Day, 35 per cent for both the October Moratorium and for other war-related issues.

At the same time, however, it seems doubtful that the bulk of the participants in such activities could properly be described as 'radicals' or that the occurrence of these protests had the same meaning as before. By the spring of 1970, a number of Johnny-come-lately Democrats also had hopped on the peace bandwagon and were echoing similar sentiments.


3. These three surveys are reported in (respectively) Richard E. Peterson, *The Scope of Organized Student Protest in 1964-65*, Princeton: Educational Testing Service, 1966; Richard E. Peterson, *The Scope of Organized Student Protest in 1967-68*, Princeton: Educational Testing Service, 1969; Alan E. Bayer and Alexander W. Astin, 'Violence and Disruption on the U.S. Campus, 1968-1969', *Educational Record*, vol. 50, no. 4 (Fall 1969), pp. 337-50. Questionnaires were answered by deans or their functional equivalents at the institutions surveyed. No evidence was presented in any of the three studies about the extent to which the deans' perceptions of protests were shared by other campus observers (or participants).


5. This is intriguing in itself. It suggests that the avant garde of the student anti-war movement very early noticed and reacted to the escalation of American involvement in the war in Vietnam. Three academic years later, however, the percentage of schools reporting anti-war protests had increased by only 16 per cent. The success of this assumed student vanguard in winning new campuses to protest was a good deal less than might have been supposed.


9. *Gallup Opinion Index*, Report No. 55 (January 1970), p. 17. The question was: 'People are called “hawks” if they want to step up our military effort in Vietnam. They are called “doves” if they want to reduce our military effort in Vietnam. How would you describe yourself—as a “hawk” or as a “dove”?' As with many such questions, the range of possible interpretations seems very wide. 'Reduce our military effort’ could have been interpreted as stop the bombing of North Vietnam, or encourage the South Vietnamese to do more of their own fighting, or bring home some American troops. By 1969, of course, such alternatives all appeared to be (or were) the policy of the Nixon administration. Hence, by the November 1969 poll, a person who agreed with Mr Nixon’s Vietnam policy logically would have classified himself as a dove in terms of the Gallup poll question.

10. Ibid., p. 16.


12. In ‘Who Killed the Student
Revolution?' *Encounter*, vol. 32, no. 2 (February 1970), p. 16, Robert Nisbet commented, 'Jerry Rubin knew exactly what the situation was . . . when, in Washington on the occasion of huge and peaceful mobilisation [in late 1969], he spat out disgustedly that 'peace has become respectable'."


14. Ibid.


16. Alan E. Bayer, *College and University Faculty: A Statistical Description*, Washington: Office of Research, American Council on Education, 1970, p. 20. The percentages were based on the responses of 60,028 American college and university faculty members. The response rate was 59.8 per cent (ibid., p. 4).


20. Actually, Armor, *et al.*, op. cit., p. 172, did compare their results with those of the Gallup poll taken at about the same time and concluded that the Boston area professors were 'more anti-war than the public at large'. The differences in question wording make this conclusion dubious given the impact that even slight changes in wording can have on the distribution of responses. (For examples of question wording effects with Vietnam opinions, see Converse and Schuman, op. cit., p. 19.)


23. Ibid., pp. 1428–9. The index was 'computed by dividing the percentage of the total full-time faculty which is in the field into the percentage of all faculty signers of the petition from that field.' (Ibid., p. 1428.)

24. In 1968 and 1969, roughly seven million people were enrolled for degree credit in American colleges, junior colleges, and professional schools. One easily measured characteristic that yields an indication of variation in educational institutions is the number of students (with attendant implications about impersonality, size of lectures, and the like). In the spring of 1969, these institutions ranged in size from Indiana University at Bloomington (52,101 students) to the Crozer Foundation School of Nursing at Chester, Pennsylvania (31 students). The statistics cited here are from Dan Golenpaul (ed.), *Information Please Almanac, Atlas, and Yearbook: 1970*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1969.


26. Ibid., pp. 23–25.

27. How many Americans, for example, have ever heard of St Francis College? *Information Please Almanac*, op. cit., p. 676, listed four institutions with that name (one each in Indiana, Maine, New York, and Pennsylvania) with a combined degree enrollment of 6,488 in the spring of 1969. That is, the students in these four schools were about three-quarters as many as attended Yale (8,361) and considerably more than attended Princeton (4,751). Needless to say, there are many hundreds of such largely unheard-of colleges in the United States.
States, the products of which also are largely unheard-of. Yet such alumni and pre-degree drop-outs show up in surveys and in the voting booth where their opinions (democratically enough) are given better representation than on the evening news show or in the New York Times.

28. This was reported by John E. Mueller, ‘Trends in Popular Support for the Wars in Korea and Vietnam’, Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev., vol. 65, no. 2 (June 1971), pp. 358–73, after an exhaustive examination of American poll data from the Korean and Vietnam war periods. Unfortunately the strength of these sentiments, the intensity with which they are held, the saliency of the war issue, and so on are matters about which the poll data tell us little.


30. Ibid., p. 182.


32. Anti-war newspaper advertisements during the Korean war appear to have been sparse in comparison to those during the Vietnam war. For example, James N. Rosenau, The Attentive Public and Foreign Policy: A Theory of Growth and Some New Evidence, Princeton: Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 1968, p. 17, reported on a count of advertisements in the News of the Week in Review section of the Sunday New York Times as follows: from June 1950 to August 1953 only two advertisements appeared, neither of which was explicitly critical of American policy in Korea. For the first year after February 1965, by contrast, there appeared 27 advertisements about the war in Vietnam, most of which expressed opposition to American policy there.


Pol. Sci. Rev., vol. 54, no. 4 (December 1960), p. 981. For instance, on 5 June 1918 the faculty of Princeton passed a resolution that stated in part: ‘‘No student shall be admitted into the university for instruction and education and no person shall be appointed to any place or office who does not sympathize with our government’s purpose in the prosecution of the war’’ (quoted in ibid., p. 981).


35. Ibid., p. 236.

36. One clear case of the draft being employed to punish dissenters took place following the Ann Arbor (Michigan) Draft Board Sit-In in October 1965. The names of the male students of draft age who were arrested following their refusal to leave when the office closed subsequently were sent to their local draft boards. Many then were reclassified from II-S (student deferment) to I-A (available for immediate induction). Those affected sought legal assistance and subsequently won the case; the punitive reclassifications were overturned and the student deferments restored. See ‘Recent Cases: Administrative Law’, Harvard Law Rev., vol. 81, no. 3 (January 1968), pp. 685–690. Given the unfavourable publicity that the I-A reclassifications received, it seems doubtful that there could have been any significant proportion of college men whose potential for dissent was ‘chilled’ by fear of punitive reclassification.


38. One obvious factor to be considered in any discussion of the dissent-curbing features of the military draft is that it applied only to men and then only primarily to physically and mentally fit men under age 26. If in fact fear of the draft really had had a deleterious impact on expression of dissent, we
would have expected that anti-war protesters would have been composed by and large of men who were not draft-eligible and of women. Had it been true that the protest movement suffered from a lack of healthy young men in its ranks, it is unlikely that this phenomenon would have passed without notice or comment by civil libertarians, particularly given the concern about potential effects of the draft on silencing young men with student deferments.

39. It is of course possible to point to deviant cases. One such case of harassment was described by Michael Parenti of himself and a colleague, both in the Political Science Department at the University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana, apparently as a result of their support of student demonstrations in the spring of 1970. See Professor Parenti's article, 'Repression in Academia: A Report from the Field', Pol. and Soc., vol. 1, no. 3 (August 1971), pp. 527–37. Another case, that of a tenured associate professor of English at Stanford University dismissed for 'having incited "disruptive" behavior on campus' was described in Kenneth Lamott, 'In the Matter of H. Bruce Franklin', New York Times Magazine (23 January 1972).

Lamott noted, however, that this was the first time that Stanford had ever fired a tenured professor and, moreover, it was 'also the only such dismissal at a major university since the Joe McCarthy era' (Ibid., p. 12). Interestingly, Lamott also described two other dismissals of tenured professors in 1971: one a professor at a Jesuit institution in Connecticut for telling his students that he was an agnostic, the other a white professor at a predominantly black state college in Virginia, apparently for his anti-communist activity and his opposition to anti-war demonstrations. The latter case suggests that the knife of 'repression' cut both ways.

40. From time to time, of course, some segments of the American left did find reasons to complain about 'repression', e.g. the shootings of Black Panthers and of students at Kent State and Jackson State, or the trials of the Chicago Seven and of Dr Spock and associates. In 'The Question of Repression', Commentary, vol. 50, no. 2 (August 1970), pp. 23–8, Walter Goodman argued that although these events are 'real' and 'troubling', they do not constitute a (successful) repression of the right to dissent. Goodman observed that in the United States in 1970, 'dissent is very much alive—and sometimes fruitful, sometimes merely fitful, yet growing and spreading . . . . But ideologues rarely make concessions to reality. The militants, busy at their game of radicalization, thrive on panic.' (Ibid., p. 28.)


44. Clearly such a utopian existence does not characterize all professorial radicals or would-be radicals; such probably is true mainly of those located at the more prestigious private universities.


48. Ibid.

49. Some remarks by Richard A. Scammon on the expressions of revolutionary sentiment among left-wing savants in the late 1960s might be of interest here: 'We hear a lot of talk about revolution. If the average middle-
class “revolutionary” ever saw a revolution, he’d puke in the gutter. At the
dead children. . . . Revolution is a bayonet in somebody’s gut. It’s a kid
kicked to death. They don’t mean this. They mean something they can talk
about.’ Mr Scammon was being quoted in William Whitworth, ‘Profiles: One

50. In the long run, it would be difficult to show that anti-war protests
had no effect on the changes in American policy in Vietnam from escalation to
staged withdrawal. On the other hand, it is doubtful that protests or student and
faculty demonstrators could have had much direct effect on swinging American
public opinion away from the war, simply because a majority of Americans
disliked protesters and at best were lukewarm, if not cold, towards dissent in
general. A compilation of polls of the American public from the 1930s to 1969,
for example, generally revealed a low tolerance for dissent. See Hazel Erskine,
‘The Polls: Freedom of Speech’, Publ. Opin. Quart., vol. 34, no. 3 (Fall 1970),
pp. 483–96.

51. For an instructive statement on
civil liberties from a member of the
‘old’ left to a spokesman for the ‘new’,
see Irving Howe, ‘A Word About
“Bourgeois Civil Liberties”’, Dissent, vol.
15, no. 1 (January–February 1968),
pp. 10–11.

52. ‘Pseudo-threat’ in two senses:
first, the ‘rich revolutionary’ has a strong
long-run interest in preserving the
existing political and economic institutions of American society. Second, young
radicals, unlike Peter Pan, do not remain forever young. Past experience suggests
that for many, the ageing process also seems to bring a reversion to professing
more conventional and socially acceptable political opinions. Such was the
view expressed by Hal Draper, a sympathetic if over-30 observer and
chronicler of the 1964–5 Free Speech Movement (F.S.M.) at Berkeley (University
of California), to one of the F.S.M. leaders: ‘“Take the 800 [arrested sit-
inners]. Ten years from now, most of them will be rising in the world and
in income, living in the suburbs from Terra Linda to Atherton, raising two
or three babies, voting Democratic, and wondering what on earth they were
doing in Sproul Hall—trying to remember, and failing.”’ (Hal Draper, Berkeley: The
New Student Revolt, New York: Grove Press, 1965, p. 169.)