Outsiders often speak of the current protest movement as though it were monolithic. While most of us know better, the differences of view within the movement have seldom been accurately charted. Professor Miller attempts to do this. He finds that the active protestors split into two rough divisions, divided primarily over the question of whether to object to American ‘objectives’ or merely to the strategies used to achieve them. Perhaps a twofold classification is too simple, but the documentation he provides is certainly useful in destroying the myth of the monolith.

In addition to his position teaching at Pittsburgh, Arnold H. Miller is Assistant Director of the University’s Center for International Studies. He has been on the staff at Pittsburgh since 1968, after completing his degree work at the same institution. In line with his research interest in perceptions, he is the editor of Perceptions and World Politics (forthcoming, 1971).
I. The Enigma of the Vietnam Protest Movement

The Vietnam protest movement has been one of the most discussed—but least understood and studied—outgrowths of United States involvement in Vietnam. This article seeks to provide some empirical data using perceptual analysis to lend coherence to the discussion about variations among "activists" in the Vietnamese protest movement. By analyzing variations within one segment of the protest movement—activists in a "typical" metropolitan area in the United States—one can discern the different perceptions and policy recommendations which comprise the amalgam of people that make up the Vietnam protest movement. Moreover, the interrelationship between perceptual sets and policy recommendations can be analyzed.

Existing scholarly literature about the protest movement fails both to analyze variations within the protest movement systematically and to focus on leadership within the movement. Instead, the literature tends to be comparative in nature: those who have favored unilateral de-escalation by the United States are compared with those who have supported United States policy. Often the data base for these comparisons is not explicitly defined, represents only one occupational group, or focuses only on patterns in the social-economic background or the socialization process of the protestors. The protest movement itself, however, is rarely considered as a frame of reference within which differences should be accounted for.

Although even superficial analysis of the activists in the peace movement indicates that "all doves are not the same type of birds,"


2 Ralph K. White devotes an entire issue of the above cited Journal of Social Issues to discussing the misperceptions of various participants involved in the Vietnam conflict without indicating the source he uses to discern these misperceptions.

3 For example, Armor, et al.

there is little scholarly research that identifies the type of birds which
nest in the peace movement.\footnote{5} One such article is Ralph K. White’s
"Misperception in the Vietnam War."\footnote{6} He divides the peace movement
into "holders" and "withdrawers." Although these differences may be
analytically useful, White’s purpose is somewhat puzzling because he
only indicates that these two groups desire different changes in United
States policy. After this obvious conclusion is reached, differences
among protestors are never again discussed. Instead, White describes
some possible misperceptions common to all members of the peace
movement. No attempt is made to distinguish the misperceptions that
apply to "holders" as compared to "withdrawers." However, if each
group is subject to the same set of misperceptions, as White implies,
the utility of this distinction becomes questionable.

Apart from White’s study one must turn to more popular literature
for a discussion of differences within the peace movement. A perusal
of this more popular literature indicates that distinctions which are
suggested do not accurately or fully account for variations within the
peace movement. Most exemplary of this problem is the distinction
frequently purported to exist between "radicals" and "liberals." Yet,
when one attempts to find the basis for this distinction, he quickly
learns that the variable most frequently mentioned which separates
radicals from liberals is age. Radicals are considered to be those under
30, plus Dr. Benjamin Spock; liberals are those over 30, plus students
who campaigned for Robert Kennedy and Eugene McCarthy. If one
seeks to discover ideological distinctions, he is left with the almost
vapid conclusion that radicals are opposed to the "system" while lib-
erals are not. This distinction is rarely accompanied by a discussion of
which aspect of the "system" radicals desire to alter, what boundaries
of the system appear most onerous, or what, if anything, they intend
to substitute for the present system. This failure to account for the
presumed ideological differences between radicals and liberals may be
explained in two ways. First, analysts who make this distinction may
not probe the differences in depth. Consequently, the distinction may
be accurate, but crude and in need of refinement. Secondly, analysts
may probe for more refined differences and find that none exist. If the
latter is the case, the relevance of the distinction for depicting the
major split in the protest movement is questionable. The only other
explicit distinctions in the literature range from differences in the

\footnote{5} "Protest movement" and "peace movement" will be used interchange-
ably to designate those people who advocated steps of unilateral de-
escalation by the United States during the time period which this article
encompasses.

\footnote{6} White, 1–164.
willingness to cooperate with Communists in protest activities,7 to the number of unconditional acts of de-escalation advocated by various segments of the peace movement.8 These hardly seem to be the type of distinctions by which meaningful differences can be accounted.

If variations do indeed exist in the protest movement, on what issues do they occur? What is their source? What implications do they have for the internal dynamics of the peace movement? What implications do they have for the conduct of American foreign policy? These questions, largely ignored in the existing literature, are the subject of this article.

II. Methodology

The population for this study consists of people in Pittsburgh who became activists in the Vietnamese protest movement from the time of the first teach-in at the University of Pittsburgh in April, 1965, to the march on the Pentagon in October, 1967. A multi-faceted definition of an activist has been adopted for this study. Anyone who gave a public lecture or participated in a public debate in this time period in which he advocated that the United States initiate some form of unilateral de-escalation is considered to be an activist. Anyone who was an officer of an organization advocating United States unilateral de-escalation and the carrying out of a program toward this end during this time period is also considered to be an activist. These include officers in ad hoc organizations which came into existence for special events, such as the Spring Mobilization of April 15, 1967, as well as on-going organizations whose activities include protest against United States policy in Vietnam, such as SANE. The third criterion for an activist is a reputational one. During the course of interviewing, several names of people important in deciding activities and strategy for the protest movement in Pittsburgh recurred. These people neither held a formal office in an organization nor participated in any public discussion. Yet they are included as leaders in this study because they were considered leaders by those who met the other criteria of leadership.

An attempt was made to interview everyone possessing these characteristics in the Pittsburgh area during the time period from April, 1965 to October, 1967. Although a few activists may have been in-

advertently overlooked, and five activists were either unavailable or unwilling to be interviewed, the ninety-four activists who were interviewed constitute almost the entire population of activists in the protest movement in Pittsburgh at this time period.

The interviews were conducted from August, 1967 to December 15, 1967, by the author. This period was one of relative stability in United States Vietnam policy, and the impact of events on the interviews is therefore thought to be minimal. Nearly all the questions asked were unstructured open-ended ones which attempt either to gauge the perceptions of the participants about the conflict or to assess their opinions on various policies related to Vietnam. This open-ended methodology was adopted because the respondents comprise a highly knowledgeable and educated group. If activists had been categorized in a set of preconceived boxes, the detail and nuance of their arguments might have been lost irrevocably. More important, since the purpose of this study was to depict and explain differences in the peace movement, it was desirable to get as complete and unedited an explanation from the activists as possible. In this way, the categorization of their responses could be based on their views, not on the preconceived notions of the researcher.

A perceptual approach has been adopted because other studies of attitudes toward the Vietnamese war indicate, at least implicitly, that perceptual analysis promises to uncover important differences among activists. The Armor study, for example, finds diversity in attitudes to American Vietnamese policy among a group of professors in the Boston area to be related to their perceptions about internal civil liberties in the USSR and the legitimacy of military intervention by one country into another's internal affairs. Although the authors do not attempt to use an explicit conceptual framework, their investigation indicates that an increased understanding of attitudes on Vietnam may result from using a perceptual framework of analysis.

The article by Verba, et al., suggests more explicitly that perceptual analysis may provide a tool for explaining different attitudes about the Vietnamese war. After noting that most standard social background variables, such as income, occupation, educational level, and religion, show little relationship with policy preferences; and finding other variables, such as accuracy of information, party affiliation, and political interests failing to account for variations in attitudes, they ask what may provide an explanation. The response they offer is:

9 Armor, et al., 169.
10 Verba, et al., 326. They do find race and sex to be related to attitudes on Vietnam with women and Negroes favoring de-escalation.
"One possible answer is that they are patterned by the respondent’s
cognitive and affective relationship to the war itself—i.e., that it is not
a group related set of attitudes but a set of attitudes related to the
object of the attitudes… One would need more data on the percep-
tions of the war, estimates of likely outcome, and the like, to see
whether this type of patterning is significant."

Further justification for adopting a perceptual approach exists when
one realizes that attempts to use social background information, the
only other conceptual framework that has been applied to the Viet-
namese protest movement, have been unsuccessful. Although the
Armor study finds variances among professors’ attitudes to be based
on academic rank, religion, and academic discipline, they find no dif-
fences in attitudes toward the war when the following factors are
analyzed: size of town or city of origin, previous military experience,
type of school attended and sex. As previously noted, the Verba
study finds no relationship between attitudes toward the Vietnamese
war and almost any standard social background factor.

When one looks for other methodologies with which to analyze
variances in the protest movement systematically, he enters unex-
plored terrain. On the assumptions that social background information
has not proved helpful and that, at least implicitly, evidence indicates
that perceptions may be helpful, a perceptual approach has been
adopted in this study.

III. Meaning of Perception

The term “perception” is used in this article to describe the way people
or groups view the politically relevant world. This world consists of a
myriad of events, aspirations, fears, and customs. Each person views
these events, aspirations, fears, and customs somewhat differently and
attaches different meanings to them. For example, one person may
view United States involvement in Vietnam as an attempt to aid a
small helpless country and prevent it from a Chinese Communist take-
over. Another person may interpret this same action as an imperialistic
thrust on the part of the United States which is grounded in economic
self-interest and perpetuated by a military-industrial complex. In both
instances the two people are assessing the same events, but their per-
ceptions are somewhat different. Hadley Cantril has called a person’s
perceptions his “reality world.” He says: “Each of us has his own re-

11 Ibid., 331.
12 Armor, et al., 170.
Cantril and Boulding hypothesize that each individual has his own somewhat unique perceptions of the politically relevant world which influences his behavior.

Although one can say that perceptions constitute the relevant world for individuals, a problem still exists in extracting that portion of one's perceptions which is thought to be most important in shaping his political attitudes. A person's politically relevant perceptions may be quite encompassing, particularly if he is a political activist. It would be extremely difficult, except perhaps through psychoanalysis, to discern the entire scope of one's politically relevant perceptions in a systematic way. Consequently, this study concentrates on the following perceptions thought to be most relevant to the Vietnamese situation: (1) activists' perceptions of the intentions of the Soviet Union; (2) activists' perceptions of the intentions of the Peoples' Republic of China; (3) activists' perceptions of the intentions of the United States; (4) activists' perceptions of the independence of the NLF from North Vietnam; (5) activists' perceptions of the indigenous support of the NLF; and (6) activists' perceptions of the indigenous support of the Thieu-Ky regime. These perceptions are then related to variances in the recommendations and political strategy that leaders advocate. Specifically, activists were asked about the following policy areas: (1) the immediate changes they desire in United States policy in Vietnam; (2) the type of government they desire for Vietnam; (3) the changes they desire in United States foreign policy objectives; and (4) the strategy they think is most appropriate for the protest movement.

The conceptual hypothesis on which this article rests, then, is that activists in the Vietnamese protest movement have differing perceptions of the politically relevant world, which are linked to their atti-

tudes and policy recommendations. The data in this article, as the following discussion will demonstrate, lend credence to this hypothesis.

IV. A Typology of Activists in the Vietnam Protest Movement

The existence of differences within the protest movement is almost self-evident, but attempts to find a meaningful typology by which they can be analyzed have been elusive, as the previous discussion on research of the protest movement indicates. The typology that is used in this study differentiates activists according to their major objections to United States involvement in Vietnam. This variable is selected on the assumption that it is some aspect of United States policy in Vietnam—rather than some deep-seated psychological neurosis or a quirk in an activist's socialization process—which is most immediately related to his becoming an activist in the protest movement. These major objections were determined in a direct way: activists were simply asked their major objections to United States policy in Vietnam.\textsuperscript{15}

According to their responses, activists then were divided into two categories.\textsuperscript{16} The first group consists of those activists who are against the basic objectives the United States appeared to be pursuing in Vietnam (AABO) at the time the interviews took place.\textsuperscript{17} The second group

\textsuperscript{15} Activists were asked the following question: "What are your major objections to the participation of the United States in the Vietnamese conflict?"

\textsuperscript{16} Although these two categories could be further subdivided into the specific objectives or strategies to which activists are opposed, these categories would be so small as to render them meaningless in this type of analysis. Moreover, in preliminary analyses made of each category there do not appear to be meaningful differences within categories which related to either perceptions activists hold or recommendations they make.

\textsuperscript{17} Although there has always been some confusion about precisely what these basic objectives were, at the time of these interviews they seemed to be: establish a non- or anti-communist Vietnam, demonstrate that guerrilla war will not be permitted to succeed, and contain North Vietnamese, Chinese, or Asian communism. J. W. Fulbright has commented: "The official war aims of the United States, as I understand them, are to defeat what is regarded as North Vietnamese aggression, to demonstrate the futility of what the communists call 'wars of national liberation,' and to create conditions under which the South Vietnamese people will be able freely to determine their own futures." See J. W. Fulbright, \textit{The Arrogance of Power}, 15. It appears that by "freely determining their own future," Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Special Presidential Adviser Walt W. Rostow had in mind eliminating the "infrastructure" of the National Liberation Front.
consists of those activists who accept these objectives, but are against the strategy the United States was using to achieve these objectives. Although the second group accepts the ideals of these basic objectives, many of its members feel that Vietnam is not a very propitious place to realize them. Others think the strategy the United States has been using has a low probability of achieving the objectives. The strategy at the time of these interviews consisted of: controlled increasing escalation by United States military forces; the “other war” to “win the minds and hearts of the Vietnamese people”; and an attempt to legitimize the South Vietnamese regime through the drafting of a constitution, electing parliamentary representatives, and electing a President and Vice President. Of the ninety-four leaders interviewed, thirty-eight were AABO’s and fifty-six AAS’s.

V. The Data: Perceptions of the “Great Powers” and the Typology of the Protest Movement

A basic hypothesis of this study is that AABO’s and AAS’s have different perceptions of the intentions of the participants in the Vietnamese conflict. In the intentions of the participants that are explored below, the data reveal two distinct syndromes of perceptions, one related to AABO’s and the other to AAS’s.

Before these data are discussed, a statistical caveat should be kept in mind. It must be remembered that there are not as many AABO’s as AAS’s. Thirty-eight (40%) of the activists are AABO’s; fifty-six (60%) are AAS’s. Therefore, in examining the relationship between the perceptions of a participant’s intentions and the typology of the protest movement, there is not a probability of an equal split between AABO’s and AAS’s. Instead, the random probability is that 40% of activists with any specified perception will be AABO’s and 60% will be AAS’s. In other words, if no relationship exists between the perception and the typology, 40% will be AABO’s and 60% will be AAS’s. These two figures of 40% for AABO’s and 60% for AAS’s provide a base-line or an expected result from which actual differences can be analyzed. The crucial dif-

18 Since “activists against the basic objectives the United States is pursuing in Vietnam” and “activists against the strategy the United States is pursuing in Vietnam” are cumbersome phrases, these two groups will henceforth be referred to as AABO’s (activists against basic objectives) and AAS’s (activists against strategy).

19 For another attempt to arrive at a base-line figure for analysis of election results, see “The Concept of a Normal Vote,” in Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, Elections and the Political Order (New York: John Wiley and Sons Inc., 1966), 9–39.
ferences are not necessarily the ones between the actual percentages because there is not a random probability of there being an equal split between AABO’s and AAS’s. Just as important as the actual differences are those differences measured from the base-line or expected results. The greater the differences from these expected results, the more meaningful is the explanatory power of the variable under analysis. The introduction of a base-line or expected result offers a norm against which the significance of the actual deviations can be assessed. In this study the base-line of 40% for AABO’s and 60% for AAS’s represents the split that should occur by chance.

Tables I, II, and III relate activists’ perceptions of the Soviet Union,

**TABLE I**

*Relation Between the Perceptions of the Soviet Union’s Intentions in Vietnam and the Typology of the Protest Movement With Base-Line Figures*20

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOVIET UNION</th>
<th>SOVIET UNION</th>
<th>SOVIET UNION</th>
<th>SOVIET UNION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IS A RELUCTANT</td>
<td>WILL TAKE</td>
<td>ADVANTAGE OF</td>
<td>THE SITUATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARTICIPANT</td>
<td>ADVANTAGE OF</td>
<td>THE SITUATION</td>
<td>IF THE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AND A STATUS</td>
<td>OPPORTUNITY EXISTS</td>
<td>OPPORTUNITY EXISTS</td>
<td>OPPORTUNITY EXISTS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>quo power</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AABO’S</th>
<th>47%</th>
<th>25%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expected percentage</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual minus expected percentages</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>-15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AAS’S</th>
<th>53%</th>
<th>75%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expected percentage</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual minus expected percentages</td>
<td>-7%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N</th>
<th>(64)</th>
<th>(28)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Cramer’s $v = .205$

Question: “There has been quite a bit of controversy concerning the intentions of the Soviet Union in Vietnam. What do you think the Soviet Union’s intentions are?”

20 Although there are ninety-four activists in this study, the totals in this chart and in most of the following charts do not add up to ninety-four. This is because some responses could not be categorized, and some activists were unable to answer the questions about the intentions of a particular participant. This format will be used in all the tables discussing the relationship between activists’ perceptions and the typology of the protest movement.
TABLE II
Relationship Between Activists' Perceptions of Chinese Intentions in Vietnam and the Typology of the Protest Movement With Base-Line Figures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CHINA HAS NO INTENTION OF DOMINATION</th>
<th>CHINA DESIRES DOMINATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>AABO's</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expected percentages</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual minus expected percentages</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>—7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AAS's</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expected percentages</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual minus expected percentages</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(28)</td>
<td>(54)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cramer’s v = .281

Question: “There has been quite a bit of controversy concerning the intentions of China in Vietnam. What do you think China’s intentions are?”

the Peoples’ Republic of China, and the United States to activists’ major objections to United States policy in Vietnam.

In all three cases there are differences between the way AABO’s and AAS’s perceive the intentions of these countries in Vietnam. Those activists who perceive the Soviet Union and China to be uninterested in control of Vietnam tend to a disproportionate extent to be AABO’s. Perceptions of more aggressive intentions of the USSR and China are associate with AAS’s. Although this relationship is apparent in both cases, it is stronger in the case of perceptions of China.

One explanation for these findings relates to the extent to which the USSR and China are viewed as threats. If activists perceive these countries to be status quo oriented, a possible justification for United States involvement in Vietnam is removed: that is, the threat of communism of South Vietnam with substantial assistance from an outside power does not exist. Activists holding this status quo perception are unlikely to see the events in Vietnam having adverse implications for the security of the United States. Consequently, in assessing United States involvement in Vietnam, they are more apt to question United States basic objectives than her strategy. On the other hand, if activists
TABLE III
Relationship Between the Explanation of the Continuation of United States Policy in Vietnam and the Typology of the Protest Movement With Base-Line Figures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Widely Held, but Incorrect</th>
<th>Structural or Institutional Deficiencies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>AABO's</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expected percentages</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual minus expected percentages</td>
<td>-12%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AAS's</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expected percentages</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual minus expected percentages</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>-42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
<td>(72)</td>
<td>(22)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cramer's $v = .466$

Question: "Let me ask you a question about the United States. If all the problems which you have mentioned with our Vietnamese policy exist, why do you think we continue to pursue this policy?"

Think the Soviet Union or China may seek domination of Vietnam, they are more likely to interpret this action as a possible security threat. Thus, their disagreement with United States policy in this case is more likely to be focused on strategy than on basic objectives.

The strongest relationship in the data about the great powers is associated with the United States. Those who attribute United States escalation to widely held but incorrect attitudes of decision-makers tend

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21 The question about perceptions of United States involvement in Vietnam was asked after the respondent had already given his views of the intentions of all of the other participants in the conflict. In explaining the perceptions activists constructed what they considered to be a strong case against United States policy in Vietnam. It was felt, therefore, that interesting information could be gleaned by asking activists—after they had proposed what they believed to be a convincing case—the reasons they felt the United States continued its policy in Vietnam. Hence, this question is phrased somewhat differently than other questions about the intentions of the participants in the conflict.
to be AAS's, while those activists who attribute this policy to the more deep-seated problem of structural or institutional deficiencies in the United States are likely to be AABO's.

One explanation for these findings rests on the extent of change implicit in the responses of the activists. Those activists who perceive United States escalation to be caused by institutional or structural deficiencies are suggesting rather extensive change. Change in either the existing policy-maker's attitudes or election of new policy-makers with different attitudes is not thought to be sufficient or meaningful enough to lead to improved policy. This extensive change in governmental institutions desired by these activists is carried over to the major objections these activists have to United States policy in Vietnam. Thus, these activists tend to express their disagreements with that policy in terms of basic objectives.

For those activists who see escalation to have been rooted in incorrect attitudes of decision-makers, change can take place relatively easily. Either new decision-makers with different attitudes can be elected or the existing decision-makers can be forced or persuaded to alter their attitudes. This demand for relatively limited change also is carried over to activists' objections to United States policy in Vietnam, focusing on the strategy the United States was pursuing at the time of these interviews.

VI. The Data: Perceptions of the Indigenous Combatants and the Typology of the Protest Movement

As in the case of perceptions of the great powers, there are differences in the way in which AABO's and AAS's perceive the indigenous participants in the conflict. When asked about the NLF's relationship with North Vietnam, the extent of support of the NLF in South Vietnam, and the support of the Thieu-Ky regime in South Vietnam, differences in the responses of AABO's as compared to AAS's appear as indicated in Tables IV, V and VI. AABO's perceive the NLF to be more independent of North Vietnam than the AAS's, see the NLF as having more support from the people of South Vietnam than do the AAS's, and see more limited support for the Thieu-Ky regime among the South Vietnamese than do the AAS's.

The three sets of perceptions which the AABO's hold about the indigenous participants in the conflict can be explained by three historical ideas surrounding United States foreign policy. These three ideas are: the United States should practice non-interference in the domestic politics of foreign governments; peoples should be permitted self-
Question: “Much of the debate about the war in Vietnam concerns the National Liberation Front or the Viet Cong. How would you describe the independence or lack of independence of the NLF in relation to North Vietnam?”

determination; and those governments are legitimate which represent and demonstrate the existence of popular support of their people.22

If activists perceive the NLF as being relatively independent of North Vietnam, as AABO’s do to a disproportionate extent, then by definition the Vietnamese conflict is a domestic one as far as these activists are concerned. Thus, by participating in this conflict, the United States is violating one of its more cherished principles. Therefore, these activists are more likely to question United States basic objectives than strategy. Conversely, if activists tend to see the NLF under North Vietnam’s control, as AAS’s do to a disproportionate extent, the conflict is no longer purely a domestic one. With this perception, the United States is seen as responding to a prior violation of the principle of noninterference into the domestic politics of another state. Conse-

22 The strength of these principles does not depend on their necessarily being adhered to in every case. As long as administrative officials believe that their specific policies are attempting to realize these goals, and they attempt to gain support for their policies with arguments based on these ideas, it is an indication of their importance.
TABLE V

**Relationship Between Perceptions of the NLF's Support in South Vietnam and the Typology of the Protest Movement With Base-Line Figures**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NLF IS THE LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE OF SOUTH VIETNAM</th>
<th>NLF HAS SOME VOLUNTARY SUPPORT IN SOUTH VIETNAM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>AABO's</strong></td>
<td>Expected Percentage</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Actual minus expected percentage</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AAS's</strong></td>
<td>Expected percentage</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Actual minus expected percentage</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>(25)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cramer's v = .246

Question: "How about the existence of support for the NLF among the people of South Vietnam? How would you assess their support?"

Consequently, objections these activists hold are more likely to be focused on the strategy the United States is pursuing in Vietnam than on her basic objectives.

An explanation for the differences in Table v can be seen in the second of these historical principles—the right of self-determination. If the NLF is perceived to be the legitimate representative of the people of South Vietnam, as AABO's tend to perceive the NLF then attempts by the United States to limit the effectiveness of the NLF can be interpreted as thwarting the self-determination of the people of South Vietnam. With such an interpretation these activists are more likely to object to the fact that the United States is involved in Vietnam than the methods she is employing there. Thus, more of these activists should be AABO's than AAS's. However, if activists perceive the NLF as being

23 The strength of this idea can be realized by the fact that the administration also frequently argues that its aim is to establish an environment where the people of South Vietnam would be free to decide their own future. The debate between supporters and opponents of the official United States policy is not over the goal of self-determination, it is over the interpretation of what constitutes self-determination.
TABLE VI
Relationship Between the Perceptions of the Support for the Thieu-Ky Regime Among the South Vietnamese and the Typology of the Protest Movement With Base-Line Figures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>THIEU-KY REGIME</th>
<th>HAS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HAS NO SUPPORT</td>
<td>LIMITED SUPPORT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AABO</strong>'s</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expected percentage</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual minus expected percentage</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>-18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AAS</strong>'s</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expected percentage</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual minus expected percentage</td>
<td>-5%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
<td>(51)</td>
<td>(18)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cramer’s $v = .206$

Question: “How would you assess the extent of support for the Thieu-Ky regime among the people of South Vietnam?”

only one group among other politically significant groups in South Vietnam, the involvement of the United States per se does not necessarily prevent self-determination in Vietnam. Consequently, the objections of these activists are more likely to be focused on strategy than on basic objectives, and these activists are more likely to be AAS’s than AABO's.

The circumstances under which the American people tend to grant legitimacy to foreign governments offer an explanation for the findings in Table VI. Ideologies and governmental organization aside, governments are considered to be legitimate to the extent that they can demonstrate the existence of support from their people. Those governments that can indicate they are founded on uncoerced popular support are more likely to get sympathetic support from the American people than governments lacking this support. If activists perceive the Thieu-Ky regime as having no support among the people of South Vietnam as AABO’s tend to do, then United States support for this regime violates this principle. Consequently, these activists are apt to question the basic reasons why the United States is supporting this regime and are more likely to find fault with United States basic objectives than her strategy. On the other hand, if the Thieu-Ky regime is perceived
as having at least limited support from the people of South Vietnam, as the AAS’s tend to perceive this regime, then support for this regime by the United States is not as likely to be interpreted as a violation. Thus, these activists’ objections are more likely to be focused on United States strategy than on basic objectives.

VII. Overview of Perceptions and AABO’s and AAS’s

The preceding analysis demonstrates the existence of a relationship between the perceptions activists have of the participants in the Vietnamese conflict and the typology of the peace movement. Although the division is not a complete one in all cases, taken as a group, these perceptions form a distinct perceptual set for each group of activists so that one can speak of a “typical” activist in each group. The typical AABO holds the following set of perceptions: (1) the Soviet Union is a reluctant participant in Vietnam and a status quo power; (2) China has no intention of dominating Vietnam; (3) the reason for the continuation of United States policy in Vietnam is because of structural or institutional deficiencies in the United States; (4) the NLF’s relationship to North Vietnam is one of aid but no control; (5) the NLF is the legitimate representative of the people of South Vietnam; and (6) the Thieu-Ky regime has no support in South Vietnam. Contrary to AABO perceptions, the typical AAS maintains the following set of perceptions: (1) the Soviet Union will take advantage of the situation if the opportunity exists; (2) China desires domination of Vietnam; (3) the continuation of United States policy in Vietnam is because of widely held, but incorrect, attitudes which exist in the United States; (4) the NLF’s policies are controlled by North Vietnam; (5) the NLF has some voluntary support in South Vietnam; and (6) the Thieu-Ky regime has at least limited support in South Vietnam.

While each perception of the AABO’s and of the AAS’s reinforces the others, each is not held with the same degree of strength. Activists’ perceptions of the reasons for the continuation of United States policy in Vietnam are much stronger than any of the other perceptions, as evidenced by a comparison of Cramer’s v for each of the tables. The v score of .466 for this relationship is much greater than any of the other relationships. The other four v scores range between .284 and

24 Cramer’s v is a nonparametric statistic which measures the existence and strength of a relationship between two variables comprised of nominal data. For a further discussion, see Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., Social Statistics (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1960), 228–234.
.384, which is considerably weaker than the relationship between the perceptions of the reasons for the continuation of United States policy in Vietnam and the typology of the protest movement. These findings suggest that more sophisticated explanations of the relative strength of variables associated with the peace movement may be possible by further probing activists' perceptions of various aspects of American society.

VIII. The Data: Typology of the Peace Movement and Policy Recommendations

Although the above tables indicate the existence of different perceptual frames of reference by the two groups of activists in the protest movement, they hint only obliquely at the policy recommendations and strategy desired by these activists. The Tables VII to X indicate that differing policy recommendations flow from these different perceptual sets held by AABO's and AAS's. In these tables the typology of the protest movement is related to the following policy recommendations: (1) the immediate changes desired in United States policy in Vietnam; (2) the type of government desired in South Vietnam; (3) changes desired in the foreign policy objectives of the United States; and (4) the strategy considered most appropriate for the peace movement.

IX. Recommendations Concerning Vietnam

The immediate policy changes desired in Vietnam provide the peace movement's raison d'être. Activists are categorized in Table VII according to the unilateral changes they want the United States to institute in Vietnam. These are steps which would require no immediate response from the NLF or North Vietnam.

There is a rather striking difference in the unilateral policy changes activists seek. Eighty-seven percent of the AABO's advocate unilateral withdrawal or a cease-fire, while only 13% recommend lesser meas-

25 Although no rule exists as to what is considered a "strong" score for Cramer's v for this type of research, William J. Crotty suggests the rule of thumb that scores ranging between .20-.29 indicate a moderate relationship, scores between .30-.39 indicate a moderately strong relationship, and scores over .40 indicate a strong relationship. See William J. Crotty, "The Party Organization and Its Activities," in William J. Crotty, ed., Approaches to the Study of Party Organization (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1968), 255.
TABLE VII

Relationship Between the Typology of the Protest Movement and Immediate Changes Desired in United States Policy in Vietnam With Base-Line Figures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AABO's</th>
<th>AAS's</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unilateral withdrawal or cease-fire</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expected distribution</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual minus expected distribution</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesser measures of de-escalation</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expected distribution</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual minus expected distribution</td>
<td>-40%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(38)</td>
<td>(56)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cramer's $v = .661$

Question: "What specific changes would you recommend the United States pursue in Vietnam?"

In Tables I to VI activists' perceptions of the participants are related to the typology of the protest movement. These perceptions are considered to be the independent variables and the typology is the dependent variable because the concern is with the relationship between activists' perceptions and the typology of the peace movement. In Tables VII to X the typology is related to policy recommendations. In these cases the typology is the independent variable and policy recommendations are the dependent variable since the concern now is with the relationship of the protest movement to different policy recommendations. This change is the reason for the alteration of the format of this and the following tables. This change in the format of tables affects the expected distribution because the expected distribution is now calculated by dividing the number of respondents in each policy recommendation by the total number of respondents. Thus, the random probability is a function of the marginal dependent variable in each table. In this case it would be a function of the marginals of those activists advocating "unilateral withdrawal or cease fire" and those advocating "lesser measures of de-escalation." Thus for Table VII the expected distribution is 47% [(0.87 x 38) + (0.20 x 56)] 94 for those advocating unilateral withdrawal or cease fire, and 53% [(0.13 x 38) + (0.80 x 56)] 94 for those advocating lesser measures of de-escalation. If no relationship exists, it is these percentages one would expect to find. Deviations from these percentages indicate an existence of a relationship between the typology and recommendations activists make. Since the marginals in the dependent variable will change from table to table, the expected distribution will change. However, the principle remains the same, that is, the expected distribution in Tables VII to X are a function of the marginals of the dependent variable.
ures of de-escalation. Nearly the reverse pattern exists among AAS's, where 20% advocate unilateral withdrawal or a cease-fire, and 80% seek lesser measures of unilateral de-escalation.

Closely related to the steps of unilateral de-escalation activists recommend in United States Vietnamese policy is the type of government they would like to see instituted in Vietnam. These findings are presented in Table VIII.

TABLE VIII

| Relationship Between Typology of the Protest Movement and the Type of Government Activists Desire in South Vietnam With Base-Line Figures |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|----------|
|                                                                                     | AABO's | AAS's |
| Government controlled by NLF or North Vietnam                      | 66%    | 40%    |
| Expected percentages                                  | 51%    | 51%    |
| Actual minus expected percentages                  | 15%    | -11%   |
| Coalition government in South Vietnam                  | 34%    | 60%    |
| Expected percentages                                  | 49%    | 49%    |
| Actual minus expected percentages                  | -15%   | 11%    |
| N                                                   | 35     | 52     |

Cramer's $v = .248$

Question: "Let me ask you a question about the type of government that will exist in Vietnam after the conflict is over. What do you think could be the best government for Vietnam?"

Though not as striking as the differences seen in the extent of unilateral de-escalation, substantial differences exist. AABO's disproportionately prefer a government controlled by North Vietnam or the NLF (66% to 34%) while most AAS's would like to see a coalition government in South Vietnam (60% to 40%).

These two different recommendations made by AABO's as compared to AAS's are easily comprehensible if the perceptual frame with which they are associated is recalled. Activists holding the set of perceptions about the great powers and indigenous participants which the AABO's hold are likely to advocate an immediate unilateral withdrawal and cease-fire and recommend a government controlled by North Vietnam or the NLF. The lack of any perceived desire for expansion and control by the USSR and China, coupled with the perception of United States
escalation in Vietnam as reflecting institutional and structural deficiencies, readily buttresses a recommendation for unilateral withdrawal or ceasefire. Similarly, recommendations for a government controlled by the NLF or Ho Chi Minh easily flow from a tendency to see the NLF as the legitimate representative of the people of South Vietnam and independent of North Vietnam in formulating policy. The view of the Thieu-Ky regime as having no support in South Vietnam also fits nicely with this recommendation.

Conversely, activists holding the set of perceptions about the great powers and indigenous participants which AAS's hold are much more likely to suggest limited forms of de-escalation in South Vietnam. If one perceives the possibility of expansion by either the USSR or China, and combines these perceptions with believing that United States escalation rests on widely held, but incorrect, attitudes, then recommendations for more limited measures of de-escalation seem to be reasonable. AAS's tend to hold these perceptions. Similarly, recommendations for a coalition government in South Vietnam rest comfortably on perceptions of the NLF as controlled by North Vietnam and as only one among other politically significant groups with support in South Vietnam. Moreover, perceiving the Thieu-Ky regime with some, if limited, support in South Vietnam further helps maintain this perception. AAS's tend both to make these recommendations and to embrace these sets of perceptions.

X. Recommendations Concerning Changes in Foreign Policy

Objectives of The United States

The differences which exist between AABO's and AAS's recommendations for United States unilateral de-escalation and the type of government desired in South Vietnam indicate that differences also exist in the general foreign policy objectives they would like the United States to pursue. Although activists were questioned about the general foreign policy objectives they advocate, their responses usually concentrated on the more specific levels of strategy and tactics than on general foreign policy objectives. For example, instead of mentioning a desire to reduce tensions in the cold war, activists recommend we ease trade policies with Eastern European countries or more rapidly pursue a detente with the Soviet Union.

Because activists tend to answer this question on the level of strategy and tactics, a categorization of their literal responses would not be helpful in assessing the changes they desire in United States general foreign policy objectives. Instead it is necessary to develop a
method for transposing the implications in their remarks about specific foreign policy changes to the level of changes in general foreign policy objectives. Therefore, a judgment must be made about the degree of change in the general foreign policy objectives implicit in activists’ recommendations. This judgment requires a classificatory scheme of general foreign policy objectives.

One such scheme is to picture the degree of change in activists’ general foreign policy objectives on a continuum. At one end of the continuum are those activists who seek \textit{systemic change} in United States foreign policy.

At the center are those activists who seek \textit{programmed-evolutionary change}. At the other end of the continuum are those who seek \textit{incremental change}.

Three criteria have been used to determine whether the activist’s specific recommendations imply a systemic change. One concerns whether the implementation of activists’ suggestions would result in a foreign policy of imperialism, \textit{status quo}, or self-abnegation on the part of the United States. Any recommendation which would result in a policy of either imperialism or self-abnegation is considered a recommendation for systemic change from the existing general objec-

\begin{itemize}
\item[27] The use of the word “systemic” has at least two antecedents in the social sciences. One is to analyze a policy in its total environment and to delineate influences that the environment, or system, has on the policy and in turn the effect the policy has on the system. Another use of the word is to designate a complete change in an area of inquiry such as the change brought about in astronomy by Copernicus as compared to the previously accepted Ptolemaic system. It is in the latter sense of the word that “systemic” is used in this study although the change desired in foreign policy is not nearly as dramatic as indicated in this example.


\item[29] I am relying on Morgenthau’s use of imperialism and \textit{status quo}. He considers an imperialistic policy to be one in which a government and its people desire to expand their influence abroad. A \textit{status quo} policy is one in which a government and its people are satisfied with their influence in the rest of the world and want to preserve it. See Hans J. Morgenthau, \textit{Politics Among Nations}, 4th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967), 38–86.

\end{itemize}
tives of United States foreign policy. An example of this type of recommendation made by some activists is that the United States lead and encourage revolutionary forces in developing countries. If this suggestion were implemented, it would result in a decision to expand United States influence abroad and would be an imperialistic policy. Consequently, a suggestion of this type is categorized as a systemic change in the general foreign policy objectives of the United States. An alternative suggestion is that the United States forego all world responsibilities and concentrate all her energies on her own domestic problems. The implementation of this policy would result in self-reduction of the existing influence of the United States in world politics, and it would, therefore, constitute a systemic change in the general foreign policy objectives of the United States.

A second and related criterion defining systemic change is the extent to which a recommendation proscribes the use of non-nuclear arms and weapons to achieve a nation's foreign policy goals. Any recommendations which envision relinquishing the use of non-nuclear armed force by the United States are considered systemic changes in general foreign policy objectives. An example of this type of recommendation is that the United States engage in conflicts only under the auspices of the United Nations. A second example is that the United States eliminate all existing overseas military bases. In both of these cases severe limitations are being placed on the use of non-nuclear armed force by the United States. Since the threat to use armed force has been a traditional means for implementing foreign policy goals, recommendations which would limit their use are considered systemic.

A final criterion which determines whether activists' recommendations involve systemic changes concerns alterations envisioned in the

30 Assessments about the extent of change in activists' foreign policy recommendations must rest on some notion about the existing general objectives of United States foreign policy. It is important to clarify assumptions about existing general foreign policy objectives so that a base-line exists from which the extent of change implicit in a recommendation can be determined. It is assumed that at the time of these interviews the general foreign policy objectives of the United States were to preserve her existing influence abroad. Thus, recommendations which suggest an immediate and far reaching deviation from preserving the existing influence of the United States abroad—such as policies of imperialism or self-abnegation—are considered to be systemic changes. If the existing policies, however, were to extend United States influence abroad, recommendations that involved only preserving the existing influence would be categorized as systemic changes. Consequently, systemic changes refer to a far reaching and complete change from existing objectives.
nation-state system. Activists' recommendations which advocate the replacement of the nation-state as the primary terminal unit in world politics are considered systemic changes in United States general foreign policy objectives. An example of this type of systemic recommendation is that the United States make immediate plans to join a world government which would assume traditional functions of defense and taxation that are now performed by existing national units.

If any one of these three criteria exists, the conduct of world politics and the role of the United States in world politics would be carried on under entirely different conditions. Because these changes are so complete and would result in a significantly different world order than presently exists, they are labeled systemic changes.

At the opposite end of the continuum are those activists who seek incremental changes in United States foreign policy. These are changes which recent administrations have been attempting to achieve and have specific programs in operation to bring about. However, either these activists object to the low priority they feel is being placed on these changes, or they object to some feature about the existing methods the administration is using to implement them. An example of this type of foreign policy recommendation would be an activist who either advocates that the United States place more emphasis on technical assistance in her foreign aid programs and less emphasis on military aid, or that she increase her cultural exchange programs with Communist nations. There are programs in operation to achieve these objectives. Activists' objections are only to the priority attached to these programs or to a minor detail of the administration of the program.

In between incremental changes and systemic changes are what can be called programmed-evolutionary changes in United States foreign policy. These are changes that the administration has no real strategy to implement, or is implementing much slower than wished by activists. The changes, however, would still maintain the essential features of the role of the United States in world politics. An example of a recommendation that fits into this category is that the United States cease supporting leaders who do not have popular support among the people in their countries. A change of this type would leave intact the basic features of the current international system. It would not result in changing the status quo orientation of United States foreign policy. It neither envisions a change in the nation-state system nor proscribes the use of non-nuclear arms. Nevertheless, it would be a significant deviation from present United States foreign policy, in which unpopular leaders are frequently supported because of perceived security reasons or economic interests.
The data to test the relationship between AABO’s and AAS’s and types of general foreign policy changes is presented in Table IX.

**TABLE IX**

Relating Typology of the Protest Movement and Recommendations for Changes in the Foreign Policy Objectives of the United States With Base-Line Figures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AABO’s</th>
<th>AAS’s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Systemic change</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expected distribution</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual minus expected distribution</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programmed-evolutionary change</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expected distribution</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual minus expected distribution</td>
<td>-8%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incremental change</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expected distribution</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual minus expected distribution</td>
<td>-15%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(37)</td>
<td>(55)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cramer’s v = .397

Question: “What general foreign policy objectives would you like the United States to pursue?”

The explanation for the difference in the recommendations of AABO’s and AAS’s also is associated with the different perceptual frames of reference of these two groups, particularly the differences which were perceived as to why the United States continued its policy of gradual escalation. Activists who perceive the reason for gradual escalation to rest with structural or institutional deficiencies in the United States are likely to see the need for far-reaching changes in United States foreign policy implied in systemic changes. Since AABO’s tend to hold this perception (see Table III), it is understandable that they would tend to recommend systemic changes in United States foreign policy.

On the other hand, activists who perceive the reason for continued United States escalation to rest on widely held, but incorrect, attitudes of policy makers are not as likely to see the need for the complete change implicit in systemic recommendations. Their recommendations will tend to be more limited in scope. As Table IX indicates, AAS’s, who tend to hold this perception, suggest to a disproportionate extent that changes in objectives in United States foreign policy be incremental or programmed-evolutionary ones.
XI. Recommendations Concerning Protest Strategy

Perhaps the most significant deviation between the recommendations of AABO’s and AAS’s can be seen in the strategy each group recommends that the protest movement pursue. The time period when these interviews were conducted marked the beginning of important discussions within the protest movement concerning its strategy. Faced with the seeming inability to alter the Johnson administration’s policy in Vietnam, activists in the protest movement began to scrutinize more carefully the activities in which they ought to engage and the alternatives which might be pursued.

Activists were asked about the strategy they felt most appropriate for the protest movement to pursue. One category of activists looked forward to the 1968 primary contests and Presidential election as well as to continuing general educational activities, such as writing articles, giving speeches, and organizing peaceful demonstrations. This strategy will be called the electoral-educational strategy. Another category of activists felt that the protest movement had already tried these methods without any visible success. Because of the perceived imperviousness of the Johnson administration to the protest movement’s arguments, these activists suggested more far reaching measures. They focused on approaches such as civil disobedience or resistance which involved either withholding taxes, refusing to cooperate with the selective service system or impeding the government’s ability to procure war material. This strategy will be referred to as civil disobedience-resistance. A third category of activists felt that the above two types of activities were not mutually exclusive and that both should be used. This strategy will be referred to as electoral-educational and civil disobedience resistance.

The differences in Table x reflect more than the temperamental composition of each activist. Those activists concerned with altering the institutional foundations of the United States, which they hold responsible for United States Vietnamese policy, do not believe they are likely to accomplish their goals through educational techniques or the electoral processes. They propose strategies which would impede the operation of these institutions—the right of a state to raise an army and collect taxes. Whether these symbols are the most appropriate ones for their goals and whether their specific approach will succeed is a moot point. It is indisputable, however, that these focal points are associated more directly with AABO’s aims than is strategy directed at the electoral process.

AAS’s, on the other hand, do not see Vietnam as an institutionally determined policy. Because they view United States participation in the war as a result of attitudes in American society, an electoral-
TABLE X
Relationship Between the Typology of the Protest Movement and the Strategy Considered Most Appropriate for the Protest Movement to Pursue

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AABO'S</th>
<th>AAS'S</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil disobedience-resistance</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expected distribution</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual minus expected distribution</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>-18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both strategies</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expected distribution</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual minus expected distribution</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>-7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral-educational</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expected distribution</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual minus expected distribution</td>
<td>-39%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N (28) (40)

Cramer's $v = .698$

Question: “What strategy do you think would be most appropriate for the peace movement to pursue now and in the months to come?”

educational approach is more closely associated with their goals. Moreover, many of the AAS's at the time of these interviews were not so much against the presence of the United States in Vietnam as they were against the measures being used there. Consequently, their aim was concerned with changing a specific policy rather than affecting a complete change in United States foreign policy. An electoral-educational strategy is much more suitable for these goals.

XII. Overview of Recommendations of AAB's and AAS's

As in the case of the perceptions, AABO's and AAS's tend to make different policy recommendations. Moreover, the recommendations of each group rest comfortably with the perceptions that each group holds. Thus the perceptions which indicate differentiations between these two groups appear to be linked to policy recommendations they make. Just as one can speak of typical and distinct sets of perceptions for AABO's and AAS's, there exist typical sets of policy recommendations for the two groups. The typical AABO recommends (1) total
and immediate unilateral measures of de-escalation, such as withdrawal or cease-fire; (2) a government in Vietnam under either North Vietnam or the NLF's control; (3) systemic changes in the general foreign policy objectives of the United States; and (4) civil disobedience or resistance as strategies for the protest movement to pursue. The typical recommendations of AAS's differ from the AABO's in all of these categories. They suggest: (1) limited steps of unilateral de-escalation by the United States in Vietnam; (2) a coalition government in South Vietnam with NLF participation; (3) programmed-evolutionary changes in the general foreign policy objectives of the United States; and (4) strategies which emphasize electoral politics or educational activities.

Although the strength of the relationship between the typology of the protest movement and the recommendations made varies, these relationships tend to be stronger than the relationships between the perceptions activists hold and the typology of the protest movement, as indicated in the relatively higher scores for Cramer's v. Only in the case of the type of government desired in Vietnam is the relationship less than .3. The relatively high scores on issues directly related to the United States again suggests that more complete explanations about variances within the peace movement may be found by probing activists attitudes about American society in further detail.

XIII. Conclusion

The combination of differing sets of perceptions and differing policy recommendations result in important differences between AABO's and AAS's. Although there is some similarity in the responses of the two groups, the overall picture that emerges indicates the existence of two distinct groups, each having its own "reality world" and each making distinct types of policy recommendations.

Let us return to the questions initially proposed in this study: What is the source of the variations in the protest movement? What implications does it have for the internal dynamics of the protest movement? What implications does it have for the conduct of American foreign policy?

The source of these differing sets of perceptions and policy recommendations is not readily apparent in the data. However, underlying the split between AABO's and AAS's, one can posit the existence of a major value difference in the acceptance or rejection of the legitimacy of basic American institutions. Activists' verbal responses indicate that AABO's have either implicitly or explicitly decided that the United States needs vast and substantial alterations in her basic institutions.
They reject the viability of present institutions for achieving their goals. AAS's also frequently have major disagreements with the way in which institutions currently function. They do, however, accept the legitimacy of these institutions. They place the responsibility for their improper functioning on the attitudes held or the individuals at the head of these institutions, rather than on the institutions themselves. Consequently, their position tends to be quite different from AABO's. Rather than change dominant institutions, AAS's recommend (as we have seen) the relatively easier job of altering widely held, but incorrect, attitudes or changing the personnel in these institutions.

In order to test this proposition in a more rigorous way, a scale of acceptance or rejection of the legitimacy of American institutions was formulated from two responses offered by activists: the impediments which activists feel prevent their foreign policy recommendations from being implemented; and the impediments which they feel prevent their domestic policy recommendations from being implemented.31

Because the same categories were used to classify activists in each of these two areas, they are easily amenable to being combined into one scale. These categories are: policy-makers, attitudes, and institutions. During the interview each activist was probed on two separate occasions to account for the reasons the policies he advocated were not being adopted. In assessing each activist's response to these two questions one can infer the extent to which an activist thinks his policies are impeded by the institutional arrangements in the United States, and thereby make a judgment about an activist's acceptance or rejection of the legitimacy of American institutions.

The scale was constructed by assigning a value of one to each response that indicates the impediments are at the level of decision-makers; assigning a value of two to each response that indicates the impediments are at the level of attitudes; and assigning a value of three to each response that indicates the impediments are at the level of institutions. In this way, a score from two to six is possible for each activist. Activists scoring towards the upper end of the scale tend to see institutions impeding the recommendations they make. Activists at the middle or lower end of the scale feel either attitudes or decision-makers are the reasons their proposals are ignored.

31 Although the data are not reported in this article, activists were asked about the changes in domestic policy they would recommend. In addition they were asked, "What impediments do you think exist which prevent these (foreign, domestic) policies from being adopted?" It is the responses from these two questions which serves as the base for this scale.
If this argument has validity, the scale permits one to analyze the extent to which this variable underlies the dichotomy between AABO’s and AAS’s. The scale can be analyzed to see the percentage of AABO’s and AAS’s at each point. By taking note of the change in percentages of AABO’s and AAS’s on each different point, one can infer the extent to which different points are linked to each group of activists. This method of analysis permits one to draw inferences about the level of acceptance or rejection of the legitimacy of American institutions that are likely to be associated with the perceptions and recommendations each group of activists maintains.

Although the number of activists is small at each point in the scale, the direction of change is directly linear. As one goes up the scale there is an increase in the percentage of AABO’s from 0% to 97% and a decrease in the percentage of AAS’s from 100% to 3%. Those activists towards the sixth point on the scale, which indicates a rejection of the legitimacy of American institutions, are to a substantial and disproportionate extent more likely to be AABO’s than AAS’s. Even those activists at the fifth point are disproportionately AABO’s, though not nearly as much so as at the sixth point. Those activists at the lower end of the scale, which signified an acceptance of the legitimacy of American institutions, are more likely to be AAS’s than AABO’s.

These data have fascinating implications concerning a value associated with AABO’s and AAS’s. Although with this data, it would be improper to suggest that values concerning the legitimacy of American institutions cause an activist to be an AABO or an AAS, the strength of the relationship is striking. The data in Table xi strongly indicate that a rejection of the legitimacy of American institutions is a value closely linked with being an AABO, and an acceptance is a value closely associated with AAS’s.

Moreover, the Cramer’s v score of .578 is substantially stronger than any of the perceptual variables tested. One would need more detailed information about activists’ perceptions of American society—its strengths, weaknesses, susceptibility for change, and structural components—to indicate further the relationship of this factor to cleavages within the protest movement.

Given these different perceptual frames of reference, different policy recommendations and an underlying disagreement which seems to exist about the legitimacy of American institutions between AABO’s and AAS’s, what are the implications for the internal dynamics of the protest movement? If one asks this question about the AABO’s, it is doubtful that any settlement implemented by the Nixon administration (or that would have been implemented by the Johnson or a Humphrey
TABLE XI
Relationship Between the Scale of Acceptance or Rejection of the Legitimacy of American Institutions and the Typology of the Protest Movement With Base-Line Figures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SCALE OF LEGITIMACY OF AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AABO'S</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expected distribution</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>97%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual minus expected distribution</td>
<td>-40%</td>
<td>-27%</td>
<td>-14%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAS'S</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expected distribution</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual minus expected distribution</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>-8%</td>
<td>-57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(15)</td>
<td>(23)</td>
<td>(21)</td>
<td>(15)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cramer's $v = .578$

administration) would satisfy them. Because United States policy in Vietnam is looked upon as an event that could have occurred in any number of other countries, assuaging the problem of Vietnam would do little to bring about that transformation of American institutions which AABO'S consider to be the root cause of the present policy. Their anger with "establishment" criticisms of United States policy in Vietnam is more easily comprehended when one realizes that these ignore the underlying forces that AABO'S believe have caused United States involvement in Vietnam. Parenthetically, it is interesting to note that the effect of this argument about institutional corruption in the United States helps solidify AABO'S organizational base. Although their expectation of future counter-insurgency efforts by the United States is sincerely believed, it also serves the function of keeping AABO'S organizations together as United States participation in the conflict in Vietnam declines. Given the institutional basis of AABO'S criticisms, no settlement to which the United States is likely to agree in Vietnam

32 In this table a random distribution would result in 40% of activists being AABO'S and 60% being AAS'S since "acceptance or rejection of the legitimacy of American institutions" is considered to be the independent variable and the typology of the protest movement is considered to be the dependent.
will mollify them, because no settlement will transform institutions in the United States in the direction AABO's desire.

If an end to the war in Vietnam will offer only limited solace to the AABO's, in what direction are they likely to turn? It seems there are at least three options available. The least likely is that AABO's, seeing no immediate prospects of satisfaction for their demands, may grow tired of protest and become politically quiescent. These activists would then become part of a permanently alienated but nonvocal segment of American society. They would still maintain their major dissatisfactions with the structures and operation of American society, but have little hope of ever changing it. This alternative may have been more probable in calmer periods in United States history, but it is unlikely as long as the inequities confronting poor and black Americans continue to exist. These inequities and the institutional aspects of white racism which surround them will increasingly become a more prominent target for AABO's. It is this direction that is most likely to sustain AABO's political activism. Consequently, the alternative of quiescence is not likely for a large number of activists.

A second alternative may be a turn from nonviolent resistance to resistance irrespective of the means used. This alternative could only achieve success, however, if there were a sustained escalation of the war with an additional commitment of American troops or if the draft impinged more directly on large numbers of college students. In the present circumstances—even with the invasion in Cambodia—activists lack the strength to deter the government's response should they attempt violent resistance. It would take a dramatic increase in the size and skills of AABO's before this alternative could be seriously pursued. Moreover, the events in Grant Park at the Democratic Convention in Chicago, and the overwhelming public support for the actions of the Chicago police, indicate that the limits of toleration in the United States for anything hinting at violent protest may have been reached. This lack of public toleration is even more striking in view of the fact that the demonstrators received very favorable coverage from the news media. Since it appears that sustained escalation in Vietnam is unlikely—especially since the reaction to the Cambodian incursion—this alternative is not a probable one for a large number of AABO's.

A third alternative would find AABO's attempting to build more idyllic social organizations within a society that is perceived as being highly corrupt and impervious to change. Establishment of free universities, community cooperatives, and independent "underground" newspapers already forecast moves in this direction. Whether this will occur depends upon how activists assess other possibilities for chang-
The above discussion assumes that the strategy of AABO's must change because their present strategy is incapable of success. Indeed one could argue that success for this group's goals could only come about as long as the war was maintained at the level of escalation of 1967 and the beginning of 1968. Even then it is questionable how long society would tolerate their activities. Significant signs of intolerance were already noticeable in the reaction of public opinion to the march on the Pentagon in October 1967, public support for the Chicago policy during the 1968 Democratic Convention, the high potential support George Wallace was able to tap during his campaign, Nixon's appeals to the "silent majority," and the rise in Nixon's standing in the Gallup Poll since the events in Cambodia. If AABO activities are de-escalated it is uncertain how long they will be able to hold their members together. The lack of support for such activities as Dick Gregory's campaign bodes ill for their future sustained programs.

Even when the war was at its highest level of escalation, AABO's were able to achieve only limited success. Since that escalated level appears to be the optimum environment for AABO's, it is questionable that any future strategy will bring them closer to realizing their goals. Therefore, regardless of the direction of their change, this segment of the peace movement is apt to remain a permanently dissatisfied part of American society.³³

Changes in the war in Vietnam are likely to have a different impact on AAS's. A settlement of the war in the near future would remove most of these activists from their opposition to the administration's policies. The limitations of the bombing of North Vietnam, the Paris Peace talks, and the withdrawal of some American troops from Vietnam were effective in muting the criticism of these activists from the time of Nixon's election until the Moratorium of October 15, 1969. In

³³ There is another possibility for revitalizing of the AABO's, that is, to get others in the peace movement to accept the veracity of their perceptual frame. It is my hypothesis that by now many of the AAS's have accepted much of the perceptual frame of the AABO's. If this argument is correct, cooperation between the AABO's and AAS's would be much more likely, though disagreements between the two groups would continue since some vital issues may still separate them. Since the author intends to re-interview these activists, the data for this hypothesis will be presented in a future article.
retrospect, even that and subsequent moratoria were events which the Nixon administration could ride out. It took a major expansion of the war effort into Cambodia to reanimate this group of activists. Moreover, the thrust of their post-Cambodian activity—involvement in electoral politics—indicates that the most likely direction for AAS's is to continue political activity by working for specific reforms within the Democratic party, aiding Senators and Congressmen who hold similar views to the AAS's, and becoming involved in various political campaigns on the local level. Even prior to the withdrawal of troops, some activists were eager to aid the Democratic national ticket during the 1968 Presidential campaign in exchange for a statement on the part of Hubert H. Humphrey at Salt Lake City that appeared to be dovish, and it is probable that almost all AAS's would have supported any of the Democratic alternatives to Humphrey had they won the nomination.

Other directions for AAS's would emerge only if a sustained escalation of the war occurred with an increase in American troop commitments. If that were to occur, one would anticipate some AAS's joining ranks with the AABO's and others becoming politically quiescent.

With these internal dynamics likely for the peace movement, what implications does it have for the conduct of American foreign policy? The relatively low scores for Cramer's v on any data directly related to the domestic politics of Vietnam, as indicated in Tables IV, v, vi, and viii, suggest the lack of strong feelings by the protest movement concerning the type of government to which the United States agrees in Vietnam. As long as the United States completely extricates herself from involvement in Vietnam, the protest movement is not likely to care much about the type of government that is established. The administration may wish to preclude certain types of settlements for other reasons and may face strong resistance from other segments of opinion in American society for certain types of settlements. These findings, however, suggest that the protest movement will not insist on any particular type of government eventuating in Vietnam. This may offer more latitude for a settlement than administrative officials realize.

These data have other implications concerning the ability of the peace movement to influence governmental policy. Assuming a continuing de-escalation by the Nixon administration and an eventual extrication of the United States from Vietnam, a further bifurcation of the peace movement should occur with AABO's retaining their strong dissatisfaction, and AAS's being coopted back into active electoral political participation. Thus, it may be increasingly unlikely for anything
resembling a unified peace movement to exert pressure on American foreign policy.34

Nevertheless, the accomplishments of the peace movement need not be minimized. Even if the AAS's are coopted, they return to a different set of assumptions about the role of the United States in world politics than existed before United States intervention in Vietnam. The impetus for seeing United States foreign responsibilities in a more limited form can be attributed, at least partially, to arguments that were first made by the peace movement. Moreover, it was remarks which were initially articulated by leaders in the peace movement about the differences in the Communist world and the less aggressive intentions of the Soviet Union that are now pronounced openly and casually in official governmental circles. Finally, the peace movement has developed enough of a mass basis of support so that it can exert some restraining influence on attempts to escalate the war, such as occurred in the incursion into Cambodia. Indeed, it is interesting to note that after the initial reaction to this event, the Nixon administration attempted to support this policy by arguing it would increase American efforts to "Vietnamize" the war and speed the withdrawal of American troops.

These changes are important, when one realizes that as recently as the 1966 Congressional elections it was not considered expedient to make these comments at all, when bombing within "seconds" of China was frequently a news event in 1968 and when an invasion of North Vietnam was under serious discussion. These changes may not reach the extent which AABO's desire or which by other criteria are necessary, but they are likely to provide important arguments so that future Vietnams—with their tragic consequences for all the participants—are avoided.

34This conclusion is based on the assumption that the perceptual frames of the two groups remain relatively stable. If AAS's adopt much of the perceptual frame of the AABO's, a strategy of gradual de-escalation with the possibility of 50,000 to 250,000 "support" troops remaining in Vietnam for an indefinite period will not be satisfactory to the AAS's. This change in the perception of AAS's, if it has occurred, may bring about more invigorated activities by the peace movement.