PERSPECTIVES ON THE AMERICAN STUDENT MOVEMENT*

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The sources of student discontent are the major concern of this paper. It is argued that a major source of this discontent is the alienation (in the Marxist sense) of intellectual labor. Arguments that point to the growth of the multiversity and to the growth of a "liberated generation" are shown to be compatible with and subsumed by this approach. Arguments that point to general political and social issues as the main causes of student unrest are held to be inadequate since they fail to answer the question of why students are so much more active than other possible constituencies. Implications of this analysis for Barrington Moore's theories about the wellsprings of freedom and for Dahrendorf's model of preconditions for organization are discussed.

The study of any social movement involves looking at a number of factors: the circumstances under which it emerges; the reasons why there is a category of people in society such that large numbers of its members are willing to be active in a movement for change; the organizational forms the movement takes; and the heavily intertwined questions of the beliefs the movement expresses, its strategies and tactics, and the nature of official responses to the movement. This analysis addresses the first two factors—the conditions of initial organization of the movement and the question of why students are available for radical political movement—in an attempt to discover some causes of student unrest and activism among white college and university students in America.

THE PRECONDITIONS

A group of people may both be oppressed and feel oppressed for many years without taking any organized action. For a movement to occur, cer-
tain preconditions must be met. In particular, as Dahrendorf (1959:182-89) points out, a movement needs a collection of initial leaders and organizers; ideologies (in the broad sense) and/or ideologists; enough political freedom that potential members can get together; communication among the potential membership base; and structurally ordered selection into the social aggregate that comprises the potential membership base.

By looking at the ways in which the student movement has met these preconditions, we can get some useful insights into its early characteristics and development as well as see one set of "causes" of the movement. First, both the initial leadership and the initial ideologies came out of the civil rights movement and the early peace movement. Thus, in the early 60s the student movement was in many ways a subordinate movement, with many of the leaders seeing it as the "campus branch" of much wider movements. Also, since its early organizers could borrow basic principles, strategies, and often even tactics from outside, at first the movement seemed to have little ideology of its own—and even developed an ideology of opposing all ideologies.

Second, the student movement first appeared at schools in which students had at least rudimentary political rights (Peterson, 1968, is unclear but seems on p. 309 to imply findings that uphold this position). Thus, Chicago, Swarthmore, Berkeley, Harvard, and Michigan, all had relatively liberal policies on students' civil liberties. In addition, the students in these schools tended to have family backgrounds and academic records that made them relatively immune from punishment—even the "extreme penalty" of expulsion would often just mean transferring to another school.

Third, students in general have a large degree of communication among themselves. News travels from campus to campus in a number of ways. Student papers carry news from other schools; there is constant intercampus visiting for football games, religious conferences, dating, political discussions, and so forth; and the mass media cover major campus confrontations. Transferring students carry even more information—a single new graduate student may embody four years of experience in the politics of her or his undergraduate college (which may explain why the leading graduate universities have often been centers for the development of movement ideologies, as activists with different experiences came into contact with each other). Thus, the precondition for communication between campuses was met easily.

On the other hand, schools vary considerably in the degree to which communication occurs among the students at a given campus. In general, such communication tends to be higher in schools in which students live in dormitories or in the immediate locale and lower in commuter schools. Similarly, students in schools in which there are nearby coffee houses and other centers of student culture will see each other more frequently than those in schools without such facilities. This implies that schools in which communication is low would have developed movements later (and would have had more trouble in sustaining them) than high communication schools.\footnote{I have little data with which to test this hypothesis. Peterson (1968:311) re-}
Finally, students clearly become students in a structurally ordered, rather than a random, way. College entrance occurs through a number of well-established procedures—going through high school, doing reasonably well in course work, taking entrance examinations, talking to friends about "where to go," and so forth. This creates a sense of common identity, as well as a wide degree of common experience, and thus makes organization easier. It also creates an elitism which has often led to statements and/or actions that have cost the student movement many possible allies. For example, many students in the early anti-war movement thought it perfectly reasonable that they should be exempted from the draft; and many non-student potential draftees reacted strongly against this.

**Sources of Student Discontent**

Perhaps the most important question in the analysis of the student movement is that of why students are discontented. The remainder of this analysis will involve some of the theories that have been proposed to explain student unrest, and will put forward an additional explanation based on changes in the nature of the after-graduation work open to students. More specifically, I develop the

ports that the commuter-residential dimension is negligible in explaining campus activism. However, the belief in the difficulty of organizing in commuter schools is shared by most movement organizers I have talked to, as well as by California ex-Superintendent of Public Instruction Max Rafferty. Also, any one who has seen the difficulties in getting a meeting together at UCLA or Northeastern as compared with Berkeley, Swarthmore, or Harvard will immediately understand this point (which applies to communication among the cadre as well as among the mass of students).

position that such work is becoming alienated, and somewhat "proletarianized," labor.

One set of explanations of student unrest focuses on conditions in the multiversity (Kerr, 1964; Scott and El-Assal, 1969; Skolnick, 1969:111-120). The argument is that its size, bureaucratization, and impersonality lead to student alienation, resentment, and protest. Theoretically, this argument falls within the basic framework of "class conflict" put forward as the central model in Dahrendorf (1959, especially chapters IV and V). There is no doubt that many student demonstrations have focused on the authority of the university administration. There is also no doubt that many students find the educational side of the university inadequate or worse, and that sometimes this too becomes an overt issue. However, it should be equally clear that this approach does not explain either of two phenomena that are absolutely crucial to the understanding of changes in student politics in the last 20 years: (1) the widely noted change in career plans of students away from business and towards social services; and (2) the predominance of non-campus issues such as the War in Indo-China, racism, and political repression as the foci of movement concern and action, and the related high frequency of off-campus demonstrations and organizing campaigns. Thus, it should be clear that the multiversity focus is only a partial explanation of student unrest.2

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2 A reasonable requirement for an alternative theory is, of course, that it not conflict with the findings supporting the multiversity theory. One aspect of the theory of the student movement proposed in this paper is that it shows how the factors that lead to the alienation of intellectual labor also lead to the creation and multiplication of multi-
Another set of explanations argue that the great political issues of American society—such as the Vietnam War, racism, male supremacy, and political repression—cause student unrest (Dunlap, 1970a; Skolnick, 1969:79-124). This explanation has a certain value—it points to the immediate causes of many demonstrations and organizations, and it is helpful in explaining many of the motivations of students taking part in their first movement activity (as well as those of many more experienced activists). Furthermore, the dynamics of many of these conflicts have determined the speed of growth of the movement, its major events, and to some extent the development of its ideologies (Friedman, 1972b). However, this explanation fails to answer the question, "Why students?" That is, all the issues pointed to as explaining the student movement could equally well "explain" other possible movements in terms of these same issues; in fact, it could become hard to see why we do not see militant movements of everyone concerned about these issues.  

It can be argued in response that students react most strongly to major current issues because of the specific nature of their social situation. That is, they have more political freedom than most universities, and, crucially, points out that the very nature of the multiversity and education therein, makes students aware of the nature of their future careers. Thus, the multiversity not only creates student discontent in its own right, it also plays an important role in linking the objective futures of students to their present (subjective) consciousness.  

This same objection also applies to explanations of the student movement in terms of goals like "building community" or "making truly human relations possible." That is, the question is still, "Why students?"

people, more time to participate in activities, and fewer restrictive commitments. Furthermore, campuses are a center for discussions of all kinds, and of political issues in particular. Finally, students tend to be relatively young, which means both that the pressures of military conscription are particularly strong and that student activists missed the conservatizing effects of the McCarthy era and of the end of the Depression before that. If this explanation is valid, it implies that students are a naturally volatile group that is liable to be active whenever there are great issues confronting society, and that in the last decade there have been historically specific factors (some of which were discussed in the "Preconditions" section of this paper) that have intensified this "normal" volatility to explosive levels.

It is clear that there is a great deal of truth to this argument. Students are members of a post-Depression generation, even if it is not true that they are post-McCarthy. (The early members of the student movement were in their teens during part of the McCarthy era; and even the younger members grew up in its shadow, since the spectre of the witchhunt was importantly weakened only by the rebirth of mass action by blacks in the early 60s and then by the student movement itself.) The campus is a center of political discussion, and provides more time and even protection for activism than does the world of work. However, this explanation is not a sufficient one. It fails short of telling us "why students?" in that there are other groups with relatively large amounts of free time and relatively high degrees of freedom from job-related pressures; and some of these groups are young and have a
fairly high degree of communication with each other. The most obvious such group is the large number of unemployed youths (who are furthermore at least as exposed to conscription as students), but others exist as well—such as the young housewives without children who are mobilizable under appropriate conditions: the clear example being the women's movement. In addition, there are a great many retired people who are equally much in close contact with each other and are often relatively safe from economic retribution as well (although they are certainly not post-Depression and certainly not as energetic as students). Thus, given that students are a volatile group, it is clear that they are not the only such group. We are left with the question of why this particular volatile group was pushed into a period of sustained activism.

It should also be noted that the explanation of the student movement in terms of the conjunction of a socially volatile campus life with major issues in the society as a whole fails to explain which students get involved except on a relatively *ad hoc* basis. More importantly, it fails to explain why there is a strong general current of alienation from American society among students—a current trend that runs far deeper than is warranted by discontent with specific issues like the war and racism. For instance, it fails to explain the widespread distaste for available career patterns that Flacks finds, or the growth of the Jesus Movement after the defeat of student activism, or the widespread search for alternative life styles among students and ex-students (Flacks, 1970; Friedman and Pierce, 1972; MacGregor, 1971; Wong, 1971).

Why, then, were students the ones in motion? There remain two types of explanation to consider. First, those that argue that students' values lead them in particular into struggle; and second, those that argue that the general social situation of students predisposes them to change major aspects of their society.

Many analysts have looked at the values and socialization of student activists (Dunlap, 1970b; Flacks, 1967, 1970; Kahn, 1969; Kenniston, 1968; Westby and Braungart, 1966). There is a considerable agreement that activists (at least in the first two-thirds of the 60s) tended to be good students who put a high value on intellectualism, independence, autonomy, and being socially useful and creative. Flacks (1970:346) in particular shows that there is a considerable degree of continuity in the values of student activists and their parents. These parents tend to be highly educated; employed in the professions, education, social service, public service, or the arts; intellectual; and humanist. Thus, the argument runs, students with such backgrounds and values come into conflict with a society organized along quite other lines. Once again we are faced with an approach that contributes to our understanding but does not suffice to explain important aspects of the student movement. Its basic failure lies in its inability to explain where the values in question come from, or, to rephrase it, why such a nonconforming generation of students has come into being at this particular time.

Flacks' explanation, that the growth of a humanistic sector of the middle class in the previous generation created a "liberated" sector within this generation's students, is of considerable value in explaining the initial base of the student movement. However, it does
not explain how the movement has been able to spread far beyond this base. Thus, Kahn found in a mail questionnaire survey of students in 1966, 19 percent of those responding had "participated in a social protest demonstration or march" or "violated the law in a deliberate act of civil disobedience on behalf of a social cause," and that approximately 25 percent of these activists had blue-collar fathers, that almost half of them had white-collar, executive or managerial fathers, and only slightly more than a quarter had professional fathers.4 Thus, it is clear that even as early as 1966 a large proportion of student movement participants were from backgrounds other than the humanistic sector of the middle class. Dunlap (1970:178) carries this forward in time in a study of "core" activists at the University of Oregon in Spring, 1969, and reports that only 22 percent of their fathers were professionals, and "[w]hen coded by occupational prestige the fathers of the SDS sample are distributed almost identically to the fathers of the cross-section [of University of Oregon students]." He also finds that 32 percent of the fathers of the SDS sample are self-employed. Thus, it would seem that by 1969 not even the organizing cadre of the student movement are the children of the "humanistic" middle class.

Finally, the sheer size of the student movement makes it clear that the movement has grown beyond this relatively small group of students. A Gallup Poll (1969) of 1,030 students in Spring, 1969, showed that 28 percent of the students had taken part in a demonstration. Furthermore, parents' income made very little difference in whether or not students had demonstrated; 32 percent of those with $15,000 and over had done so, as compared with 27 percent for the $10,000-15,000 category, 31 percent for the $7,000-10,000 category, and 30 percent for the "under $7,000" category. Even more convincing is the vast size of the Spring, 1970, demonstrations against the Cambodia invasion and the killing of students at Kent State and Jackson State. Lipset (1971: 89-94) reports that about half the college population of the United States took part in these demonstrations, and that parents' income and occupation was not an important differentiating factor.

Thus, Flacks' explanation—and others based on the social composition of the student movement in its earlier stages—is useful only as an explanation of the initial base of the movement.5 Beyond this, in trying to explain the existence of a wider student base, we are left with the almost tautological explanation that student unrest exists because student values are not congruent with the society as it exists.

We must turn, then, to explanations that look to the general social situation of students as a source of discontent.

**Students and the Alienation of Intellectual Labor**

The most obvious fact about students' relationships to society is that they are being trained to fill various roles after graduation, and that most

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4 Kahn (1969), Tables 1 and 2. The percentages for fathers' occupations are only approximations, since Kahn gave only one percent activist of those with fathers in a given occupational group; and I computed the percent of the activists whose fathers were in each group.

5 Flacks' recent writings agree with this. See Flacks and Mankoff, 1971; Flacks, 1971.
students are being prepared for jobs as "intellectual laborers." The average student is in training for a job as a teacher, a lawyer, a nurse, a social worker, an engineer, a technician, or in some other paid position in which part of the job requires the use of knowledge (or social "graces") learned in school, as opposed to being in school as preparation for a life in top management, as a self-employed businessman, or as a housewife who never is employed. It is to changes in the nature of work as an intellectual laborer that one should then look as a possible source of student unrest.

Two commonplace findings of social science shed further light on this. First, since the economic and political need for coordination and innovation has been growing larger as American society becomes more complex and more technological, the role of intellectual labor in the society has been increasing. As a consequence, so has the enrollment in colleges and universities. Thus, the number of professional and technical workers in the United States increased from 4.5 million in 1950 to 11.1 million in 1970 (an increase from 7.6 percent of total employment to 14.1 percent) and the number of all white-collar workers from 22.4 million to 38.0 million (an increase from 37.6 percent of total employment to 48.3 percent) (Statistical Abstract 1970:222). The nature of work as an intellectual laborer has been changing rapidly. It is increasingly conducted by groups rather than by individuals, and under bureaucratic planning rather than at the intellectual laborer's discretion. The intellectual laborer is then faced by a situation in which his or her work is less and less a product of individual initiative and creativity, and more and more a set of tasks defined by others in pursuit of others' goals.

Let us look at the change in the nature of intellectual labor more closely. What appears to be happening is a process in which intellectual labor is increasingly becoming alienated labor in the Marxist sense. That is, intellectual laborers decreasingly control the nature of their work, the uses to which it is put, and the scheduling and conditions under which it is performed. Furthermore, their labor and the products, thereof, increasingly are valued in commodity terms, i.e., their prices are set by impersonal market mechanisms rather than in more personal ways. The market criteria of value often force the intellectual laborer to emphasize quantity over quality, transforming intellectual work from artisanry in which its products involve creativity and care to mass production in which production is on an assembly-line or batch basis. And to the extent that intellectual labor is becoming a large scale operation that requires heavy capital investment (whether in computers, classrooms, laboratories, or other necessary items), the intellectual laborer is personally unable to own the facilities or equipment needed for her or his work and thus is forced to work at alienated labor in which work is a commodity in all the above ways.

The analysis just presented may seem very abstract. Two examples may help to clarify it. First, consider the job of professor. Since research is the chief basis of evaluation, and since the various disciplines have become mass nationwide markets in which it is impossible for one's work to become known except through the journals in the field, one's market value (and hence job security, salary, and pos-
sibility or getting a new job) are based on the number of articles published in the "leading" journals. Thus, there is set up a need to produce such articles—with several consequences:

a. Research becomes less and less a matter of individual creativity and one's own desire to contribute to knowledge or art, and more and more a matter of adding to one's commodity value by getting a publication.
b. The professor is induced to do research in those areas in which granting agencies are willing to provide funding. This is in part a consequence of the fact that research is becoming a rationalized and expensive part of the productive and governmental processes of society.
c. Similarly, the professor finds it prudent to do research in areas in which the leading journals are interested, using methods of research of which they approve. This means that the nature of a professor's research work is to some extent taken out of his or her hands and put into those of these journals.
d. Since quantity and rate are increasingly important, research becomes less a matter of thinking things through and more a matter of "getting the article out."

Turning to the teaching side of professordom, similar elements of alienation of labor are also increasing. The expansion of class size forces professors more and more towards assembly-line lecturing and grading, in which personal contact with students is minimized and "the lecture" becomes a product to be passed on to listening students.8 Control over conditions and scheduling of work is also in other hands; thus, semesters are changed to quarters which are then changed into trimesters, and professors' objections are ignored.

With the decline of the "free intelligentsia" as a source of alternative employment (which is based on the economic limits of the market for academic or semi-academic articles), the professor is pretty much forced into the alienated labor just described. If he or she leaves the faculty, about the only employment available which uses his or her special abilities is in a research firm or government agency which uses criteria of evaluation similar to those used by large colleges and universities, and offers similar working conditions (except there are no students).

Thus, we see that under the pressures to mass-produce intellectual laborers and to turn out research for the rest of the economy, the work that professors do is more and more becoming alienated labor in which the professor and his or her work is a commodity and in which control over the conditions, scheduling, goals, uses, and form of this labor is in the hands of market forces and/or distant bureaucracies.

As a second example, let us briefly consider the work of an electronics engineer. To an increasing extent, electronics engineers are employed in military more than doubled, whereas the number of faculty members has increased by approximately 55 percent. The student-faculty ratio has increased from 9.5 in 1958 to 13.5 in 1969 (which is higher than the 12.8 in 1900). Thus, it appears that teaching has in general become less personal and more massive. It should, however, be noted that there are undoubtedly many schools where this particular aspect of the alienation of professors' labor has not occurred.

8 See Machlup (1962:80-81), who points out that the student-faculty ratio in institutions of higher education decreased from 1900 to 1950, and then remained at about the same level during the 1950's. He argues that "lower student-faculty ratio, relative to earlier years, is probably less a result of smaller than of fewer classes per teacher, in accordance with the increased emphasis on research which has accompanied the growth of graduate education." Since he wrote this, the number of students has
(or other) research, development, or production. Their jobs involve alienated labor, in that:

a. Their tasks are set within ever narrower limits by their supervisors. Each project their firm is involved in requires a great deal of coordination of all those who work on it, and this means that the engineer must complete each job on schedule, or the timetable for the project will be disrupted. Furthermore, the product of this work must be such as to fit the assumptions on which other tasks were assigned.
b. The uses to which an electronics engineer's work is put are not under his or her control. There are instances, e.g., the Manhattan Project during World War II, in which engineers are not even told what the project is all about until it is over. Furthermore, given the budget priorities of the 1960's at least, many of them are unable to find employment on the kinds of projects on which they would like to work. Thus, in one case I know, a man had to work in defense electronics even though he could contribute a great deal in medical electronics.
c. As a consequence of the points already mentioned, the electronics engineer has little control over the conditions of work or the form it takes.
d. Thus, the engineer is forced to relate to work more as a chore to be done than as personal fulfillment. His or her labor is a commodity sold to the employer rather than an element of his or her own creative power and initiative.
e. Finally, as recent events have made painfully clear, changes in the size and allocation of Federal research budgets can destroy engineers' jobs on a massive scale. This, of course, is the same kind of insecurity that has always been true of blue-collar work.

How does this analysis of changes in the nature of intellectual labor over the last 30 years help us to understand the student movement? Although very few students think of it in terms similar to those in this article, a great many students are aware of the change in the nature of intellectual labor. This expresses itself in many ways. The process of finding a career takes up a lot of time and worry, and can be very frustrating as one possible line of work after another is tried out and rejected. Increasingly, students have turned away from the business world as a source of employment (and law students from corporation law to more social service oriented law) and toward social service careers such as teaching, social welfare, and the Peace Corps, which they hope will be less alienating; but since the alienation of intellectual work includes even these jobs, they sour on these as well. It should be noted here that, as it has developed, the student movement has discovered that both businesses and social service institutions are involved in racism, male supremacy, imperialism, and militarism. This has led to even greater rejection of such work, as it has become clearer that the goals of the intellectual laborer are not those of one's employer, and that the increasing lack of control over one's work means that attempting to put your own goals into practice instead of those of your employer is futile (and becoming more so as time goes on).

Thus, the student comes to see no place for himself (or herself) in the society. This leads to dropping out (whether as the Beats of the 50s or psychedelics of the 60s, or Jesus People after the defeat of activism) and attempting to set up "new and meaning-

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7 The economic recession of the early 1970's has, of course, intensified this, since many students have been faced with a prospect of finding no employment at all available when they graduate. This has seemed to increase their discontent but deter activism, since they have not wanted to jeopardize their employability by becoming known as radicals.
ful life styles."8 For those who do not drop out, or who do so but remain close to a campus, it produces a willingness to take part in activist movements. Thus, on many campuses action has been directed at expelling those parts of a school that are most alien to student's goals (as they have developed politically, e.g., war research and whites-only admissions) and thus symbolize students' general lack of power over their own lives both as students and afterwards. In addition, many of America's traditional sanctions against radical political behavior have lost their impact, since the fear of being expelled from school or of being blacklisted from employment is greatly minimized for a person who sees very little value in the employment for which school is training her (or him).

A third way in which the alienation of intellectual labor moves students into political activism deserves closer study. To the extent that students perceive the way in which these changes in the nature of intellectual labor will affect their own lives, they are less willing to put up with unpleasant conditions or arbitrary authority while in school to secure such work. Yet the very fact that intellectual labor has become a major sector of the economy (and of government) means that the conditions students face in school have become more unpleasant. More concretely, the increased enrollment in colleges and universities results in large impersonal classes, in mass grading techniques, and in student ghettoization. Attempts to be creative run afoul of the impersonal drive to process batches of students as quickly as possible. As part of this, faculty and administrators are forced to become more arbitrary in their behavior by the increasing demands on their time which stem both from the larger number of students and from the research-oriented side of their jobs; i.e., the alienated nature of professors' work increases the burdens on students too. Following Moore's (1966:468-74) analysis of the conditions under which peasant movements break out, we can view this as an increase in exploitation (since greater sacrifices at school are being rewarded with less return in the form of creative work than was previously the case) that results in students being more willing to take action to change the society.

Finally, there is an important subjective impact of these changes in college life on students. The grading system and the impersonal nature of education carry a message about the nature of intellectual jobs. It is clear to them that grades are the mechanism by which students are given their commodity value for these job markets; and it is clear that they are being trained for routinized and bureaucrati- zed labor on relatively narrow projects. Thus, the very mechanisms necessitated by the change to an economy in which intellectual labor is used on a mass scale serve both as ways in which students are alienated from their studies and as ways in which students become aware of the fate awaiting them after graduation.

The argument just given could be rephrased in terms used earlier. Changes in society have led to the growth of multiversities, which both conveys to students the alienated na-

8 During the post-1970 decline in the student movement, dropping out has in many cases taken the form of seeking one's livelihood in ways that are not alienated labor, such as hip craftsmanship or rural communes.
ture of their future career opportunities and provides many immediate grievances that lead to still more student discontent. Thus, we can see why it has been found that the characteristics of a multiversity encourage student activism, as well as why many schools that are very unlike multiversities nonetheless have vigorous student movements. The basic sources of the discontent exist at all these schools, but at multiversities they are aggravated and illuminated and are thus more likely to produce a movement.

An explanation in terms of the alienation of intellectual labor allows us to explain a number of other facts about the student movement as well. For example, it helps in understanding Flacks' (1970) findings. He summarizes a number of studies that indicate in the earlier stages of the student movement, the parents of activists tended to be intellectual laborers and tended not to be businessmen, blue-collar workers, or white-collar workers other than intellectual laborers (p. 346); that activists as well as a large number of apolitical students have great difficulty in deciding on a career or vocation because they find the available choices unsatisfactory (p. 349); and that the revolt with these available adult roles and careers predates movement involvement for many students (p. 349). It is apparent that these findings in no way contradict, and in fact support, the contention that changes in the nature of intellectual labor underlie the student revolt. Thus, these changes help to produce the revulsion against available career choices to which Flacks points. The finding that in the earlier stages of the movement activists tended disproportionately to be intellectual laborers' children can be explained as follows. It is to be expected that the intellectual laborers of the previous generation, who had children in the period before the proletarianization of intellectual labor was well established, had values appropriate to such labor. Thus, they passed on to their children values and expectations such as those Flacks (1970:346-48) describes: intellectualism, the desires to be socially useful and creative, independence, and autonomy. These children then found that their values, which were fairly well suited to the intellectual labor of their parents' generation, did not correspond to the career opportunities of the America in which they live. That they and their friends became activists earlier and in greater proportions than others in their age group is thus not surprising.

In this regard, two findings are worth noting. As mentioned earlier, Dunlap (1970b:178) found that 32 percent of his SDS sample had self-employed fathers. He also found a similarly high proportion of self-employed fathers among members of a very conservative student organization. Thus, it would appear that one could make the argument that self-employed parents have passed on values of autonomy and independence, and that the conflict between these values and the alienation of intellectual labor has led their children into political activism. It is also worthwhile to compare these arguments and findings with a picture of freshman students who are the children of blue-collar parents.

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9 Flacks explains this in terms of incompatibility between students' ideals and the political and social functions of these jobs. I do not disagree with him on this, but point to the nature of the work involved in intellectual labor as both prior to and more basic than this moral incompatibility.
These students come to college (according to a 1958 study, Ellis and Lane, 1966) with expectations about their future careers as follows: They set lower limits on the occupational goals they consider acceptable had not come to value personal autonomy in the work situation (as with a job that would leave them 'relatively free of supervision by others' and give them a 'chance to exercise leadership') were less likely to contemplate those careers which are the mainstay of the upper and upper-middle classes (such as careers in law, medicine, or architecture).

It thus seems reasonable that students from blue-collar families have been slow to join the student movement. Their expectations seem to be more in line with the reality of increasingly alienated intellectual labor; thus they do not encounter the surprise and disappointment of finding their hopes to be false. On the other hand, the limits of socialization theories of social movements are emphasized by the fact that students from blue-collar families have in fact taken considerable part in the student movement. That is, in the face of changing objective factors, socialization can retard involvement in attempts to improve things; but given enough time, this barrier wears thin.

**Some Counter-Arguments Rebutted**

One could argue that if student un-

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10 There are other reasons as well why they have been less forward in joining the movement. They are more likely than students from higher status families to fear flunking out, and thus less likely to want to spend time on politics. They are more likely to fear expulsion, since they do not have a parental "cushion" of resources and contacts to fall back upon. Finally, they are less likely to find the upper middle-class tone of many student movement organizations a comfortable one than are students from upper middle-class families.

rest is based on the alienation of intellectual labor, then one would expect a large degree of activism among students in engineering and related fields; and that the fact that activism among such students is quite low then casts doubt on the theory. In reply, it should be noted that there is every reason to suspect that one of the first steps in becoming an activist is to switch one's major out of the hard sciences and into more socially oriented fields of study. This then results in a relatively low proportion of activists in engineering and related fields of study. I have no hard data on this, but it is a commonplace that there is a very high rate of such switches of major. In addition, many individual cases come immediately to mind, e.g., Mario Savio of the Free Speech Movement, and Todd Gitlin, President of SDS in 1963-64. (Carl Oglesby, who became President of SDS in 1965, had dropped out of scientific employment to become an activist.)

It could also be argued that if intellectual labor is becoming alienated, one would expect the intellectual laborers themselves to be making some response, and probably a much more visible one than are students who are not yet subjected to the reality of alienated work. My response to this is several-fold. First, it is worth recalling the role of the multiversity in forming students about alienated labor by giving them a taste of it and by making it clear that they will be judged in commodity terms on the job market. Second, one would in fact expect that students, who are in a stage of their lives when they are expected to look carefully at their available opportunities, evaluate them and choose one, would be very sensitive to what they are getting into. Third, students are much more able to take action
than are intellectual laborers. They have far fewer commitments, such as professional commitment implicit in having spent a large number of years preparing for and working in a given field. They also have fewer responsibilities, such as those to one's spouse and children. Lastly, it should be noted that intellectual laborers are not so quiescent as the above argument seems to imply. Unionization movements have occurred in a number of such occupations (e.g., teachers and social workers); and women who are intellectual laborers have been very active in the women's liberation movement.

It could also be asked, how do college students know about the alienation of intellectual labor? There are several ways in which they can learn—and it is part of the role of the student to seek out information about potential careers and kinds of careers, since it is part of the role to choose a field of work. First, among those with parents and/or friends' parents in such occupations, they observe the nature of these fields of work as reflected in their practitioners' lives. Second, they talk with slightly older friends who have graduated and gotten jobs. Third, they read literature and see movies that describe what work and life are like in modern America; even the exaggerations in these views of life can serve to alert the student about what to look out for. Fourth, they see the actions taken by some sectors of intellectual laborers, such as unionization or high job turnover, as reflecting unsatisfactory work lives. Finally, as I have pointed out several times here, students infer the nature of what they are being prepared for from the nature of the process of preparation; and thus the alienation of life and learning in the multiversity (or even in the college) informs them of the alienation of their future work.

It could also be argued that, if this analysis is correct, one would expect to see the goals of the protests focused explicitly on changing the nature of intellectual labor. My reply to this is simply that I doubt the logic of the argument. That is, the alienation of future work does not have to be on the banner of the movement to be a real force behind the unrest. Thus, it can be a source of general discontent without being a conscious element in the protest by being seen or felt (however vaguely) as something wrong with the society, even though it is not seen as something susceptible to political solution. Furthermore, the fact that society does not offer interesting and creative roles for future work can be a powerful factor in decreasing the effectiveness of threatened penalties and in generally delegitimating the entire society in students' eyes, without itself ever having to become a major pole of conflict. Finally, if one looks closely at the rhetoric of the movement, one finds constant references to this source of discontent; thus, e.g., Mario Savio's statement of 1964:

And (students) find at one point or other that for them to become part of society, to become lawyers, ministers, businessmen, people in government, that very often they must compromise those principles which were most dear to them. They must suppress the most creative impulses that they have; this is a prior condition for being part of the system. . . .

It is a bleak scene, but it is all a lot of us have to look forward to. Society provides no challenge. American society in the standard conception it has of itself is simply no longer exciting. The most exciting things going on in America today are movements to change America. America is becoming ever more the Utopia of sterilized, automated contentment. The 'futures' and 'careers' for which American students now prepare
are for the most part intellectual and moral wastelands. This chrome-plated consumers' paradise would have us grow up to be well-behaved children. But an important minority of men and women coming to the front today have shown that they will die rather than be standardized, replaceable and irrelevant.

Or, to quote the Port Huron Statement of Students for a Democratic Society:

... Although our own technology is destroying old and creating new forms of social organization, men still tolerate meaningless work and idleness.

The economic sphere would have as its basis the principles that work should involve incentives worthier than money or survival. It should be educative, not sterilizing; creative, not mechanical; self-directed, not manipulated, encouraging independence, a respect for others, a sense of dignity and willingness to accept social responsibility, since it is this experience that has crucial influence on habits, perceptions and individual ethics; that the economic experience is so personally decisive that the individual must share in its full determination. . . . . . .

(1964:3 and 8)

One could also object to the analysis presented here as too bound up with American society. After all, the student movement is in many ways an international one. For example, there are student movements in France, Britain, India, Mexico, Japan, and South Africa. This raises the question of whether the analysis presented here can be extended to these other countries; and if not does this invalidate it as an explanation?

The logic of the argument in this paper is that student movements are likely to develop where intellectual labor is becoming alienated labor. Analyses of the movements in France and Britain indicate that this may well be the case in those countries, though no work bearing directly on this point has come to my attention (Jones, 1969: 25-26; Seale and McConville, 1968: 27-31). It is probable that similar patterns hold true in other heavily industrialized countries, such as Japan and West Germany, since many of the changes in their economies are very similar to those in the United States economy. As to student movements in countries such as Mexico and India, they may well have causes different from those we have just considered. College graduates go on to occupy relatively elite administrative positions in these countries (rather than being part of a massive force of intellectual laborers), except in those countries where many of them remain unemployed or underemployed for much of their lives. (It should be added that even in Mexico this is decreasing as students increasingly graduate into jobs that are heavily bureaucratized; indeed, this is one of the themes of their student activists.) There is no reason to believe, then, that student activism in such a context is the product of the same causes as in advanced capitalist societies, even though bonds of comradeship and emulation of each other's actions may well occur among activists from these different countries.

Implications of This Analysis

Let us now turn to some of the implications of this analysis for the theory of social movements and social change. First, it seems to provide additional evidence in favor of Moore's (1966:505) speculation that "the well-springs of freedom lie not only where Marx saw them, in the aspirations of classes about to take power, but perhaps even more in the dying wail of a class over whom the wave of progress is about to roll." Thus, new ideas of freedom and democracy seem to have
been generated in the student movement, which can be viewed both as the "dying wail" of the petty bourgeoisie (and particularly of its fee professions sector) and as the first notes of struggle by the newly proletarianized intellectual laborers.

This analysis also suggests an important modification of Dahrendorf's (1959:182-89) model of the preconditions for organization. Specifically, his model of the leadership and the base needs widening. Given the circumstances of the early 60s, the student movement might never have spread to more than a very few non-black campuses had the students whom Flacks identifies not existed. This suggests that the presence of what I will call an "initial constituency" may be a necessity for the spread of many social movements. An "initial constituency" can then be defined as a portion of some "potential mass constituency" which, for some structural reason, is particularly prone to take up the call (by an initial leadership) for the "potential mass constituency" to try to change its condition or remake the entire society. There are many examples of such initial constituencies in history. Thus, it is well known that skilled workers were the initial base for socialist ideas in much of Europe, which later spread to the mass base of much of the working class. Similarly, the Jews of the Roman Empire, and "fellow-traveling" Gentiles, provided an initial base for the spread of Christianity (Neill, 1964:27-28).

It should, of course, be noted that this can in some circumstances become a "concentric rings" model. Thus, if the American student movement should spread its struggles to the mass of alienated intellectual labor, or to the even larger ranks of the working class as a whole, we would have three rings: the student children of the "humanist sector of the middle class," students in general, and intellectual labor or the working class. Nor is the requirement that there be a specially fertile initial constituency simply an empty formalism. The absence of such a group can prevent a movement from ever getting started; the peculiarities of such a group can shape its initial course and perhaps steer it into a dead end. Thus, the intellectualism of the initial constituency of the student movement undoubtedly retarded its spread to the mass base, and the upper-middle class nature of the initial constituency contributed to its view of industrial workers as hopelessly conservative.

Another implication of this analysis relates to the general nature of the American crisis of the past decade. This crisis stems from a number of factors, but one of the chief among them is the continued development of American capitalism toward massive organizations, and the associated decline of the independent professional and of small business. This paper argues that this has been a major cause of the rise of a mass student movement which has developed in very radical directions. As I have shown elsewhere, it is also a major cause of the rise of the Black Power theme in the black peoples' movement (Friedman, 1970; Friedman, 1972a); and O'Connor (1970) argues that the general fiscal crisis of the many levels of government in the United States has related origins.

Let us finally look at events since the Cambodia crisis to see the implications of this analysis for the student movement. First, the very success of the crisis in mobilizing students brought the mass of discontented stu-
students face-to-face with their own lack of power. It became quite evident that they did not have the power to bring about the changes they wanted. This, together with the lack of any working class (or other) movement for change with the political potential of the recent workers' movements in France or Italy, has led to a period of confusion and despair (Friedman, 1972b). One offshoot of this has been the Jesus Movement, which is in many ways similar to the millennial movements analyzed by Lanternari (1963), Worsley (1968), and others (although more post-political than prepolitical). The Jesus Movement is in many ways testimony to the strength and depth of the forces that underlie student discontent (Friedman and Pierce, 1972). For the future, we should probably expect a fading away of the activism of the movement, except that during periods when other social movements are active, students will probably attempt to solve their discontents by allying with or helping in these other movements. Thus, if the United States is beginning a period of labor activism (as seems likely), we can anticipate growing and ultimately large scale student support for working-class radicalism.

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