Forrester Blanchard Washington and His Advocacy for African Americans in the New Deal

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Forrester Blanchard Washington (1887–1963) was an African American social work pioneer recruited to the first New Deal administration of Franklin Delano Roosevelt as director of Negro Work in the Federal Emergency Relief Administration. This role gave Washington a platform from which to object strenuously to the development of social policies that were predisposing African Americans to chronic dependence on welfare programs instead of creating equal opportunities for employment. Washington’s policy analysis and recommendations represent social work’s advocacy for equal employment opportunity long before the related civil rights legislation in the 1960s. An analysis is offered to explain Washington’s decision to abort his federal career when the political agenda of the Roosevelt administration began to conflict with his values and professional goals. His actions are exemplary of resignation in protest—an aspect of advocacy more often discussed than used. This article is based on Washington’s writings and materials found in the National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, Maryland.

KEY WORDS: advocacy; African Americans; employment; social policy; social work

For six months in 1934, before the enactment of the Social Security Act, Forrester Blanchard Washington agitated for social change as director of Negro Work in the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA) and used his reputation and accomplishments as a social work leader to create broad awareness of the negative consequences of the New Deal’s social welfare policy for African Americans (Kirby, 1980). His advocacy is significant because his efforts represent social work’s early attention to the need for work opportunities for African American people. Washington sought to change policies that placed African Americans on public assistance programs and that “reinforced the links of dependence and subordination” between them and elite white people (Lieberman, 2005, p. 65). Washington’s efforts were important to the evolution of social work in the United States because he advocated for a vulnerable African American population at a time when the profession, mirroring the broader society, generally offered little validation for their contributions to the cultural, social, and economic development of the country. Some leading white settlement house leaders and their associates, including Jane Addams, Louise de Koven, Frances Kellor, and John Daniels, blamed the social and economic problems of African Americans “on what they considered [to be] the weakness of the black family, the degradation of the black individual psyche and the annihilation of culture, all resulting from the system of slavery” (Lasch–Quinn, 1993, p. 13). The role of government and public policy in creating these problems was secondarily considered. The perspectives held by these settlement house movement leaders had long-term consequences in that they dominated the thinking of reformers who came after them (Lasch–Quinn). They helped create the social work climate in which Washington worked for equal employment for African Americans.

WASHINGTON’S BACKGROUND

Washington was born in 1887 in Salem, Massachusetts, where his New England location somewhat protected him during his formative years from the open racism that constrained the lives of his southern African American peers. Washington’s family raised him in this comparatively tolerant environment and was able to provide him with the opportunity for a rich education, one that was exceptional for African Americans of that era (Barrow, 2002). Washington graduated from Tufts College (now University) in 1909, completing a classical curriculum (Tufts...
University, 1950). He pursued a post-baccalaureate degree in economics at Harvard University from 1912 to 1914 (Harvard University Archives, 2000) and graduated from Columbia University with a master's degree in social economy in 1917 (Columbia University, 1925). Washington also trained at the New York School of Social Work, with support from a National Urban League (NUL) fellowship.

In the ensuing years, Washington held a number of important leadership positions. He served as the first director of the Detroit Urban League, where he assisted African American migrants in gaining employment. He became director of an NUL affiliate in Philadelphia in 1923 (Barrow, 2002), and three years later he became the director and an educator at the Atlanta School of Social Work (Carlton-LaNey, 1999). It was from this position that Washington was recruited to become director of Negro Work in FERA in February 1934 (Barrow).

Washington was always concerned with the broader social, political, and economic needs of African Americans. In both the North and the South, he took an early stand on the importance of African American employment and self-help because he believed that personal integrity emanated from employment and self-sufficiency (Barrow, 2002). In the 1920s he conducted a newspaper crusade against housing conditions and landlord exploitation in Philadelphia that were contributing to high infant mortality rates and communicable disease in African American communities (Washington, 1925). When he became president of the Atlanta chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) in 1936, Washington began to use cases brought to the NAACP to challenge and publicize the inequities faced by the entire African American community. In the past, the focus had been on only individual circumstances. Moving away from the politics of conciliation and accommodation, in Atlanta Washington helped mobilize interest groups to exert political pressure, conducted voter registration drives to develop an electoral constituency, and used black-owned newspapers to get the word out about issues pertinent to the African American community (Ferguson, 2002).

THE GREAT DEPRESSION, THE NEW DEAL, AND AFRICAN AMERICANS
The Great Depression called for bold new action to alleviate the widespread suffering resulting from the collapse of the economy in 1929 and a massive drought from Virginia to Arkansas. Jobs had been lost, not only because of the economic downturn, but also because new farming technologies had displaced thousands of workers (Day, 2006). When the Hoover administration failed to find remedies to the nation's problems, Franklin Delano Roosevelt was elected president in 1932 with the hope that he could help Americans climb out of crisis. In the first 100 days of his administration, Congress passed a great deal of legislation to address unemployment, "to promote economic recovery and [to] strengthen government regulation of the economy" (American Social History Project, 1992, p. 347).

One piece of legislation enacted in May 1933 was the Federal Emergency Relief Act, which established FERA. Roosevelt appointed social worker Harry Hopkins to administer the agency, which provided work relief and direct relief. FERA policy represented an attempt to make a major change in social norms in that it "prohibited discrimination because of race, religion, color [or] non-citizenship" (American Social History Project, 1992, p. 348). However, although written FERA policy was nondiscriminatory, states and local agencies with responsibility to implement policy did not change their prevailing practice of giving preferential treatment to white people (American Social History Project). For example, Georgia Governor Eugene Talmadge "flatly refused to follow [federal] government guidelines on equal relief pay" for benefits for African Americans and white Americans (Sitkoff, 1978, p. 49). He was determined that there would be "no Negroes pushing wheelbarrows and boys driving trucks getting forty cents an hour when the good white men and white women, working on the fields alongside [the] roads [could] hardly earn forty cents a day" (p. 49). In Atlanta the average monthly relief check was $32.66 for whites and $19. 29 for African Americans (Sitkoff, 1978).

President Roosevelt gave Hopkins unlimited authority to disburse $500 million in grants for direct relief. Over its three-year existence, FERA spent more than $3 billion dollars in relief. Because the law contained "no specific guidelines for relief giving other than means testing," FERA workers dispensed funds with discretion: They could use their own judgments in determining eligibility, grant amounts, and cash benefits (Day, 2006, p. 289). This allowed for many abuses in the administration of locally managed programs that
included denial of opportunities for work as well as direct relief.

The Roosevelt administration had two periods. The first New Deal programs, of which Washington was a part, were conceived to be temporary means to improve the economy by “putting money into the hands of consumers to increase buying power and begin an upward spiral of the economy” (Day, 2006, p. 288). Roosevelt believed his first remedies needed to be “saving farms and homes, reducing farm production, hiring out the unemployed in public works and supporting manufacturers so they would hire the unemployed” (Day, p. 288). The second phase of New Deal programs (which occurred after Washington’s resignation from FERA) were geared toward a social reform agenda marked by the enactment of the Social Security Act and the beginning of the welfare state (Lieberman, 2005). In both periods, African Americans were largely discriminated against.

During the Great Depression, those first to lose their jobs were Hispanic and African American men, followed by African American women whose domestic jobs were given to white women (Day, 2006). By “1932, 56% of African Americans were unemployed and by 1933 nearly 18% of African American family heads were certified for relief” (Day, p. 286). An estimated 2.5 to 3 million African Americans were unemployed in 1933 (Schwartz, 1934). “African Americans generally felt utter distress and pessimism. Added to the denials of freedom and democracy was the specter of starvation” (Franklin & Moss, 2000, p. 420).

African Americans made many appeals to their elected officials for intervention in work discrimination. For example, in a letter to his congressman, Freeman B. Ransom, a lawyer who was the finance and operations manager of the African American-owned Madam C.J.Walker Company, made a fervent appeal for intervention in work discrimination. He reported that in Indiana, on a daily basis African Americans applied by the hundreds for jobs at federal and state unemployment bureaus, only to be told “we have nothing for you” (Ransom, 1935, p.1). All jobs had been given to white workers by white supervisors and mangers who gave preference to their own kind. This pattern and practice occurred all over the United States (Ransom). President Roosevelt and his cabinet officers received hundreds of letters that registered African Americans’ complaints about discrimination in relief offices and portrayed their despair over not being able to obtain work (American Social History Project, 1992).

Despite the dreadful social and economic conditions of the time (for example, discrimination, joblessness, and poverty), some African Americans exercised their right to vote. Their growing political voice in the 1930s contributed to African American appointments in the Roosevelt administration, and a diverse group of African American intellectuals who came to be known as the “Black Cabinet” were selected for advisory positions (Banks, 1996). Washington was recruited to become the director of Negro Work in FERA because of his established record as an educator, his history of service delivery to African Americans, and his political independence (Ferguson, 2002; Kirby, 1980).

By accepting a New Deal position, Washington joined a new African American leadership cohort with whom he would sustain lasting relationships. This cohort included Mary McLeod Bethune, founder of Bethune Cookman College in Florida, and Eugene Kinckle Jones of the NUL (Kirby, 1980). This group also included Robert Weaver, who in 1966 became the first African American secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development; Robert Vann, publisher and editor of the Pittsburgh Courier; and Lawrence Oxley, who championed the development of professional social work in North Carolina (Kirby). These leaders shared Washington’s concern about the consequences of policies for African Americans. Despite limitations in advisory roles, their presence gave African Americans a new degree of hope, because for the first time African Americans had advocates inside the federal government (Kirby).

WASHINGTON’S WORK AT FERA

Washington began his tenure at FERA with a vision of becoming a policymaker who would help institute systemic change. From the beginning he objected to the policies and practices that resulted in bulking Negroes on the direct relief rolls of the FERA “out of proportion to their numbers in the general population” (Washington, 1934c, p.178). In his first meeting of the Interdepartmental Group of Negro Advisors, Washington made it clear that he wanted all African Americans to have an equal chance to obtain jobs created in the New Deal recovery programs.

Washington argued that by removing discriminatory barriers to employment for African Americans,
the federal government would be able to remove many African Americans “from dependence upon any type of relief” and would help “to revive [the African American] instinct for self-reliance” (Washington, 1934c). Moreover, he insisted that African Americans should be considered for all jobs in the federal work programs, not just menial labor, which meant that those jobs aimed at a competent cadre of people with professional training should be made open to African Americans (Washington, 1934b) as well. Washington was also concerned about the conditions of educational institutions and health facilities for African Americans and recommended that improvements be made in those institutions because positive benefits would accrue for all citizens (Washington, 1934d). A social welfare infrastructure was needed, especially in the South, to address issues of health and education for all of its citizens (Brueggemann, 2002). Washington was very familiar with the need for African American education, and earlier experiences had made him keenly aware of the public health consequences for all citizens of inadequate health care and untreated communicable diseases, which were major problems in African American communities (Washington, 1925).

Washington’s Assessment of African American Problems during the Depression

In a 1934 speech to the National Conference of Social Work, delivered while Washington was still employed at FERA, Washington (1934c) identified numerous groups playing a role in developing welfare dependencies by the denial of employment opportunities to African Americans and analyzed how the process was occurring. Washington likely highlighted these groups because he understood the effects that environmental conditions could have on individuals and wanted to convey this important message to his audience. The person-in-environment construct permeates Washington’s writings as he described how African Americans faced joblessness at every turn and racial discrimination in every aspect of their lives. Many African Americans lived in fear because of oppression and terrorism perpetrated against them in that era. Washington had a keen understanding of how environmental barriers were being put into place.

Local Government and Organized Labor. Washington (1934c) highlighted how local white legislators were enacting laws that restricted “the use of Negro labor” in such cities as Tulsa, Oklahoma, and West Palm Beach, Florida. Organized labor groups “contributed to the problem by insisting directly and indirectly that only union members [should] be employed under the recovery program” (Washington, p. 179) and then denying African Americans membership in these unions.

Washington (1934c) noted how inequitable local administration of the federal government’s recovery programs, particularly in the rural South, also forced African Americans onto relief rolls. For example, assistance policies designed to provide loans that would have enabled African Americans to remain independent were frequently denied to African Americans. Both white and African American sharecroppers were exploited by landlords. However, landlords “had less to fear from [African Americas] and from public sentiment” regarding African American treatment (Washington, p. 181). Disadvantaged white people could vote, but African Americans in the South were disenfranchised by poll taxes and intimidation. As Washington asserted, “A voteless people cannot bring much pressure to bear and conversely are not to be feared” (p. 182).

Employers. Washington drew attention to southern plantation owners who deliberately placed “Negroes on relief during the layoff season when the plowing and chipping and cotton picking were over” (Washington, 1934c, p. 178). Manufacturers in the North and the South also forced African Americans onto relief rolls by upholding color bans, and they generally gave preferential treatment to white workers. The lax and biased way in which relief policies were implemented resulted in the U.S. government becoming a “subsidizer of southern, northern and rural and urban employers of Negro labor” during seasonal layoffs (Washington, 1934c, p. 178). Washington’s office received hundreds of letters during his tenure in which African Americans complained about discrimination and appealed for assistance in getting work (Washington, 1934a).

Organized Terror. Washington (1934c) also raised awareness that mobs were responsible for organizing public intimidation of African Americans and the employers who hired them, and he noted that the government did nothing to intervene. One such example was night parades conducted in Atlanta, Georgia, by an organization called the Black Shirts, in which members moved about the city carrying signs such as “Employ white men and let Niggers go,” “Thousands of white families are starving to death. What is the reason?” and “Send Niggers back
to the farms” (Washington, 1934c pp. 178–179). Because white men and women were out of work, many white people, especially those in the South, opposed African Americans’ employment and supported this overtly racist climate.

All of these practices and conditions—fear, pressure from the public on employers to avoid hiring African American workers, unfair local administration of work programs, and the unwillingness of employers to engage African Americans if their pay had to be equal to white workers’ compensation—created barriers to employment for African Americans during the Depression and ultimately led to African Americans being placed disproportionately onto relief rolls.

The large numbers of African Americans using relief funding began to affect the social workers assigned to help them. Some employees of various local relief administrations became “emotional and jittery on the subject and in their exasperation . . . [began] to blame the African Americans themselves for their presence in large numbers on relief rolls” (Washington, 1934c, p. 184). Washington (1934c) observed this phenomenon and noted that social workers in the relief agencies were becoming blind to “the underlying factors that were forcing masses onto relief” (p. 185). Some even responded by denying aid to the deserving and needy on the basis that the “great mass of African Americans [were] chiselers” (p. 185).

**Washington’s Advocacy and a Nonresponsive Administration**

Washington tried to persuade Roosevelt’s administration that the timing was right to fully address the challenges faced by African Americans, in a manner that went beyond offering African Americans only direct relief or common labor. Furthermore, he argued that the only substantive remedy to the large number of complaints coming to his office lay in the intelligent and thoughtful integration of African Americans into federal programs as they were being developed (Washington, 1934c). In addition, he detailed the dangerous consequences of large numbers of African Americans being placed on relief, noting, in particular, “the danger of making the Negro as a race, a chronic dependent” and “the danger of developing racial friction through creating resentment about the presence of so many [African Americans on relief]” (Washington, p. 184).

In spite of Washington’s ardent efforts to effect change within the federal government, he was unsuccessful. FERA Director Hopkins was not responsive to Washington’s recommendations, and Washington could not gain the president’s attention. In fact, Roosevelt was never willing to meet with members of his Black Cabinet (Franklin & Moss, 2000); perhaps this was because Roosevelt believed that he could not alienate the southern votes he needed for economic reform measures. Economic recovery was Roosevelt’s primary concern for the nation, and he would not defy Congress on racial matters for fear that it would jeopardize the bills and appropriations needed “to battle the joblessness, privation, and misery [for white Americans]” (Sitkoff, 1978, p. 44).

According to Sitkoff (1978): “The House and Senate did not want a distribution of benefits based on need, but one that would do the most political good and assist [African American people] the least” (pp. 48–49). This was the sentiment of African American leaders, including Ralph Bunche, A. Phillip Randolph, W.E.B. Dubois, and E. Franklin Frazier. They observed that “the government looked on in silence and at times with approval” of inaction where African American people were concerned (Sitkoff, p. 56).

However, this marginalization did not silence Washington. In addition to providing well-documented reports to the FERA director, Washington also used his professional standing within the social work community to get the word out—regarding the effects of FERA relief policies—to empathic groups through public addresses and his written publications, including in the Proceedings of the National Conference of Social Work.

**Washington’s Policy Recommendations**

Washington identified seven problem areas regarding integrating African Americans into federal work programs, made policy recommendations for each, and detailed those recommendations in his speech and a subsequently published article (Washington, 1934c). The first problem Washington identified was an absence of federal leadership. He called for the president or a public official to provide moral leadership and to impress on employers the social injustice and civic blunder made by “throwing Negro Labor on the relief arm of the federal government” (Washington, p. 193) rather than employing African Americans and providing fair compensation.
Washington argued that the federal leadership should direct similar communications to politicians who were encouraging employers to discharge African American workers. Furthermore, he recommended that a “federal curb should be placed upon” certain organizations that had a history of “organizing for the purpose of ousting African Americans from industrial employment” (Washington, p. 193).

Second, Washington called for FERA to integrate African Americans into its work program to preserve the “industrial stability and morale” of the African American labor force, which was being destroyed by job discrimination. Third, Washington wanted FERA to ensure that African Americans had full access to the agency’s self-help programs so that cooperatives and subsidized industries could be developed in African American communities. Washington was fully committed to supporting the strengths and resilience of African Americans. His fourth recommendation was that organized labor be compelled to remove the bans set up against African American membership in craft unions. If unions continued to discriminate, Washington wanted “preferential treatment” withheld by all government agencies expending federal funds (Washington, 1934c, pp. 193–194). The fifth recommendation was to establish full participation of African Americans on all committees “having to do with the distribution of government funds intended for the rehabilitation of victims of the unemployment crises” (Washington, p. 193). Washington knew that African American communities contained individuals capable of guiding social welfare service delivery and used all opportunities to bring this fact to the awareness of social welfare planners.

Sixth, Washington argued that African American social workers should be hired to work in their local communities as a way of ensuring equitable and efficient distribution of government funds. Washington underscored the logic of employing African Americans in their local communities, given that African Americans had greater knowledge of their community characteristics and the social relationships therein, which white workers did not have (Washington, 1934c). Furthermore, as an early proponent of culturally sensitive social work practice, Washington was acutely aware of the need for African American communities to be supported by social workers who had both empathy and skills to assist their people. The final recommendation was the appointment of administrators who would not discriminate against people because of race. Washington asserted that the federal government would need to assume responsibility and centralize authority to make this happen. He knew that his recommendations were not politically acceptable to many states’ rights advocates, but he was not apologetic for “advocating moderate and modernized centralized control” (Washington, p. 194). He perceived that this was “the only way the Negro could be guaranteed a fair chance for rehabilitation, during the Depression and into the future” (Washington, p. 194).

Washington was uncertain, but doubtful, that Hopkins would act on his ideas, so he also gave the final report containing his recommendations to Walter White of the NAACP, who gave it to Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt (Kirby, 1980). It is unknown whether Washington’s recommendations had any effect on the policymaking process of the administration, but by November 1934, President Roosevelt had decided to substitute work for relief. Roosevelt feared that he was creating a permanent class of “relievers” who might never get off the government payroll and told Congress that “the dole” was “a narcotic, a subtle destroyer of the human spirit” and that “the federal government must and shall quit this business of relief” (Leuchtenburg, 1963, p. 122).

WASHINGTON RESIGNS IN PROTEST

Despite his initial optimism when joining FERA, Washington quickly learned that African Americans were not a focus of the Roosevelt administration’s political agenda (Katz, 2000). No matter how thoughtful or accurate his findings were in his role as director of Negro Work, he concluded he would not be heeded by the administration. As a result, Washington resigned and returned to Atlanta to “be of greater service to the needy of [his race]” (Barrow, 2002; Kirby, 1980; Washington, 1934a). Washington’s departure from FERA signified a resignation in protest; this is an example of social advocacy more often discussed than used (Pruger, 1979). Washington did not want to become a party to government policy that he felt would create long-term welfare dependencies and put masses of African Americans in the position of being blamed for a fate over which they had no control. In the end, Washington placed social justice before self-interest, taking the unusual step of terminating what could have been a long federal career, an enviable
opportunity during the Depression, and a prestigious vocation regardless of the time period.

WASHINGTON CONTINUES HIS SOCIAL WELFARE ADVOCACY
Unable to influence the development and implementation of constructive social policies for African Americans while working in the federal government, Washington nonetheless continued to challenge the administration’s policies after his resignation—in his speeches and writings. He acknowledged that FERA was helping many impoverished African Americans, but he underscored that far more intervention from the federal government was needed (and possible). Washington received wide coverage and support in the black press for his ideas and position regarding the Roosevelt administration’s treatment of African Americans (Kirby, 1980). A typical critique of relief policy by Washington was reported in a 1935 Atlanta Daily World article: “Under the FERA the Negro was shown the same place shown to him at the close of the Civil War, which for seventy years sealed his illiteracy and poverty” (Katznelson, 2005, p. 43). The first New Deal in Washington’s opinion had done little to substantively change the poor economic and social conditions of African Americans.

Washington challenged his fellow social workers, too. In particular, he called on social workers to assume greater responsibility for the design of social welfare systems, on behalf of their clients as well as themselves (Washington, 1936). He asserted that if social workers did not assume an active role in social welfare systems’ development, they could only blame themselves if they were dissatisfied with how the programs were shaped by politicians (Washington). In 1936 Washington was one of eight people who participated in a written symposium on “Political Action and Social Work” published in Social Work Today (Washington, 1936). The symposium was a venue for Washington to call for political activism and to give attention to the negative consequences of social workers becoming bureaucratized in the federal government (the 1935 Social Security Act had changed the context for social work practice from primarily private to public auspices). He was concerned about those middle-class social workers who blamed the downtrodden for their own shortcoming. He asserted that there was a need to get rid of that type of social work but to do so would require changes in the economic and political system that created such attitudes (Washington, 1936). Washington was against what he perceived to be an abandonment of a social advocacy role and failure to participate in the political processes that were shaping American social welfare.

WASHINGTON’S SOCIAL WORK LEGACY
Washington was a social work trailblazer who modeled a principled response to social injustice even though he was marginalized as a government advisor and expected to carry only a symbolic role as director of Negro Work at FERA. Washington’s opposition to unfair policies and the social welfare structures of the 1930s is an important part of social welfare history because it increases understanding of the evolution of contemporary welfare policy. It also sounds alerts about the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) (P.L. 104-193), which devolved responsibility to states, once again giving them full authority to implement programs. The PRWORA has benefited some African Americans who have good social supports and networks that facilitate their moving from welfare to work (Crewe, 2003). However, the future consequences of the policy’s requirements remain unknown because “over reliance on reduced [welfare] rolls as an indicator of success fails to capture the experiences of individuals who are differentially impacted” by the PRWORA (Crewe, p. 753). Crewe asserted that “welfare reform has not ended discrimination” because “it is inextricably linked to race” (Crewe, p. 765). Of special concern are the welfare-to-work provisions and those related to education. Although it is too soon to know the full impact of the law, the variations in state implementation that determine how successful a person can become in achieving independence are known (Crewe). There is some concern that people of color are “being punitively sanctioned off the welfare rolls” and “subjected to rampant discrimination in welfare offices and workplaces—work places that are on average, low wage, dead end jobs” that will not free them from poverty because they cannot support “high[er] education and training” (Hurd, 2002, p. 1). These concerns signal the need for vigilance and policy analysis by social workers so that their advocacy can address structural barriers for African Americans as they seek access to the kinds of programs and services that will support their economic independence.

Crewe (2003) believed that “a living wage should be a requirement of welfare reform” (p. 768). But
the federal government has yet to support a living wage policy or the need for comprehensive job retraining programs that can result in economic independence and a sense of personal dignity. The political environment supports wealth accumulation and concentration in a select few. Too often strategies suggested by social welfare policymakers focus on individuals as the target of change, to the exclusion of the broader ecological system.

A study of Washington’s advocacy and contributions helps to correct distortions about the desires of African American people for work opportunities. It can expand social work knowledge about an African American social worker’s efforts to influence welfare policy development during the Great Depression, information that has been subjugated (Hartman, 1992). It also fosters awareness of the multiple political and ideological factors that contribute to policy outcomes, such as African Americans becoming disproportionately dependent on welfare benefits. Absent an understanding of the interactions between politics and ideology, it becomes easier to blame victims without attention to the culpability of others, including federal social welfare policymakers. Like Washington, social workers must strive to become astute at social policy analysis and courageous advocates if they are to meet the social justice commitments of the profession.

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